MANIKANA

A NAVYA-NYAYA MANUAL

EDITED WITH

English translation and notes by

DR. E. R. SREEKRISHNA SARMA

FOREWORD BY

H. H. RAMAVARMA OF COCHIN

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ABBREVIATIONS

BG	*Bhagavadgītā*
BL	*Buddhist Logic*, T. H. Stcherbatsky, Leningrad, 1932
BP	*Bhāṣāpariccheda*, also known as *Kārikāvalī*, with six commentaries, Sri Balamanorama Press, Madras, 1923
D	*Dinakarī*, commentary on M
HIL	*A History of Indian Logic*, Satis Chandra Vidyabhushana, Calcutta, 1921
K	*Kiraṇāvalī*, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, part 1, 1911-12, part 2, 1956
M	*Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, commentary on BP
N	*Nīlakaṇṭhī*, also known as *Tarka-saṃgraha-dīpikā-prakāśa*, commentary on TD
NK	*Nyāyakośa*, Jhalakīkar, Poona, 1938
NNL	*Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic*, D. H. H. Ingalls, Harvard Oriental Series, 1951
NP	*Nṛsiṃha-prakāśikā*, commentary on TD
NSD	*Nyāyasiddhānta-dīpa*, Pandit Series, Banaras
NT	*Nītitattvāvirbhāva*, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 1953
NVTP	*Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-pariśuddhi*, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1911-24
Pā	Pāṇini, *Aṣṭādhyāyī*
PIL	*A Primer of Indian Logic*, Kuppuswamy Sastri, Madras, 1932
RR	*Rāmarudrī* also known as *Taraṅgiṇī*, commentary on D; also on TD
TC	*Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1884-1901
TD	*Tarka-saṃgraha-dīpikā*, commentary on TS
TS	*Tarka-saṃgraha*, with nine commentaries, Sri Balamanorama Press, Madras, 1920
YS	*Yājñavalkya-smṛti*

FOREWORD

A FEW centuries back there arose in the vast firmament of Sanskrit literature a big and brilliant star, the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Śrī Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. It was acclaimed by all erudite men of that time as the clearest and most authoritative exposition of the principles of Nyāya, and to some extent of Vaiśeṣika, philosophy. The intrinsic value of this great work prompted not a few of the intellectual giants of succeeding generations to write elaborate commentaries on it, commentaries on the commentaries and so on. Even great writers on other Darśana-s, such as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Śrī Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, quoted *Tattvacintāmaṇi* to prove the rightness of the standpoint taken up by them. Such was the popularity and reputation of this invaluable work among the Paṇḍita-s that it came to be spoken of, as if in affection, by the shortened name of *Cintāmaṇi* and then merely as *Maṇi*.

For reasons which we need not consider here, students and even teachers began to neglect the study of the whole work and were content to go through a portion of *Anumānakhaṇḍa* with Śrī Raghunātha's commentary, the *Cintāmaṇi Dīdhiti*, with the assistance of *Jāgadīśī* or *Gadādharīya*. Writers then began to bring out abridgments of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* like *Maṇisāra*. To this category belongs *Maṇikaṇa* now being presented to the public by Dr. Sreekrishna Sarma, a well-known

Pandit teaching in the Tirupati University College. Dr. Sarma while working in the famous Adyar Library picked out this short but lucid work and after close study thought it might be of great help to those who take up the study of Nyāya.

Some western scholars of repute have for some time past been evincing a keen interest in the Darśana-s of ancient India. Happily the number of such scholars is increasing. It is naturally difficult for them to begin with such voluminous works as the *Cintāmaṇi*. They are in need of shorter treatises with good English translations. It is to meet this want that Dr. Sarma has undertaken the editing of *Maṇikaṇa* with his own translation. He has also most thoughtfully added notes to expound the principles enunciated in the Sanskrit text wherever the necessity was felt. Dr. Sarma had the good fortune to come in contact during his foreign travels with various scholars interested in the study of Sanskrit literature. He was able to realize what assistance they would require for the understanding of this text. The fact that even to the Indian students who choose Sanskrit for their M.A. degree in our universities, English is more familiar than Sanskrit, might also have influenced Dr. Sarma in deciding to edit the text with a translation and notes. It is true that the *Tarkasaṃgraha*, the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, etc., have been published with translations. But they follow more or less the method adopted by Śrī Praśastapādācārya in his reputed *bhāṣya* on the *Kaṇāda-sūtra-s*. *Maṇikaṇa*, on the contrary, is concerned solely with the principles

discussed in the *Cintāmaṇi* itself and is, therefore, more useful to those who desire knowledge of that great work.

Dr. Sarma had to work under the handicap of having to depend solely on one copy of the manuscript. It need hardly be said that manuscript copies of old works are likely to contain errors of commission and omission. I am glad to say that Dr. Sarma has tried his best to rectify them. But I am afraid there may be a few others which intelligent readers may notice.

All lovers of Sanskrit literature especially of the Śāstra-s will be grateful to Dr. Sarma for bringing out this rare work. I congratulate him for his great diligence and hope that this work will have a wide circulation particularly among students in universities. I wish Dr. Sarma a long and happy life and a prosperous career.

RAMAVARMA,
Pareekshit

Hill Palace, Tripunittura
30th November 1960

PREFACE

THIS edition of the text of the *Maṇikaṇa* is based on the only manuscript known so far, PM 1654 of the Adyar Library. A description of the manuscript follows:

Substance	country-made paper
Size	22×11 cm
Condition	old; some letters are damaged by worms
No. of pages	62 (fols. 1-32)
No. of lines on each page	7
No. of letters in each line	28
Script	Devanāgarī
Extent	complete

The only information we have about the work is that it was composed for teaching a certain Gopāla. Nothing is known about the author.

In 1956, when I joined the staff of the Adyar Library and Research Centre, I found that the *Maṇikaṇa* was included in the list of rare works to be published by the institution. The work interested me, especially for the reason that it was the only composition, so far as my knowledge went, which aimed at giving an epitome of the celebrated *Tattvacintāmaṇi* in the form of a *prakaraṇa* or manual. When the Library decided to publish the work, it was thought that an English translation of the text with explanatory notes

would add to the usefulness of the publication. The result is now placed before students and scholars of Nyāya in the form of this book.

I have tried to give a more or less literal translation of the text. As the Nyāya terminology is peculiar and the style enigmatic, I have explained the language as well as the concepts in the notes. In translating technical terms I have made use of the works of Athalye, Kuppuswamy Sastri, Vidyabhushana, Madhavananda, Suryanarayana Sastri and Ingalls, though I have not strictly followed any of them. In the Introduction I have tried to furnish general information about the Nyāya-śāstra, which I hope will be useful to the students who seek entrance to the field of Nyāya.

I am grateful to the Adyar Library and Research Centre for undertaking this publication. I should not hesitate to state that I alone am responsible for its drawbacks and that whatever merit it may have is largely owing to the kind cooperation and constructive criticism of many friends. I am sure that but for the keen interest and vigilance of Mrs. Radha Burnier, not only would the language of the translation and the notes be poorer, but the work also would not have been in the present form. I have benefited much from the constructive criticism of Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, who has also been kind enough to look through the proofs. Dr. V. Raghavan encouraged me by giving his valuable suggestions. A formal thanksgiving to these friends will not relieve me of my indebtedness to them.

Pandit V. Krishnamacharya not only went through the proofs but also made valuable suggestions. Sri V. Anjaneya Sarma, M.A., a colleague and research student of mine, has kindly prepared the glossary, besides assisting in reading the proofs. Dr. S. S. Barlingay with his deep knowledge of modern logic has helped me view the Navya-nyāya concepts from a new angle. I am thankful to all of them.

Before translating the text I had the good fortune of reading it with Panditaraja K. Achutha Poduval, Retired Professor of Nyāya of the Maharaja's Sanskrit College, Tripunittura. But for his kind help I would not have been able to carry out the work. I pay my respects to this veteran scholar of Nyāya.

Words are hardly adequate to express my indebtedness to H. H. Ramavarma of Cochin, affectionately referred to by people as 'Pareekshit Tampuran', for allowing me to read the text and translation to him and for blessing this work with a valuable Foreword. Erudition in the Śāstra-s, a passion for Sanskrit, and large-heartedness have made this king of scholars a source of inspiration for the present Sanskrit world. I record my sincere devotion to this great savant of Sanskrit.

E. R. SREEKRISHNA SARMA

INTRODUCTION

IN THE thirteenth century, Gaṅgeśopādhyāya of Mithilā wrote his celebrated *Tattvacintāmaṇi* which marked the inception of the Navya-nyāya school. It was from this time that the works on Nyāya, beginning with the *Nyāya-sūtrā-s* of Akṣapāda and ending with the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and the *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-pariśuddhi* of Udayana became designated by the term Prācīna-nyāya. Though Nyāya thought again underwent a considerable revolution at the hands of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, whose immortal work is the commentary *Dīdhiti*[1] on TC, his successors mostly preferred Gaṅgeśa's theories to those of Raghunātha, even while admitting the striking originality and logical acumen of the latter. The *Tattvacintāmaṇi* won such universal acclamation from scholars that it gave rise to a very large volume of literature on Navya-nyāya, mainly in the form of commentaries on TC and also separate works based on it. Students can find a brief account of the works and

[1] Even the name *Dīdhiti* indicates Raghunātha's precise thinking and adherence to the law of parsimony. The word consists of three vowels, all *i* sounds, and three consonants, all dental. Among words meaning 'splendour' or 'ray', appropriate in connection with *Cintāmaṇi* (jewel of thought), there is hardly any other which is simpler to pronounce.

authors of Navya-nyāya in *A History of Indian Logic* by Vidyabhushana (pp. 402-87) and *Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic* by Ingalls (pp. 4-27).

What distinguishes TC from the works of Prācīna-nyāya is its novel methodology and arrangement of subjects. Although the Nyāya system was known as *pramāṇa-śāstra* or the branch of learning dealing with the means of valid knowledge, the earlier works did not lay stress on the *pramāṇa-s*, but treated them as one of several topics. Efforts to combine the once independent systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika had resulted in both systems losing their individual characteristics and it had become difficult to say whether some of the works on Nyāya were *pramāṇa-śāstra-s* or *prameya-śāstra-s*. Gaṅgeśa redeemed Nyāya from this state of ambiguity by laying stress on the treatment of the *pramāṇa-s*. All other topics found in the earlier works are also dealt with in TC, but are subservient to the main topic of the *pramāṇa-s*. Gaṅgeśa defined the terms more accurately and used new expressions to measure subtle thoughts. Every thought and expression was subjected to careful examination. When a new topic was introduced, the propriety of doing so, its relation to the topic previously dealt with and its position in the composition as a whole were carefully examined. This made the language of TC terse and its content serious. The status of Nyāya as a *pramāṇa-śāstra* was thus fully established.

But the concept of *pramāṇa* is relative, as there can be no *pramāṇa* without *prameya* or the object known.

So a *pramāṇa-śāstra* cannot do without the treatment of *prameya*. With regard to *prameya*, all Nyāya works including TC accept the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, necessarily with some alterations. For no system of Indian thought other than the Vaiśeṣika, which is thoroughly realistic and pluralistic in outlook, would have served the purpose of the Naiyāyika-s, who are extreme realists.

An important point to be borne in mind is that Nyāya is not logic in the strict sense of the word. It is a system of philosophy. It is true that it lays stress on inference or reasoning as a means to correct knowledge, but it is not formal. It is not a mere device for correct thinking, but a well-thought-out and complete metaphysical thesis. It sharply divides itself from theological and religious philosophy, though it cannot be said to be in the least atheistic. It seeks to establish the existence of a super-human Creator through inference and admits the validity of the Veda-s on the ground that they were first uttered by Him. Like every other Hindu system of thought, it accepts that the final goal of human life is liberation from bondage. Its various theories and assumptions are so well knit that even if one of its metaphysical tenets were disturbed, it would lose ground as a *pramāṇa-śāstra*. To regard the Nyāya system as one of mere logic is mistaking the part for the whole. Even those who are interested only in the logic of Nyāya cannot turn away from the metaphysics of the system, for without a knowledge of the latter the former can hardly be understood.

METHODOLOGY

Definition (*lakṣaṇa*)

Vātsyāyana, the earliest commentator on the *Nyāya-sūtra-s*, states that the *śāstra* is constituted of three components: enumeration (*uddeśa*), definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and examination (*parīkṣaṇa*). In the Navya-nyāya writings, definition occupies an important place. Each and every term that stands for a concept is precisely defined before dealing with the concept. The usual method is to give a simple definition and examine the purpose of each word included in it (*dala-prayojana-cintā*). Then if the definition is found to be faulty, it is remodelled by adding more words until it becomes perfect and flawless. In the course of this process several important theories of the *śāstra* are introduced. Thus the defining of a concept itself throws much light on several theories of the system. For example, the definition of valid cognition brings in the theories of *anyathākhyāti*, *ārambha-vāda*, normal and supernormal contact of the senses with their objects, and so on, all of which are vital to the *Nyāya-śāstra*.

A definition is susceptible to three faults: *ativyāpti* (overapplicability), *avyāpti* (noninclusiveness) and *asambhava* (nonapplicability). If we define the cow as 'an animal with horns', the definition extends to noncows and does not include cows which have no horns. If we define the cow as 'a single-hoofed animal', the definition is not applicable to any cow. A definition should not have any of these defects.

A definition serves two purposes: It distinguishes the thing defined from other things, and makes it possible to call the thing defined by a convenient name. (*Vyāvṛttir vyavahāro vā lakṣaṇasya prayojanam.*)

PRINCIPLE OF LOGICAL ECONOMY (*lāghava*)

This principle plays a very important part in the thinking of the Naiyāyika-s. An assumption is unacceptable to them if a simpler assumption can explain the phenomenon or solve the problem in question. Many of their theories are established in accordance with this principle, such for instance as the theory of illusion known as *anyathākhyāti* which is held to be the most acceptable because there is simplicity in assuming a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) as the cause of volition in general.[1] The assumption of prior nonexistence (*prāgabhāva*) as one of the causes of every effect, of the relation of inherence as a separate Category, and of consideration (*parāmarśa*) as a qualified single cognition causing inferential knowledge, is consequent upon adherence to the principle of logical economy.

APPREHENSION OF THE CAUSAL RELATION (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-graha*)

The relation of cause and effect between two things is apprehended by noticing their copresence (*anvaya*) and coabsence (*vyatireka*). If the presence or absence of one thing invariably follows the presence or

[1] See note 51 on PERCEPTION.

absence, respectively, of another thing in the same sub-strate, the relation of the two things can be considered to be that of cause and effect. (*Yatsattve yatsattvam, yadabhāve yadabhāvaḥ.*) It should be remembered here that no existence is conceivable to the N a i y ā y i k a-s without reference to a substrate. If a thing exists, it exists in a substrate through some relation. The cause and the effect must exist in a common substrate, if they are to be considered as cause and effect. The relation through which they exist in the substrate may be different; but both must exist in the same substrate. For example, with regard to the ocular perception of a thing, the contact of the eye with the thing is a cause. The cause, namely the contact, exists in the thing through the relation of inherence, while the effect, perception, also exists in the same thing, but through another relation, objectness (*viṣayatā*). Here the co-existence of the cause and the effect in the same sub-strate can be shown in another way:

Perception exists in the self through the relation of inherence, while the contact of the eye also exists in the same substrate, the self, through the relation, *sva-samavāyi-saṃyukta-saṃyoga*, i.e., the contact here being conjunction (*saṃyoga*) exists both in the eye and the thing, through the relation of inherence; the eye has conjunction with the mind (*manas*) which is conjoined with the self.

Wherever the theory of causation is applied, the coexistence of the cause and the effect in the same substrate has to be shown.

THREEFOLD CAUSE (*trividhaṃ kāraṇam*)

Every effect except annihilative nonexistence (*dhvaṃsa*) requires three kinds of causes for it to come into being. They are the material cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), which is invariably a Substance; the non-material cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*), which is either a Quality or an Action; and other causes which are not included in these and are called instrumental causes (*nimitta-kāraṇa*). Taking the example of a cloth, which is an effect, the threads of which the cloth is made are its material cause; the conjunction of the threads (*tantu-saṃyoga*) which is a Quality is the nonmaterial cause; the loom, the weaver, etc., are the instrumental causes.

COMMON CAUSES (*sādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*)

Instrumental causes are of two kinds: special and common. The loom, etc., are the special instrumental causes with regard to the cloth. God, His knowledge, His desire, His volition, Space, Time, merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*) and the prior nonexistence of the effect are common causes with regard to any effect. Besides these, the absence of the obstructing element (*pratibandhaka-saṃsargābhāva*) is also a common instrumental cause according to the Navya-nyāya school.

EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT (*karaṇa*)

The effective instrument also is one of the instrumental causes.[1]

[1] See note 19 on PERCEPTION.

AUXILIARY CAUSE (*sahakāri-kāraṇa*)

With regard to certain effects, apart from the principal instrumental causes, there might also be some auxiliary causes. For example, with regard to the perception of nonexistence, the sense-organ which apprehends the nonexistence is the principal instrumental cause, whereas the competent nonapprehension of the thing of which the nonexistence is perceived is the auxiliary cause. The absence of the auxiliary cause stands in the way of the effect coming into existence.

SUPERFLUITY (*anyathāsiddha*)

Though a cause is defined as that which exists in the substrate of the effect at the moment immediately preceding the effect, everything that immediately precedes the effect is not considered to be a cause. Only those things which are not other than indispensable for the emergence of the effect are considered to be its causes; all else is *anyathāsiddha*.[1]

OBJECT, SUBJECT (*viṣaya*, *viṣayin*)

Knowledge causes desire which causes volition. These three are said to have objects (*saviṣaya*). An object means an object of one of these. Knowledge, desire and volition are called subjects (*viṣayin*). The subject and object are related through the relation of being subject and object (*viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāva*).

[1] See note 117 on INFERENCE.

ASSUMPTION OF CERTAIN ATTRIBUTES

In the cognition of a pot, the pot is the object, while the cognition is the subject. The cognition of the pot can be either perceptional, inferential, verbal, or in the form of recollection, as the case may be. Though in all these cases the object is the same, i.e., the pot, its state of being the object is different. In one case it is in the state of being the object of perception, but in another case in the state of being the object of recollection. The cognition's state of being the subject is also different in all these cases. In order to point out this difference precisely, the N a i y ā y i k a-s assume that an attribute called objectness (*viṣayatā*) abides in the object and an attribute called subjectness (*viṣayitā*) abides in the subject. These attributes are also the relation between the subject and the object.[1] Similarly, an attribute called causality (*kāraṇatā*) exists in every cause, and an attribute, effectness (*kāryatā*), exists in every effect. For example, a staff may be the cause of several effects; in each case, the causality existing in the staff is different though the cause, the staff, is the same. In the same way, a pot may be the effect of several causes; in each case, the effectness existing in the pot is different. The causality in the cause and the effectness in the effect are also correlated. This correlation is called *nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāva*. In the Nyāya terminology the causal relation between the staff and the pot is expressed as follows: *ghaṭaniṣṭha-kāryatā-*

[1] See note 20 on PERCEPTION.

nirūpitā kāraṇatā daṇḍe ; daṇḍaniṣṭha-kāraṇatā-nirūpitā kāryatā ghaṭe.

DELIMITANT (*avacchedaka*)

While treating of the attributes, such as causality (*kāraṇatā*), effectness (*kāryatā*), countercorrelateness (*pratiyogitā*), probanshood (*hetutā*), probandumhood (*sādhyatā*), and subjecthood (*pakṣatā*), the Naiyāyika-s specify them by stating their delimiting attributes. For example, as we have already seen, there is the attribute causality in the staff which is one of the causes of the pot. The causality in the staff is delimited by the attribute, staffness. Similarly, the effectness in the pot is delimited by the attribute, potness. Thus in the language of the Naiyāyika-s the causal relation between the staff and the pot is expressed as follows: *ghaṭaniṣṭhā ghaṭatvāvacchinnā kāryatā daṇḍaniṣṭha-daṇḍatvāvacchinna-kāraṇatā-nirūpitā ; daṇḍaniṣṭhā daṇḍatvāvacchinnā kāraṇatā ghaṭaniṣṭha-ghaṭatvāvacchinna-kāryatā-nirūpitā.* Without the concept of these delimitants the causal relation would be ambiguous. Because, as there are several attributes existing in the staff as well as in the pot, one cannot be sure by virtue of which attribute the staff is the cause of the pot and the pot is the effect of the staff. A staff has earthness (*pṛthivītva*), Substanceness (*dravyatva*) and other attributes, besides staffness. So has the pot. But the staff is the cause of the pot by virtue of its having staffness and not by virtue of its having other attributes.

This is so in the case of other delimitants also. For instance, in the inference, 'The mountain has fire,

because of smoke', smoke is the probans. Here the delimitant of the probanshood existing in the smoke is smokeness (*dhūmatva*). That is to say, smoke is the probans by virtue of having the attribute smokeness.

DELIMITING RELATION (*avacchedaka-saṃbandha*)

The Naiyāyika-s specify the delimiting relation of the attributes, such as causality, to make their statements unambiguous. The statement, 'The staff is the cause of the pot' means 'The staff produces the pot when the former comes into contact, through the relation of conjunction, with the two halves in which the pot exists through the relation of inherence'. Here the relation delimiting the causality in the staff is conjunction (*saṃyoga*), and the relation delimiting the effectness in the pot is inherence (*samavāya*). Thus the causal relation is completely expressed as follows: *ghaṭaniṣṭha-samavāyasaṃbandhāvacchinna - ghaṭatvāvacchinna - kāryatā-nirūpitā daṇḍaniṣṭha-saṃyogasaṃbandhāvacchinna-daṇḍatvāvacchinna-kāraṇatā.*

Similarly the delimiting relations of other attributes have also to be distinctly stated. For instance, a pot is the countercorrelate (*pratiyogin*) of its nonexistence. When we say, 'There is no pot on the floor', we mean that there is the nonexistence of the pot on the floor through the relation of conjunction. For, the nonexistence of the pot on the floor through the relation of inherence is always there, since two separate Substances cannot be related to each other through inherence. Thus the relation delimiting the countercorrelateness in

the pot is, in this case, conjunction. Similarly, the delimiting relation of probanshood, probandumhood, subjecthood, etc., is also to be understood.

METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTS

THE EFFECT IS DIFFERENT FROM ITS MATERIAL CAUSE (*ārambha-vāda*)

The Naiyāyika-s maintain that the effect is totally different from its material cause; they do not admit that the pot was latent in its material cause, earth, before it became a pot. This theory is opposed to the *satkārya-vāda* of the Sāṅkhya system. According to the Naiyāyika-s, the ultimate component of a Substance is its prime atom (*paramāṇu*). Two prime atoms produce a dyad; three dyads a triad, and so on. All logical and metaphysical theories of the Nyāya system are based on this concept.

NYĀYA CATEGORIES (*padārtha*)

Following the Vaiśeṣika-s,[1] the Naiyāyika-s accept seven Categories. They are: Substance, Quality, Action, Generality or the Universal, Particularity, Inherence and Nonexistence. Everything that finds a place in the system comes under one or the other of these Categories.

SUBSTANCE (*dravya*)

A Substance is that which is the substrate of a

[1] The author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-s* admits only six Categories, to which his followers added the seventh, nonexistence.

Quality or an Action. It is sevenfold: earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), space (*dik*), the self (*ātman*) and the mind (*manas*). Of these the first three are perceptible to the external senses. The fourth is, according to some, perceptible to the sense of touch; according to others only its touch is perceptible, the Substance being cognized by inference. The ultimate constituents of these four Substances are their prime atoms, which are eternal. Ether, time, space and the self are eternal and omnipresent. The self is twofold: the individual self (*jīvātman*) and the Supreme Self (*Īśvara*). The former is perceptible to the internal sense, the mind, and is manifold; whereas the Supreme Self is single. The mind is of atomic magnitude, eternal and manifold.

QUALITY (*guṇa*)

There are twenty-four Qualities. They exist solely in Substances, through the relation of inherence. They are: (1) colour, (2) taste, (3) smell, (4) touch, (5) number, (6) magnitude, (7) separateness, (8) conjunction, (9) disjunction, (10) remoteness, (11) nearness, (12) knowledge, (13) pleasure, (14) pain, (15) desire, (16) aversion, (17) volition, (18) weight, (19) liquidity, (20) oiliness, (21) tendency, (22) merit, (23) demerit and (24) sound.

Liquidity is twofold: natural and conditional. Tendency is threefold: velocity, elasticity and impression (*bhāvanā*).

The distribution of these Qualities among the Substances is shown hereunder:

Earth	1 to 11, 18, 19,[1] 21[2]	(14)
Water	1, 2, 4 to 11, 18, 19,[3] 20, 21[4]	(14)
Fire	1, 4 to 11, 19,[1] 21[4]	(11)
Air	4 to 11, 21[4]	(9)
Ether	5 to 9, 24	(6)
Time	5 to 9	(5)
Space	5 to 9	(5)
The self (individual)	5 to 9, 12 to 17, 21,[5] 22, 23	(14)
The Self (*Īśvara*)	5 to 9, 12, 15, 17	(8)
The mind	5 to 11, 21[4]	(8)

ACTION (*karman*)

Any movement is an action. Like Qualities, Actions also exist solely in Substances, through the relation of inherence.

GENERALITY OR THE UNIVERSAL (*sāmānya* or *jāti*)

Universals exist in Substances, Qualities, and Actions through the relation of inherence. Though there are several universals, such as potness, cowness, manness, etc., each universal is single, existing in all individuals of the same class; there is only one cowness, one potness, and so on. Universals existing in perceptible things are perceptible, and in imperceptible things

[1] Conditional liquidity. [2] Elasticity. [3] Natural liquidity.
[4] Velocity. [5] *Bhāvanā*.

are imperceptible. They are apprehended by the same senses which apprehend their substrates.

There is a gradation of universals. In a pot there are potness, earthness and Substanceness. Each one is a universal. Here the lowest universal is potness, which exists only in pots. Earthness is a higher universal, which exists not only in all pots but also in several other things which have earthness. Substanceness is still higher, and exists in all Substances. The highest universal, according to the Naiyāyika-s, is *existence* (*sattā*), which exists in all Substances, Qualities and Actions. A lower universal is called *aparā jāti*, while a higher one is called *parā jāti*.

All generic attributes are not considered to be universals. Only that attribute which is single, eternal and inherent in more than one individual can be a universal. In conformity with this definition of the universal, Udayanācārya has enumerated six conditions, which prevent an attribute from being a universal. These conditions are:

1. Existing in only one individual. For example, etherness (*ākāśatva*) is not a universal, since ether is single.
2. Equality of extension. Because the same thing is known under two names, there cannot be two different universals. For example, the pot has two names, *ghaṭa* and *kalaśa*, but there is only one universal, either *ghaṭatva* or *kalaśatva*; for wherever there is the one, there is the other too.

3. Cross-division (*saṃkara*). This is explained in note 61 on PERCEPTION.
4. *Regressus ad infinitum.* Potness (*ghaṭatva*) is a universal. But if it is assumed that potness-ness (*ghaṭatvatva*) is another universal existing in potness, the process will be unending. So it is assumed that a universal does not have a universal.
5. Losing one's characteristic. The Category, Particularity, is accepted by the N a i y ā y i k a-s to differentiate one prime atom from another of the same class. This Particularity is self-differentiated. If it be assumed that Particularityness is a universal, Particularity will lose the characteristic of being self-differentiated. So Particularityness is not a universal.
6. Lack of relation. Inherencehood (*samavāyatva*) and Nonexistenceness (*abhāvatva*) are not universals. For, a universal must exist in its substrate through the relation of inherence. Nothing can exist in Inherence and Nonexistence through this relation.

The attributes which are not universals are called *upādhi-s*.

PARTICULARITY (*viśeṣa*)

This is manifold and exists only in eternal Substances. The assumption of this Category is mainly for differentiating ultimate and eternal prime atoms from each other. As noticed above Particularities are differentiated by themselves.

Inherence (*samavāya*)

This Category is in the form of a relation between two entities that are inseparable (*ayutasiddhayoḥ sambandhaḥ*). It is through this relation that the whole exists in its parts; Qualities and Actions exist in Substances; and universals exist in Substances, Qualities and Actions. See text, pp. 20, 22 and note 85 on Perception.

Nonexistence (*abhāva*)

According to the Naiyāyika-s, nonexistence is not a negative concept, but a positive reality. It exists in the substrate of a thing of which the nonexistence is apprehended.

Nonexistence is of two kinds: relational nonexistence (*saṃsargābhāva*) and mutual nonexistence (*anyonyābhāva*). The latter is also called difference (*bheda*).

Relational nonexistence is threefold: prior nonexistence (*prāgabhāva*), annihilative nonexistence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) and absolute nonexistence (*atyantābhāva*).

Prior nonexistence is the nonexistence of a thing before the thing comes into existence. With regard to any effect, the prior nonexistence of it is a cause. Otherwise, asks the Naiyāyika, why is a thing not effected again after once coming into existence, since all the other causes continue to be present in the substrate of the effect? By assuming prior nonexistence, however, the nonproduction of the same thing again can be explained, for one of the causes, namely, its

prior nonexistence, is not there, having been destroyed by the emergence of the thing.

Prior nonexistence is beginningless, but has an end. As soon as a thing comes into existence, its prior nonexistence is destroyed. (*Anādiḥ sāntaḥ prāgabhāvaḥ.*)

Annihilative nonexistence is produced. Having once come into existence it lasts for ever (*sādir anantaḥ*)

That nonexistence, which was, is and will be, is absolute nonexistence (*traikālika-saṃsargāvacchinna-pratiyogitākābhāvaḥ*). For example, the nonexistence of colour in the air is absolute nonexistence. This is the earlier view. According to this view, there is no absolute nonexistence in the substrate of an instance of prior nonexistence or of annihilative nonexistence. The later view is that the absolute nonexistence of everything exists everywhere at all times. For instance, even when a pot exists on the floor, there is its nonexistence through the relation of inherence, since the pot exists on the floor through conjunction. In this way, the nonexistence of everything can be shown everywhere through some relation or other. So this nonexistence is eternal; but when there is a pot on the floor, its nonexistence is not apprehended, because there is no relation between the nonexistence and the floor at the time. See note 104 on PERCEPTION.

The notion 'A is not B' or 'A is different from B' gives evidence of mutual nonexistence. It is eternal, since the difference between two things always exists.

RELATIONSHIP

In conformity with their strict realism, the Naiyāyika-s admit of several kinds of relationship. The assumption of innumerable kinds of indirect relationship is ridiculed through the well-known saying current among the traditional students of Nyāya that any two persons are related to each other through the relation of *svagrāhaka-yama-grāhyatva*, i.e., the same God of death who takes one away takes the other away too!

Conjunction

This relation exists only between two Substances. It exists in both the conjoined things through the relation of inherence. When the parts of two wholes are conjoined together, the wholes also become conjoined. For example, when there is conjunction between a finger and a book, there is conjunction between the body and the book also. This kind of conjunction is called *saṃyogaja-saṃyoga*.

Conjunction between two omnipresent Substances like time and the self or ether and space (*vibhudvaya-saṃyoga*) is not generally accepted.

Inherence

As seen above, this relation is a separate Category.

Temporal attributiveness (*kālika-viśeṣaṇatā*)

Though Time is infinite and single, in order to explain the notions, 'this moment', 'this week', 'this month', etc., the Naiyāyika-s accept finite times,

which are infinite Time conditioned by the movements of the sun. Everything exists in Time through the relation of temporal attributiveness. That is why Time is said to be the substrate of everything (*sarvādhāra*). In the notions, 'Now there is a pot on the floor', 'This month it rains', etc., a relation between the pot and 'now', etc., is presented to the cognition. Here the pot, etc., exist in 'now', etc., through the relation of temporal attributiveness, and the substrate is finite time (*khaṇḍa-kāla*). The temporal relation in these instances is direct.

Temporal attributiveness can also be an indirect relation, as for example when two persons are related to each other through the relation of *svāśrayakālāśritatva*, i.e., time which is the substrate of one is the substrate of the other also.

SPATIAL ATTRIBUTIVENESS (*daiśika-viśeṣaṇatā*)

The relation between the nonexistence of a thing of which the nonexistence is apprehended, and the substrate is spatial attributiveness. For example, the nonexistence of a pot exists on the floor through this relation.

SELFSAMENESS OR IDENTITY (*tādātmya*)

According to the Naiyāyika-s, a thing exists in itself through this relation. With regard to a Quality inherent in a Substance, the Substance is a cause. Here the relation that delimits the causality in the Substance (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka-saṃbandha*) is selfsameness.

Collective extensity (*paryāpti-saṃbandha*)

In order to account for the notions, 'One is not two' and 'One has duality', the Naiyāyika-s accept this relation. Numbers, such as 'one' and 'two', are Qualities and they exist in Substances through the relation of inherence. Hence, as duality inheres in two things separately, one could say 'One pot is dual', inasmuch as duality exists even in a single pot. To avoid such an absurdity, the Naiyāyika accepts a relation through which duality exists collectively in two things. This relation is *paryāpti-saṃbandha*. It explains the notion 'One is not two', as duality does not exist in one thing alone through the relation of *paryāpti*. On the other hand, the notion 'One has duality' (*eko dvitvavān*) is possible, as duality does exist even in one thing through the relation of inherence.

Svarūpa-saṃbandha

Objectness (*viṣayatā*), correlatedness (*nirūpitatva*), temporal and spatial attributiveness, etc., are called *svarūpa-saṃbandha-s*, as these relations are in the form of either of the related things.

Two types of relations

The relations mentioned above are of two types. Some limit occupancy (*vṛtti-niyāmaka*), while others do not (*vṛttyaniyāmaka*). *Vṛttitā* or occupancy is that state in which one of the related things is the substrate and the other is the occupant (*ādhārādheya-bhāva*).

Conjunction can be both *vṛtti-niyāmaka* and *vṛttyaniyāmaka*. While a pot is on the floor, or berries are in a basket, the conjunction between the pot and the floor on the one hand, and the berries and the basket on the other, is *vṛtti-niyāmaka*. For here the relation delimits the *ādhārādheya-bhāva* of the two related things; the floor and the basket are *ādhāra*, the pot and the berries are *ādheya*. In such instances the *ādhārādheya-bhāva* is expressed by the locative case-ending: *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*; *kuṇḍe badaram*.

The conjunction between the palms held vertically is *vṛttyaniyāmaka*; for here there is no *ādhārādheya-bhāva*, and one does not say 'hand on hand' (*haste hastaḥ*), in this instance.

Inherence is a *vṛtti-niyāmaka* relation. In expressing it, the locative case-ending can be used with one of the related.

Temporal attributiveness is *vṛtti-niyāmaka* when it is a direct relation. The indirect relation of temporal attributiveness is not *vṛtti-niyāmaka*, for there is no *ādhārādheya-bhāva* between the two things, though both of them abide in time.

Spatial attributiveness is also a *vṛtti-niyāmaka* relation.

Objectness, subjectness, contact in the form of cognition,[1] contact in the form of generality,[2] and the relation of being the correlator and the correlated are not *vṛtti-niyāmaka*.

[1] See text, p. 26. [2] See text, p. 28.

SOME TECHNICAL TERMS

Pratiyogin, *anuyogin*

Of two related things, one is the *pratiyogin*, while the other is the *anuyogin*. For example, with regard to the conjunction between the pot and the floor, the pot is the *pratiyogin*, while the floor is the *anuyogin*. The *pratiyogin* exists in the *anuyogin* through the relation of conjunction. Thus, although the relation of conjunction exists in both the related things, we say 'The pot is on the floor' and not 'The floor is in the pot'.

Just as a relationship involves a *pratiyogin*, so does nonexistence. A thing of which the nonexistence is predicated, is the *pratiyogin* of that nonexistence. The pot is the *pratiyogin* of the nonexistence of the pot, the cow is the *pratiyogin* of the nonexistence of the cow, and so on. In this case the substrate of the thing is the *anuyogin*. In the Nyāya language, the nonexistence of a pot on the floor is *ghaṭa-pratiyogika-bhūtalānuyogika-abhāva*.

Avacchedaka, *avacchinna*

That which delimits a thing or an attribute is called *avacchedaka*, while the delimited is *avacchinna*. The pot is delimited by potness and cloth by clothness. So potness (*ghaṭatva*) and clothness (*paṭatva*) are *avacchedaka-s*, and the pot and the cloth are *avacchinna-s*. The reason for this assumption is as follows: Seeing a pot, nobody doubts whether it is a pot or not, because it is known that the thing seen has the characteristic of

potness. So the definite knowledge, 'This is a pot', is possible only when the pot is known as delimited by potness. (See p. xxiv above).

Vyāpya, vyāpaka

Though these terms are used with slightly differing connotations in different contexts, the usual definition is that that which has narrower extension is *vyāpya*, and that which has wider extension is *vyāpaka*. For example, smoke is *vyāpya*, while fire is *vyāpaka*. Fire exists without smoke, but not smoke without fire. Similarly, an *aparā jāti* is *vyāpya* and a *parā jāti* is *vyāpaka*. In an inference, the probans is *vyāpya* and the probandum is *vyāpaka*.

Kṣaṇika

A thing which perishes at the third moment of its existence is said to be *kṣaṇika* or momentary (*tṛtīya-kṣaṇavṛtti-dhvaṃsa-pratiyogitvam*).

Mūrta

Earth, water, fire, air and the mind are called *mūrta-s*. These have lower magnitude,[1] the definition being *apakṛṣta-parimāṇavattvam*.

Bhūta

The *mūrta-s* excluding the mind and including ether are called *bhūta-s*.

[1] See note 74 on PERCEPTION.

Vibhu

Ether, time, space and the self are *vibhu* (omnipresent) Substances. Omnipresence is defined as *sarva-mūrta-dravya-saṃyogitvam.*

Viśeṣaguṇa

Qualities 1 to 4, 12 to 17, 19,[1] 20, 21,[2] 22 to 24 are called *viśeṣa-guṇa-s* or special Qualities.

SOME PREMISES

A few premises accepted by the Naiyāyika-s are given below. Others are discussed in the notes.

1. Conjunction is only between Substances. (*Dravyayor eva saṃyogaḥ.*)
2. No Quality exists in another Quality. (*Guṇe guṇo na.*)
3. A nonmaterial cause exists at the moment when an effect comes into being. (*Asamavāyi-kāraṇasya kāryasahabhāvena kāraṇatvam.*)
   The above has to be accepted although the general definition of a cause is 'that which exists at the moment immediately preceding the emergence of the effect', for otherwise the following would not be valid.

[1] Natural liquidity.
[2] *Bhāvanā.*

4. The destruction of a Substance is caused by the destruction of its nonmaterial cause. (*Asamavāyikāraṇa-nāśād dravya-nāśaḥ.*) This accounts for the destruction of the dyad. For, the material cause of a dyad is two prime atoms, which are imperishable. So the dyad is held to be destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction of two atoms.
5. The special Qualities of the self are not nonmaterial causes with regard to any effect. (*Ātmavṛtti-viśeṣaguṇānāṃ kutrāpy asamavāyikāraṇatvaṃ nāsti.*)
6. Atomic magnitude is never a cause. (*Aṇuparimāṇam na kasyāpi kāraṇam*). Thus, according to the Naiyāyika-s the magnitude of a dyad is caused by the duality existing in the two prime atoms which constitute it. The acceptance of this premise is necessitated by the following one.
7. A certain magnitude is the cause of a higher magnitude, which is of the same class as its cause. (*Parimāṇasya svasamānajātīya-svotkṛṣṭa-parimāṇa-janakatvam.*) Atomic magnitude belongs to the class, atomic magnitudeness, which is different from the class, medium magnitudeness, to which the magnitude of the triad belongs. The atomic magnitude of the dyad is not higher than that of the prime atom and medium magnitude does not belong to the class of atomic magnitudeness. So atomic

magnitude cannot be the cause of the magnitude of the dyad and the triad.

8. With regard to a qualified cognition, knowledge of the qualification is the cause. (*Viśiṣṭa-jñānaṃ prati viśeṣaṇa-jñānaṃ kāraṇam.*) Knowledge of the colour blue is a prerequisite to the cognition of a blue pot.
9. With regard to a cognition which has a qualified thing for its object, a knowledge, in which the delimitant of the qualificationhood is an adjunct, is the cause. (*Viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyajñānaṃ prati viśeṣaṇatāvacchedakaprakārakaṃ-jñānaṃ kāraṇam.*) For example, in the cognition, 'I cognize the pot' (*ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi*), the cognition is an adjunct to the self 'I', and is qualified by the pot, which is qualified by potness. With regard to this cognition, a knowledge in which potness is an adjunct, namely, knowledge of the pot, is the cause.
10. If the causal relation is established between two things, the same can be held to exist between the two classes to which they belong, provided nothing contradicts it. (*Yadviśeṣayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ asati bādhake tatsāmānyayor api.*) Thus, if the volition of the potter is the cause of the pot, which is the effect, it can be held that with regard to any effect, the volition of the agent is a cause.
11. When a simple attribute serves the purpose, a cumbrous attribute should not be the

delimitant of causality. (*Sambhavati laghudharme gurudharmo na kāraṇatāvacchedakaḥ.*) With regard to any effect, the nonexistence of an impediment is a cause. Though this nonexistence is absolute nonexistence, the delimitant of causality is not absolute nonexistenceness, but relational nonexistenceness (*saṃsargābhāvatva*). *Atyantābhāvatva* is cumbrous, since *atyantābhāva* involves the notion of eternality. So the nonexistence of an impediment is the cause by virtue of the nonexistence being a relational nonexistence.

12. With regard to the perception of conjunction, the perception of both the substrates of the conjunction is the cause. (*Saṃyoga-pratyakṣaṃ prati yāvadāśraya-pratyakṣaṃ kāraṇam*). So, though a pot and ether are conjoined, their conjunction is not perceptible, since ether is imperceptible.
13. A cognition of anything other than universals and unanalysable attributes (*akhaṇḍopādhi*) must have an attribute as its adjunct. (*Jātyakhaṇḍopādhyatirikta-padārthajñānasya kiṃcid-dharma-prakārakatvam.*) In the cognition of a pot, potness is an adjunct. The cognition of potness, however, is possible even without featuring an adjunct.
14. The sense-organ which apprehends an individual apprehends the universal existing in that individual and the nonexistence of the same.

(*Yena indriyeṇa yā vyaktir gṛhyate tenaiva indriyeṇa tanniṣṭhā jātiḥ tadabhāvaś ca gṛhyate.*) Thus, the pot, potness and the nonexistence of the pot are apprehended through the eye.

5. If a doubt about something or a definite knowledge of the absence of that thing obstructs something else, a definite knowledge of the former thing is the cause of the latter thing. (*Yatsaṃśaya-vyatirekaniścayau yadutpatti-pratibandhakau tanniścayas taddhetuḥ.*) For example, a doubt regarding pervasion or a definite knowledge of the absence of pervasion obstructs inferential knowledge; so a definite knowledge of pervasion is the cause of inferential knowledge.
6. The knowledge that one thing possesses another thing, is obstructed by the knowledge that the former thing is pervaded by the absence of the latter thing. (*Tadvattābuddhiṃ prati tadabhāvavyāpyavattājñānaṃ pratibandhakam.*) For instance, the knowledge that a lake has water which is pervaded by the absence of fire, obstructs the knowledge that there is fire in the lake.

"मोहं रुणद्धि विपुलीकुरुते च बुद्धिं
सूते च संस्कृतपदव्यवहारशक्तिम् ।
शास्त्रान्तराभ्यसनयोग्यतया युनक्ति
तर्कश्रमो न तनुते कमिहोपकारम् ॥"

प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदः

जगन्नाथं नमस्कृत्य संक्षेपादेष निर्मितः ।
निबन्धो लुठतात् कण्ठे श्रीगोपालचिरायुषः ॥

मङ्गलवादः

अभिमतकर्मारम्भसमये कर्मसमाप्तिकामाः शिष्टा मङ्गलमाचरन्ति। तत्र मङ्गलं समाप्तिं प्रति कारणम्, विघ्नध्वंसो व्यापारः; समाप्तिस्तु ग्रन्थादौ चरमवर्णः तद्ध्वंसो वा इत्याचार्याः ॥

मङ्गलं न समाप्तिं प्रति कारणम्, सत्यपि मङ्गले कादम्बरीकारादिग्रन्थस्यापरिसमाप्तेः असत्यपि मङ्गले प्रमत्तनास्तिकादिप्रणीतग्रन्थसमाप्तेश्च अन्वयतो व्यतिरेकतश्च व्यभिचारात् । किंतु मङ्गलेन विघ्नध्वंसः, तेन च प्रतिबन्धकसंसर्गाभावमुद्रया समाप्तिर्जन्यते । विघ्नत्वं तु मङ्गलनाश्यतावच्छेदकतया समाप्तिप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकतया च सिद्धा जातिः । कादम्बर्यामसमाप्तिस्तु मङ्गलानन्तरोत्पन्नविघ्नात् लौकिककारणविरहाद्वा । न च मङ्गलं विना क्वापि विघ्नस्य नाश इति नान्वयतो व्यतिरेकतश्च व्यभिचार इति मणिकृतः ॥

I. PERCEPTION

MAY this treatise, composed in a short form after having bowed to the Lord of the Universe, ever sport on the throat [1] of the long-lived [2] Gopāla.

Maṅgala-vāda

At the beginning of a desired undertaking, the disciplined ones,[3] wishing the completion of the work, perform *maṅgala*.[4] With regard to this the venerated Ā c ā r y a [5] says that *maṅgala* is the cause of the completion [of the undertaking], and the destruction [6] of obstacles [in the way to completion] is the [intermediary] function; [7] and that the completion in the case of a book, etc., is either the last phoneme [8] or its destruction.[9]

Maṅgala is not the cause of completion; for in spite of the *maṅgala* the compositions of the author of the *Kādambarī* [10] and of others are incomplete; and even without *maṅgala* books composed by erring heretics,[11] etc., have been completed; thus there is both positive and negative deviation of causality.[12] But the destruction of obstacles [13] is caused by *maṅgala*, and through this [destruction] completion [of the work] is effected by virtue of the absence of the obstructing element.[14] 'Obstacleness' is the universal established as the determinant of that which is destroyed by *maṅgala*, and as the determinant of that which obstructs completion.[15] The non-completion of the *Kādambarī* was due either to obstacles which arose after [the performance of] *maṅgala* or to the absence of empirical causes.[16] Nowhere is there destruction of obstacles without *maṅgala*. There is, therefore, no positive or negative deviation of causality; [17] thus [holds] the [venerated] author of the *Maṇi*.[18]

प्रमाणवादः

प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणम् । तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवः प्रमा । तथाहि—रजते रजतमिति ज्ञानं रजतत्ववति रजतत्वप्रकारकम्; शुक्तौ रजतमिति ज्ञानं न तथा । रजतविशेष्यतानिरूपितरजततत्वप्रकारताकज्ञानं यथार्थमिति व्यवह्रियते । रजतत्वाभाववद्विशेष्यतानिरूपितरजतत्वप्रकारताकं ज्ञानं भ्रम इति व्यवह्रियते । विशेष्यता प्रकारता च विषयताविशेषो ज्ञानविषययोः संबन्धः । विषयतयोर्निरूप्यनिरूपकभावोऽपि 'रजतत्वेनामुं जानामि' इत्यनुभवसाक्षिकः ॥

प्रामाण्यवादः

तच्च प्रामाण्यं प्रथमव्यवसायेन गृह्यते । तथाहि—रजतेन सह चक्षुःसंनिकर्षः; ततो 'रजतम्' इति जायमानं चाक्षुषं मितिमातृमेयान् विषयीकरोति । मितिर्ज्ञानं, माता ज्ञाता, मेयं ज्ञानविषयः । तथाच 'रजतमहं पश्यामि' इत्येवमाकारकं चाक्षुषं रजते रजतत्ववत्ताम्, रजतेन सह

Pramāṇa-vāda

That which is the efficient instrument [19] of valid cognition is *pramāṇa*. The experience which has reference to a substantive possessed of that [attribute] which is an adjunct to it [i.e., experience] is valid cognition.[20] This may be explained as follows: The cognition '[This is] silver' with regard to silver is one which has reference to a substantive possessed of silverness, which is an adjunct [to the cognition]. [But] the cognition '[This is] silver' with regard to nacre is not so.[21] The cognition which presents the adjunctness in silverness as correlated with the substantiveness in silver is said to correspond [exactly] to the object (*yathārtha*); the cognition which presents the adjunctness in silverness as correlated with the substantiveness in something that does not have silverness is said to be illusory.[22] Substantiveness as well as adjunctness is a particular [form] of objectness (*viṣayatā-viśeṣa*), which is a relation between the cognition and [its] object. The existence of the relation of the correlated and the correlator between the two objectnesses [i.e., *viśeṣyatā* and *prakāratā*] is evidenced by the experience [which takes the form], 'I cognize this [i.e., the thing before me] as silver'.[23]

Prāmāṇya-vāda

This validity [of cognition] is apprehended through the primary cognition.[24] This may be explained as follows: There is the contact of the eye with the silver. From this originates ocular perception in the form '[This is] silver', which objectifies *miti*, *mātṛ* and *meya*. *Miti* [is] cognition; *mātṛ* [is] the cognizer;[25] *meya* [is] the object of cognition. Thus ocular perception in the form 'I see silver' objectifies the following: the state of 'having silverness' in the silver; the

ज्ञानस्य विशेष्यताम्, रजतत्वेन सह प्रकारताम्, प्रकारता-विशेष्यतयोः निरूप्यनिरूपकभावं च विषयीकरोति; तेषां ज्ञानवित्तिवेद्यत्वात् इति प्राभाकराः ॥

चाक्षुषानन्तरोत्पन्नो 'रजतमहं पश्यामि' इत्यनुव्यवसायो निर्दिष्टरीत्या प्रामाण्यं गृह्णातीति मुरारिमिश्राः ॥

प्रथमं 'रजतम्' इति चाक्षुषम्; ततो रजतत्वप्रकारिका रजतसमवेता ज्ञातता विशेषणताविशेषेण आत्मन्युत्पद्यते; ततो 'रजतत्वप्रकारकरजतसमवेतज्ञाततावान् अहम्' इति ज्ञातताप्रत्यक्षम्; ततः 'यो यत्प्रकारकयत्समवेतज्ञाततावान्, स तत्प्रकारकतद्विशेष्यकज्ञानवान्' इति सामान्यतो व्याप्तिस्मरणम्; ततो 'रजतत्वप्रकारकरजतविशेष्यकज्ञानवान् अहम्' इत्यनुमितिः; इति ज्ञानातीन्द्रियत्ववादिनो भाट्टाः ॥

मतत्रये प्रामाण्यं स्वतोग्राह्यम्। स्वतोग्राह्यत्वं तु तदप्रामाण्याग्राहकयावज्ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यत्वम् ॥

अत्र नैयायिकाः—प्रामाण्यं स्वाश्रयग्राहकेण सर्वेण न गृह्यते, गृहीतेऽपि ज्ञाने तत्र प्रामाण्यसंशयात्। तथाहि—

cognition's [relation of] substantiveness with the silver; [the cognition's relation of] adjunctness with silverness; the relationship of the correlated and the correlator between the adjunctness and substantiveness; for these are invariably cognized along with the cognition of knowledge. Thus [say] the Prābhākara-s.

[The venerated] Murāri Miśra[26] [says] that apperception which arises after ocular perception and takes the form, 'I see silver', apprehends the validity [of the cognition] according to the [above-]mentioned procedure.[27]

First arises the ocular perception, '[This is] silver'; then originates in the self (*ātman*), through a certain [relation of] attributiveness (*viśeṣaṇatā*), the cognizedness[28] which has silverness as adjunct and is inherent[29] in silver; after this occurs the perception of the cognizedness in the form 'I have the cognizedness which has silverness as [its] adjunct and is inherent in silver'; then arises the recollection of the pervasion in a general way, such as, 'He who has the cognizedness which has *something* for [its] adjunct and is inherent in *something*, has the cognition in which *that thing* is an adjunct and *that thing* is a substantive'; subsequently [there arises] the inferential knowledge 'I have the cognition in which silverness is the adjunct and silver the substantive'. Thus [say] the Bhāṭṭa-s, who uphold the transcendency of cognition.[30]

According to the three [foregoing] views, the apprehension of validity is intrinsic. Intrinsic apprehension [of validity] means apprehension by the entire means which causes the apprehension of cognition but does not cause the apprehension of its [i.e., of the cognition] non-validity.

• Here the Naiyāyika-s [say]: Validity is not apprehended by everything that causes the apprehension of its locus [i.e., cognition]; even after the cognition is apprehended

प्रथमं 'रजतम्' इति चाक्षुषम्, ततः तदनुव्यवसायः, ततः प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यकोटिस्मरणम्, ततो 'रजतज्ञानं प्रमा न वा' इति संशयो जायते । स च स्वतस्त्ववादेऽनुपपन्नः; प्रथममनुव्यवसायेन तस्मिन् ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यनिश्चयात्; अननुव्यवसाये च धर्मिज्ञानाभावात् । अतो ज्ञानग्राहिकाया अनुव्यवसायसामग्र्याः प्रामाण्यग्रहणेऽसामार्थ्यं कल्प्यत इति न स्वतस्त्वम् । किंतु अनुमानेन प्रामाण्यग्रहः । तथाहि—'रजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानं न रजतत्वाभाववद्विशेष्यकम्, अरजतगोचरव्यवहाराजनकत्वात्' इति रजतत्वाभाववद्विशेष्यकत्वाभावे सिद्धे 'इदं रजतत्वप्रकारकं रजतविशेष्यकम्, रजतत्वाभाववद्विशेष्यकत्वाभावे सति रजतत्वप्रकारकत्वात्' इत्यनुमानेन रजतत्वप्रकारत्वावच्छेदेन रजतविशेष्यकत्वं सिध्यत् प्रामाण्य एव पर्यवस्यति इत्याहुः ॥

उत्पद्यतेऽपि प्रमा परतो गुणात्; न स्वतो ज्ञानसामग्रीमात्रात्। गुणस्तु, अवयविप्रत्यक्षे भूयोऽवयवेन्द्रिय-

doubt arises as to its validity. This may be explained as follows: First [arises] the ocular perception, '[This is] silver'; then apperception of the same; then a recollection of the alternatives of validity and non-validity; then originates doubt as to whether the cognition of silver is a valid cognition or not. This cannot be explained according to the theory of intrinsic validity, because the validity of the cognition in question has been determined by apperception at the [very] beginning. If there be no apperception [then] there could not be the cognition of that with regard to [the validity of] which doubt arises.[31] Therefore it is maintained that the means of apperception which causes the apprehension of cognition is not capable of apprehending [its] validity; hence [there is] no intrinsicality. But the apprehension of validity is through inference. This may be explained as follows: When [through the inference], 'The cognition in which silverness is the adjunct does not have a substantive in which silverness is absent, because it [i.e., the cognition] does not originate volition[32] with regard to non-silver', it is established that the cognition does not have a substantive which lacks silverness, through [another] inference, 'This [cognition] is one in which silverness is the adjunct and silver the substantive, because while not having a substantive in which silverness is absent it has silverness for [its] adjunct', the fact that [the cognition] has the substantive silver as determined by the adjunctness in silverness [becomes established]; and [thus] it culminates in the establishment of the validity [of the cognition].[33]

Further,[34] valid cognition originates extrinsically from merit;[35] not intrinsically from the entire means of cognition. The merit is, with regard to the perception of the whole, the repeated contact of the sense-organ with the parts;

संनिकर्षः ; संशयविपर्ययोत्तरप्रत्यक्षे सद्विशेषदर्शनम् ; अनुमितौ सल्लिङ्गपरामर्शः ; उपमितौ सदतिदेशवाक्यार्थज्ञानम् ; शाब्दबोधे सत्तात्पर्यज्ञानम् , योग्यताप्रमा वा ; सर्वत्र वा विशेष्यसंबद्धविशेषणज्ञानम् ॥

गुणो न प्रमाकारणम् , प्रमात्वस्य कार्यतानवच्छेदकत्वात् इत्येकदेशिनः ॥

अन्यथाख्यातिवादः

ननु—भ्रमो नाम व्यधिकरणप्रकारकं ज्ञानं जगति नास्त्येवेति कस्य व्यावृत्तये प्रमालक्षणे तद्वतीति विशेषणम् ? अथ यदि शुक्तौ रजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानं नाभ्युपेयते, तदा तथाविधो व्यवहारोऽनुपपन्नः, समानाकारज्ञानस्य व्यवहारजनकत्वात् इति चेत् ; न । व्यवहारं प्रति स्वतन्त्रोपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्य कारणत्वात् । तथाहि—शुक्तौ रजतत्वप्रकारकव्यवहारत्वं जन्यतावच्छेदकम् । शुक्तेश्चक्षुषा ग्रहणम् , रजतस्य

with regard to the perception that arises after doubt and misapprehension,[36] right knowledge of the distinctive features [of the object perceived]; with regard to inferential knowledge, right subsumptive reflection of the probans;[37] with regard to assimilative knowledge, correct knowledge of the meaning of the assimilative proposition; [38] with regard to verbal comprehension, right knowledge of intention [39] or valid knowledge of congruity ; [40] or in all cases, [it is] knowledge of the attribute as related to the substantive.[41]

Certain theorists [among the Naiyāyika-s] hold that merit does not cause valid knowledge, since the state of being valid knowledge cannot be a determinant of effectness.[42]

Anyathākhyāti-vāda

Now, as there is no such cognition as illusion, presenting an adjunct that has a different substrate [i.e., other than the substantive],[43] what is meant to be excluded by the adjectival clause 'possessed of that [attribute]' in the definition of valid cognition? [The argument]—'If the silverness-adjunct-cognition having reference to [the substantive] nacre were not recognized, there would be no possibility of that sort of volition [which presents silverness as the adjunct with reference to the substantive nacre], because what originates the volition is a cognition which has common features with it [i.e., the volition]' [44]—is also incorrect. For, what causes the volition is the non-apprehension of the difference [from the thing lying in front] of the desired [object] [45] presented [to the cognition] [46] independently.[47] This may be explained as follows: [In this case] the silverness-adjunct-volitionness with reference to [the substantive] nacre, is the determinant of that which is caused.[48] The apprehension of the nacre with the eye, the independent recollection of the silver, the

च स्वातन्त्र्येण स्मरणम्, 'इदं न रजतम्' इति भेदग्रहस्याभावश्च त्रितयं कारणम्। तथाच तत्त्रितयादेव विसंवादिव्यवहारसिद्धौ किमन्यथाख्यात्या? संवादिव्यवहारे तु विशिष्टबुद्धिरेव लाघवात् कारणम्; अतो न सर्वत्र विशिष्टज्ञानोच्छेद इति प्राभाकराः॥

तन्न; सामान्यतो विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन रजतत्वप्रकारके व्यवहारे रजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानस्य विशेष्यतया कारणत्वात् अन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धेः; संवादिविसंवादिव्यवहारभेदेन कारणताभेदकल्पने मानाभावात्। किंच 'रजतत्वेन पुरोवर्तिनं जानामि' इत्यनुव्यवसायादेव अन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः। अन्यथा अनुव्यवसायाद्धस्त्वसिद्धौ प्रमापि न सिध्येत् इति॥

संनिकर्षवादः

तच्च प्रमाणं चतुर्विधम्—प्रत्यक्षम्, अनुमानम्, उपमानम्, शब्द इति॥

साक्षात्कारस्य करणं प्रत्यक्षम्। साक्षात्कारत्वं 'साक्षात्करोमि' इत्यनुव्यवसायसिद्धा जातिः। साक्षात्कारकरणम् इन्द्रियं षोढा—घ्राणम्, रसनम्, चक्षुः, त्वक्, श्रोत्रम्, मन इति॥

absence of apprehension in the form 'This is not silver' of the difference [between the thing in front and the silver]—all these three [jointly] are the cause.[49] Thus when [cases of] unsuccessful volition can be accounted for by the above-mentioned three [causes], why postulate a cognition of one thing as another? With regard to successful volition,[50] however, due to the principle of [logical] economy, a qualified cognition alone is the cause.[51] There is not, therefore, total elimination of the qualified cognition.[52] Thus [argue] the Prābhākara-s.

This is not correct; for, as a general rule, with regard to silverness-adjunct-volition through the relation of substantiveness, silverness-adjunct cognition through [the relation of] substantiveness is the cause; thus the cognition of one thing as another is established. There is no reason for positing a difference in causality with regard to successful and unsuccessful volitions.[53] Moreover,[54] by apperception [in the form] 'I cognize the thing in front as silver' itself, the cognition of one thing as another is established.[55] Otherwise, if [it is contended that] nothing can be established by apperception, even valid cognition cannot be established.

Sannikarṣa-vāda

The efficient instrument of valid cognition is fourfold: Perception, Inference, Comparison and Verbal Testimony.

The efficient instrument of immediate apprehension[56] is Perception. 'Immediate-apprehensionness' is the universal established by the apperception 'I apprehend immediately'. The senses which are the instruments of immediate apprehension are six in number: the sense of smell, the sense of taste, the sense of sight, the sense of touch, the sense of hearing and the mind (*manas*).

साक्षात्कारे जननीये इन्द्रियाणां नव प्रत्यासत्तयः—संयोगः, संयुक्तसमवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेतसमवायः, विशेषणता, ज्ञानलक्षणा, सामान्यलक्षणा, योगजलक्षणा चेति । तासु लौकिके साक्षात्कारे षट्, अलौकिके तिस्रः कारणानि ॥

संयोगेन द्रव्यग्रहः । चक्षुःसंयोगेन पृथिव्यप्तेजसां चाक्षुषम्; त्वक्संयोगेन तेषामेव त्वाचम्; मनःसंयोगेन जीवात्मनो मानसं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥

द्रव्यवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतया तत्पुरुषसमवेतचाक्षुषे तत्पुरुषचक्षुःसंयोगः समवायेन कारणम् ॥

द्रव्यवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतया जन्यसाक्षात्कारे समवायेन महत्त्वम् उद्भूतरूपं च कारणम् । तेन परमाणोः वायुगगनादेश्च न साक्षात्कारः ॥

उद्भूतत्वं चानुद्भूतत्वाभावः । अनुद्भूतत्वानि शुक्लत्वादिव्याप्याः षट् जातयः । एकैव वा शुक्लत्वव्याप्यजातिरनुद्भूतत्वम् ॥

आलोकसंयोगोऽपि द्रव्यचाक्षुषे कारणम्; अन्यथा

In bringing about immediate apprehension the senses have nine [varieties of] contacts [with their objects]: conjunction, inherence in the conjoined, inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined, inherence, inherence in the inherent, attributiveness, [contact] in the form of cognition, [contact] in the form of generality and [contact] originating from yogic power. Of these, six are causes of normal immediate apprehension and three of supernormal immediate apprehension.

Apprehension of Substance is through [the contact of] conjunction. Ocular perception of Earth, Water and Fire [takes place] through the conjunction of the sense of sight [with them]; tactual perception of the same [Substances] is through the conjunction of the sense of touch; mental perception of the individual self is through the conjunction of the mind [with the self.][57]

With regard to the ocular perception which exists through [the relation of] inherence in some person and through [the relation of] normal objectness in a Substance, the conjunction of the ocular sense of that person with the Substance through [the relation of] inherence is the cause.

With regard to a caused [58] immediate apprehension of a Substance through [the relation of] normal objectness, medium dimension and manifested colour are causes through [the relation of] inherence.[59] So, there is no immediate apprehension of the prime atom, or of Air, Ether, etc.[60]

Manifestedness is the absence of nonmanifestedness.[61] Nonmanifestedness comprises six universals pervaded by whiteness, etc.[62] Or [it can be said that] there is only one universal of nonmanifestedness pervaded by whiteness.[63]

With regard to ocular perception of Substances, the conjunction of light [64] is also a cause; otherwise, ocular perception

अन्धकारे द्रव्यचाक्षुषापत्तेः । द्रव्यत्वाचे उद्भूतस्पर्शोऽपि कारणम् । अन्यथा प्रभायाः स्पार्शनप्रसङ्गात् ॥

एवं द्रव्यान्यद्रव्यसमवेतचाक्षुषं प्रति चक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवायः, द्रव्यान्यद्रव्यसमवेतत्वाचे त्वक्संयुक्तसमवायः, सद्रासने रसनसंयुक्तसमवायः, सद्घ्राणजे घ्राणसंयुक्तसमवायः कारणम् । तथाहि — द्रव्यान्यद्रव्यसमवेतवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतासंबन्धेन चैत्रीयचाक्षुषे विशेषणतया चैत्रीयचक्षुःसंयुक्तोद्भूतरूपवन्महत्समवायः कारणम् । चैत्रचक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवायविरहेऽपि गुणादौ मैत्रीयचाक्षुषोत्पत्त्या व्यभिचारस्य वारणाय कार्यतावच्छेदके चैत्रीयत्वप्रवेशः । त्रसरेणुचाक्षुषे व्यभिचारवारणाय कार्यतावच्छेदकसंसर्गे द्रव्यान्येति । गुणत्वरूपत्वादिचाक्षुषे व्यभिचारवारणाय द्रव्यसमवेतेति । गुणोपनीतभाने व्यभिचारवारणाय

of a Substance in darkness would be possible. With regard to tactual perception of Substances, manifested touch is also a cause; otherwise, tactual perception of radiance[65] would become possible.

Thus, with regard to ocular perception of a thing other than a Substance and inherent in a Substance,[66] [the relation of] inherence in what is conjoined with the sense of sight; with regard to tactual perception of a thing other than a Substance and inherent in a Substance, [the relation of] inherence in what is conjoined with the sense of touch; with regard to gustatory perception of a thing possessed of *existence*,[67] inherence in what is conjoined with the sense of taste; and with regard to olfactory perception of a thing possessed of *existence*,[68] inherence in what is conjoined with the sense of smell—are the causes. This may be explained as follows: With regard to Caitra's ocular perception through the relation of normal objectness existing in something which is inherent in a Substance and is other than a Substance, the inherence in a thing which has medium dimension and manifested colour, and is conjoined with Caitra's sense of sight is the cause through [the relation of] attributiveness.[69] Here [the clause] 'Caitra's [sense of sight]' is introduced into the determinant of effectness to avoid deviation [of causality], since even without inherence in what is conjoined with Caitra's sense of sight, Maitra has ocular perception of Qualities, etc. In order to avoid deviation [of causality] in the case of ocular perception of a triad,[70] [the clause] 'other than a substance' is introduced into the relation determining the effectness. [The clause] 'inherent in a substance' is [introduced] to avoid deviation [of causality] in the case of ocular perception of [the universals], qualityness, colourness, etc.[71] [The epithet] 'normal' is [introduced] to avoid deviation

लौकिकेति । पिशाचघटितसंनिकर्षात् तत्परिमाणादिप्रत्यक्ष-वारणाय कारणकोटौ चक्षुःसंयुक्ते उद्भूतरूपवत्ताप्रवेशः । परमाणुघटितसंनिकर्षेण तद्गुणानां प्रत्यक्षवारणाय महत्त्वप्रवेशः ॥

एवं त्वक्संयुक्तसमवायस्यापि गुणादित्वाचे कारणत्वमवसेयम् । तत्र प्रभाघटितसंनिकर्षेण प्रभागुणत्वाचवारणाय उद्भूतस्पर्शस्य, त्रसरेणुगुणत्वाचवारणाय प्रकृष्टमहत्त्वस्य च कारणकोटौ प्रवेशः ॥

एवं घ्राणसंयुक्तसमवायरसनसंयुक्तसमवाययोरपि कार्य-कारणभावः स्वयमवसेयः ॥

सद्वृत्तिलौकिकविषयतया घ्राणजे रासने च तादात्म्येन गन्धरसयोः कारणत्वम् । तेन न रूपादेर्घ्राणजरासनप्रसङ्गः ॥

एवं चाक्षुषे स्पर्शरसगन्धानां त्वाचे रूपरसगन्धानां प्रतिबन्धकत्वम्; अन्यथा स्पर्शादिचाक्षुषस्य रूपादिस्पार्शनस्य चापत्तेः ॥

[of causality] in a case where a quality is presented to the consciousness through contact in the form of cognition.[72] In order to exclude perception of the dimension, etc., of a spirit (*piśāca*), through contact [of the sense-organ] with a thing in contact with the spirit, [the clause] 'having manifested colour in what is conjoined with the sense of sight' is introduced as a qualification 'of the cause'.[73] [The phrase] 'medium dimension' is introduced to exclude perception of the qualities of a prime atom [74] through contact of the sense-organ with a prime atom.

In this way, it should be concluded that inherence in what is conjoined with the sense of touch is the cause of the tactual perception of qualities, etc. Here, in order to exclude the tactual perception of the qualities of radiance through sense-contact with radiance, [the phrase] 'having manifested touch', and to exclude the tactual perception of the qualities of a triad, [the phrase] 'having higher magnitude' are introduced [75] as a qualification of 'the cause'.

In this way, one can oneself understand the causality of inherence in what is conjoined with the sense of smell and of inherence in what is conjoined with the sense of taste with regard to their [respective] effects.

With regard to olfactory and gustatory perception through [the relation of] normal objectness existing in a thing possessed of *existence*, smell and taste are causes [respectively] through [the relation of] self-sameness.[76] There is, therefore, no possibility of olfactory or gustatory perception of colour, etc.

In this way, [it is to be held that] touch, taste and smell obstruct ocular perception [of themselves]; and colour, taste and smell obstruct tactual perception [of themselves]. Otherwise, there would be the possibility of ocular perception of touch [quality], etc., and tactual perception of colour, etc.

स्थितिस्थापकगुरुत्वादीनां च साक्षात्कारसामान्ये प्रति-बन्धकत्वमवसेयम् ॥

सद्वृत्तिलौकिकविषयतया चैत्रीयश्रावणे चैत्रश्रोत्रसमवायो विशेषणतया कारणम् । श्रोत्रं नाम कर्णावच्छिन्नं नभः । यस्य शब्दस्याधारता कर्णसंयोगेनावच्छिद्यते स शब्दः श्रवसा गृह्यते । सदन्यत्र समवेते वृत्तिविषयतया चैत्रीयश्रावणप्रत्यक्षे चैत्रीयश्रोत्रसमवेतसमवायः कारणम्; येन शब्दसमवेतजातीनां शब्दत्वकत्वादीनां ग्रहणम् ॥

समवायवादः

'गुणक्रियाजातिविशिष्टबुद्धिः विशेषणविशेष्यसंसर्ग-विषया, विशिष्टबुद्धित्वात्; दण्डिपुरुषविशिष्टबुद्धिवत्' इत्यनु-मानेन लाघवादेकः संबन्धः सिध्यति । स एव समवायः; स्वरूपसंबन्धानामनेकत्वगौरवात् ॥

नव्यास्तु जन्यसत्त्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति द्रव्यं तादात्म्येन

It is also to be concluded that elasticity, weight, etc., obstruct any kind of immediate apprehension [of themselves].[77]

With regard to Caitra's auditory perception abiding through [the relation of] normal objectness in a thing possessed of *existence*,[78] inherence in Caitra's auditory organ is the cause through [the relation of] attributiveness. The auditory organ is the Ether delimited by the ear. That sound, with regard to which the state of being the substrate [of the Ether] is delimited through the conjunction of the ear [with the Ether], is apprehended by the auditory sense. With regard to Caitra's auditory perception through [the relation of] objectness abiding in a thing which is inherent [in something] and is other than what possesses *existence*,[79] inherence in what is inherent in Caitra's auditory organ is the cause. Through this are apprehended universals such as soundness, *ka*-ness,[80] etc., which are inherent in sound.

Samavāya-vāda

Through the inference—'A cognition qualified by Qualities, Actions and universals [81] has a qualifying [attribute], a qualified [substantive] and a relation [between the two] for its content,[82] because it is a qualified cognition, as is the qualified cognition 'a man having a staff'' [83]—a single relation is obtained according to [the principle of logical] economy. And this, verily, is inherence; for the assumption of relations of self-sameness is cumbrous due to plurality.[84]

The modern [logicians],[85] however, say that with regard to every effect possessed of *existence*,[86] Substance is the cause

कारणम् । तत्कार्यतावच्छेदकसंसर्गतया समवायसिद्धिः ; अन्यथा स्वरूपसंसर्गेण क्रियास्वरूपकालोपाधावपि जन्यसदुत्पत्त्या व्यभिचारप्रसङ्गादित्याहुः ॥

अभाववादः

श्रोत्रविशेषणतया शब्दाभावस्य, श्रोत्रसमवेतविशेषणतया शब्दे कत्वाद्यभावस्य, चक्षुःसंयुक्तविशेषणतया भूतले घटाभावादेः, चक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवेतविशेषणतया गुणादौ द्रव्यत्वाद्यभावस्य, चक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवेतविशेषणतया जात्यादौ सत्त्वाद्यभावस्य, इन्द्रियसंबद्धविशेषणतया अभावे भावत्वाभावस्य प्रत्यक्षम् ॥

यत्राधिकरणे यस्य प्रतियोगियोग्यानुपलब्धिः स तत्राभावो योग्यः । अनुपलब्धौ योग्यत्वं प्रतियोगिसत्त्वप्रसञ्जनप्रसञ्जितप्रतियोगिकत्वम् । घटाभावस्य प्रतियोगी घटः, तत्सत्तया भूतले घटोपलब्धिः प्रसञ्जयितुं शक्यत इति भवति

through [the relation of] self-sameness;[87] and, therefore, inherence is established as the relation determining that effectness.[88] Otherwise,[89] as the produceable *existent*[90] originates even in the limiting adjunct of Time which is in the form of action,[91] through the relation of self-sameness,[92] there would be deviation [of causality].[93]

Abhāva-vāda

The perception of the nonexistence of sound [is] through [the relation of] attributiveness to the auditory sense; of the nonexistence of *ka*-ness, etc., in a sound [is] through [the relation of] attributiveness to what is inherent in the auditory sense; of the nonexistence of a pot, etc., on the floor [is] through [the relation of] attributiveness to what is conjoined with the sense of sight; of the nonexistence of substanceness, etc., in Qualities, etc., [is] through [the relation of] attributiveness to that which is inherent in what is conjoined with the sense of sight; of the nonexistence of *existence*, etc., in universals, etc., [is] through [the relation of] attributiveness to what is inherent in that which is inherent in what is conjoined with the sense of sight; of the nonexistence of the state of being existent in nonexistence [is] through [the relation of] attributiveness to what is in contact with the sense-organ.[94]

That nonexistence, the countercorrelate of which has competent nonperception in a substrate, is competent in that [substrate]. The competence of nonperception consists in having a countercorrelate [of nonperception] contingent on the existence of the [posited] countercorrelate [of the non-existence]. The countercorrelate of the nonexistence of a pot is the pot; by [assuming] its existence it is possible to assume the perception of the pot on the floor;[95] thus the

भूतले घटानुपलब्धिः योग्या । एवं पृथिव्यादिपरमाणौ महत्त्वाभावः, महाबाह्याकाशादौ रूपाभावः, स्तम्भे पिशाचान्योन्याभावः, घटे मनोभेदश्च योग्यो भवतीत्यवधेयम् ॥

भाट्टास्तु—अभावस्यानुपलब्धं भिन्नमेव ज्ञानम्; न तु चक्षुरादीन्द्रियजन्यम्; इन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानमाश्रयग्रहणोपक्षीणमित्याहुः । तन्न; एवं त्वचा गृहीते अधिकरणे नीलाभावादीनामानुपलब्धज्ञानप्रसङ्गात् ॥

ननु नीलाभावादिज्ञाने चाक्षुषी अधिकरणोपलब्धिः, चाक्षुषनीलोपलब्धेरभावश्च कारणमिति चेत्, एवं सत्यपि घटाभावादेरानुपलब्धे ज्ञाने क्वचिच्चाक्षुषी क्वचित्त्वाची अधिकरणोपलब्धिः तत्तदिन्द्रियजन्यघटोपलम्भाभावसहकृता कारणमिति तत्कार्यतावच्छेदकतया आनुपलब्धे ज्ञाने वैजात्यद्वयकल्पनप्रसङ्गात्, घटाभावगोचरे ज्ञाने क्लृप्तचाक्षुषत्वाचत्वादिकल्पनायामेव लाघवमिति ॥

अभावोऽपि नाधिकरणस्वरूपः, किंतु 'न' इत्यनु-

nonperception of the pot on the floor is competent. In this way, it is to be understood that the nonexistence of medium dimension in the atoms of Earth, etc., the nonexistence of colour in the unlimited external Ether, etc., the mutual non-existence of a spirit (*piśāca*) in a pillar, and the difference of the pot from the mind, are competent.[96]

The Bhāṭṭa-s, however, say that the cognition of non-existence called nonapprehension is different [from percep-tion] and that it is not originated by the eye and other senses; the conformity of the senses [to it] through copresence and coabsence comes to an end by apprehending the locus.[97] This is not correct; for if this were the case, there would be [the possibility of] a nonapprehending cognition of the nonexistence of blue colour, etc., when the substrate is apprehended by the tactual sense.[98]

[If it be contended that] with regard to the cognition of the nonexistence of blue colour, etc., the ocular appre-hension of the substrate and the absence of the ocular appre-hension of the blue colour are causes, even then with regard to the nonapprehending cognition of the nonexistence of a pot, etc., in certain instances ocular apprehension and in certain [other] instances tactual apprehension of the substrate aided by the nonapprehension of the pot caused by the respective senses will have to be posited as the cause; thus two [different kinds of] generic attributes, as the determinants of the effectness of such a cause, will have to be assumed with regard to nonapprehending cognition.[99] Therefore, with regard to a cognition which objectifies the nonexistence of a pot, only the assumption of its already accepted[100] visuality, tactuality, etc., conforms to [the principle of logical] economy.[101]

Also nonexistence is not of the form of [its] substrate;[102]

गतप्रतीतिसिद्धः सप्तमः पदार्थः । अन्यथा भूतलादेरधिकरणस्यैक्यात् घटापसरणकाल इव घटसत्ताकालेऽपि 'भूतले घटो न' इति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गात् । अभावातिरेक्यमते तु नित्यस्यात्यन्ताभावस्य विशेषणता तत्तत्कालादिस्वरूपा, न नित्या, इति भवति भूतलादौ घटाद्यत्यन्ताभावस्य सामयिकमव्याप्यवृत्तित्वम् ॥

अत एव समवायवद्विशेषणताप्यतिरिच्यत इति परास्तम् ॥

प्रत्यक्षकारणवादः

तन्निष्ठालौकिकप्रकारकबाह्यप्रत्यक्षे तन्निष्ठया विषयतान्तरनिरूपितविषयतया विशिष्टं ज्ञानं कारणम् । निर्विकल्पकविषयतावारणाय विषयतान्तरनिरूपितत्वं विषयताविशेषणम् । तन्निष्ठालौकिकविषयताकमानसे तद्विषयकसप्रकारकज्ञानस्य पृथगेव जनकता । अत एव उपनीतं विशेषणतयैव भासते, मानसे त्वनियम इति वदन्ति ॥

विशेषणविशेष्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेन कारणतयैवोपपत्तेः ज्ञानलक्षणा न पृथक् जनिकेति नवीनाः ॥

but the seventh category proved by the notion 'no' experienced in several instances.[103] Otherwise, as the substrates, the floors, etc., are the same, there would be [the possibility of] the notion, 'There is no pot', even when the pot is there, just as when the pot is removed. According to the view that nonexistence is a distinct [category], however, since the attributiveness of the eternal, absolute nonexistence is in the form of corresponding [parts of] Time and, therefore, not eternal,[104] the temporal partial extensity [105] of the absolute nonexistence of the pot, etc., on the floor, etc., is possible.

For the same reason, the view that attributiveness also is a distinct category like inherence, is rejected. [106]

Pratyakṣakāraṇa-vāda

With regard to an external perception abiding in something through [the relation of] supernormal adjunctness, the cause is a cognition possessing an objectness correlated with another objectness and abiding in that thing.[107] To exclude the objectness of indeterminate [perception],[108] the qualifying epithet 'correlated with another objectness' is added to 'objectness'. With regard to the mental perception abiding in something through [the relation of] supernormal adjunctness, a cognition which has an adjunct and objectifies that thing is a separate cause.[109] Hence they say: 'That which is brought [to the cognition through supernormal relation] [110] appears only as an attribute; but in the case of mental perception there is no such rule'.[111]

The modern [logicians] hold that contact in the form of cognition is not a separate cause [of perception] since its causality can be explained either as that of the cognition of the attribute or as that of the cognition in which the determinant of the substantiveness is the adjunct.[112]

धूमत्वादिप्रकारतानिरूपितालौकिकमुख्यविशेष्यतया चाक्षुषे स्वप्रकारीभूतधूमत्वादिमत्तासंसर्गेण चाक्षुषं कारणम् । तेन धूमत्वेनैकस्मिन् धूमे गृहीते धूमा इति सकलधूमगोचरं चाक्षुषमुपपद्यते । मानसस्थले तु धूम इति ज्ञानमात्रं सामान्यलक्षणा; न तु तस्य मानसत्वमप्यपेक्ष्यते ॥

विशेषणज्ञानकारणतैव सामान्यलक्षणा कारणतेति तु नवीनाः ॥

योगजलक्षणा तु योगजनितो धर्मविशेषः । स स्वाश्रयसंयोगस्वाश्रयसंयुक्तसमवायादिसंसर्गेण द्रव्यगुणादौ प्रत्यासन्नः तत्प्रत्यक्षं जनयति । प्रणिधानं च तत्सहकारि । अत एव 'क्षणं ध्यात्वाब्रवीन्मुनिः' इत्युपपद्यते ॥

सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकवादौ

प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधम्, निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं च । निर्विकल्पकमेव आलोचनम् । सप्रकारकं सविकल्पकम् । प्रकारो द्विविधः—विशेषणमुपल[क्षणं] च । प्रत्यभिज्ञापि विशिष्टज्ञानम्, न तु ज्ञानद्वयम्, स्थैर्यासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् ॥

इति प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदः

With regard to ocular perception through [the relation of] supernormal, principal substantiveness [113] correlated with the adjunctness in smokeness, etc., ocular perception through the relation of having smokeness, etc., which is the adjunct in the perception, is the cause. So, when smoke in a particular place is apprehended as having smokeness, ocular perception [in the form of] 'smokes', objectifying all smoke becomes possible.[114] In the case of a mental perception, however, the cognition, '[This is] smoke', alone is the contact in the form of generality; the fact of its being mental is not relevant there.[115]

The modern [logicians] say that the causality of contact in the form of generality is no other than the causality of the cognition of the attribute.[116]

[Contact] in the form of Yogic power is a certain characteristic produced by Yoga. This [characteristic] having come into contact with Substances, Qualities, etc., through the relations of conjunction with its own locus,[117] inherence in what is conjoined with its own locus, etc.,[118] causes their perception. Contemplation is an aid to it. Therefore, [the statement] 'The sage spoke after contemplating for a moment' becomes appropriate.

Savikalpaka-nirvikalpaka-vāda

Perception is twofold: indeterminate and determinate. The indeterminate is the same as *ālocana*. That which has an adjunct is determinate.[119] There are two types of adjuncts: attributive and indicative.[120] Recognition is also a qualified [single] cognition and not [a combination of] two cognitions;[121] for [otherwise] the stability of the object of cognition would remain unexplained.[122]

THUS ENDS THE CHAPTER ON PERCEPTION

अनुमानपरिच्छेदः

अनुमितिप्रकरणम्

अथानुमानं निरूप्यते । व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञान-जन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः । तत्करणमनुमानम् ॥

अनुमितिः प्रत्यक्षमेवेति चार्वाकाः । तन्न; 'अनुमि-नोमि' इत्यनुव्यवसायसिद्धस्यानुमितित्वस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वसामानाधि-करण्ये मानाभावात् ॥

व्याप्तिप्रकरणम्

तत्र व्याप्तिः न साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वं, साध्यवदन्यावृत्ति-त्वं वा; केवलान्वयिसाध्यके 'वाच्यं ज्ञेयत्वात्' इत्यादाव-व्याप्तेः । किंतु प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणहेत्वधिकरणनिष्ठाभावप्रति-योगितानवच्छेदकसाध्यतावच्छेदकविशिष्टसाध्यसमानाधिकरण-हेतुत्वं व्याप्तिः ॥

'संयोगी, द्रव्यत्वात्' इत्यादिसंग्रहाय हेत्वधिकरणे

II. INFERENCE

Anumiti-prakaraṇa

Now inference is being considered. The knowledge originated by the cognition of the presence of the probans in the subject as qualified by the pervasion [of the probans and the probandum] [1] is inferential knowledge; the efficient instrument [2] of this knowledge is inference.

The C ā r v ā k a - s [3] say that inferential knowledge is nothing but perceptional knowledge.[4] That is not so; for there is no ground [for holding] that inferencehood which is established by apperception [in the form], 'I infer', has a common substrate with perceptionhood.[5]

Vyāpti-prakaraṇa

Here pervasion is not the absence [of the probans] in a substrate in which the probandum is nonexistent; [6] nor is it the absence [of the probans] in a substrate other than that which has the probandum; [7] for [in both these cases] the definition would not include an inference in which the probandum has only positive pervasion, e.g., 'It is nameable, because of [its] knowability'.[8] But pervasion is to be that probans which has a common substrate with the probandum, as specified by the determinant of being the probandum, which [determinant] is not the determinant of the countercorrelateness of the nonexistence resting in the substrate of the probans, which [substrate] is not a substrate of the countercorrelate [of the nonexistence].[9]

To include [an inference such as] 'This has conjunction because of substanceness', the qualifying epithet 'which is

प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणत्वं विशेषणम् । प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणत्वं तु प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकविशिष्टानधिकरणत्वम् । तेन 'गुणान्यत्व-विशिष्टसत्तावान् जातेः' इत्यादौ नातिव्याप्तिः । हेत्वधि-करणत्वमपि हेतुतावच्छेदकविशिष्टाधिकरणत्वम्; अन्यथा 'द्रव्यं गुणाद्यन्यसत्त्वात्' इत्यादौ अव्याप्तिप्रसङ्गात् । प्रति-योगिता च साध्यतावच्छेदकसंसर्गावच्छिन्ना ग्राह्या । तेन वह्नेः समवायेनाभावस्य धूमवद्वृत्तित्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । अव-च्छेदकत्वं चे[ह गुरु] लघुसाधारणम् । तेन प्रमेयधूमत्वादिना साध्यतायां वह्नौ हेतौ नातिव्याप्तिः ॥

प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणहेतुसमानाधिकरणाभावप्रतियोगि - तासामान्ये यत्संसर्गावच्छिन्नत्वयद्रूपावच्छिन्नत्वोभयाभावः, तेन संसर्गेण तद्रूपविशिष्टसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरिति तु युज्यते ।

not a substrate of the countercorrelate' is added to 'the substrate of the probans'.[10] 'Not being the substrate of the countercorrelate', however, is [to be interpreted as] 'not being the substrate of that which is specified by the determinant of the countercorrelateness'; so [the definition] would not include [such inferences as], 'It has *existence* possessed of difference from that of Qualities, because it has a universal,' etc.[11] 'Being the substrate of the probans' is also [to be interpreted as] 'being a substrate specified by the determinant of being the probans'; otherwise the definition would not include the inference, 'It is a substance, because it has an *existence* different from that of Qualities, etc.[12] The countercorrelateness is also to be understood as specified by that relation which determines the state of being the probandum.[13] There is, therefore, no defect in the definition even though there is the nonexistence of fire through the relation of inherence in that which possesses smoke.[14] Here the state of being a determinant is also [to be taken as] common to both the complex and the simple. There is, therefore, no overapplicability [of the definition] with regard to [an inference] where 'knowable-smokeness', etc., are the determinants of the probandum and 'fire' is the probans.[15]

It is, however, appropriate [to hold] pervasion as being [i.e., the existence of the probans] in the same substrate [with the probandum] through that [particular] relation and as determined by that [particular] form [i.e., attribute], which relation and which form [i.e., attribute] do not [jointly] exist as determinants [of countercorrelateness] in the entire countercorrelateness [16] of the nonexistence which does not exist with [its] countercorrelate in the same substrate but exists in the same substrate with the probans.[17] Otherwise, this [definition] would not include an inference in which the probandum

अन्यथा महाकालिकविशेषणतया घटादौ साध्ये महाकालत्वे हेतौ अव्याप्तिप्रसङ्गात् । कस्यापि हेत्वधिकरणवृत्तेरभावस्य साध्यतावच्छेदकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकस्य स्वप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसंसर्गेण प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणत्वाभावादिति संक्षेपः ॥

व्याप्तिग्रहोपायप्रकरणम्

व्याप्तेर्ग्राहकं हेतुसाध्यसहचारदर्शनं व्यभिचारदर्शनाभावश्च । स चाभावः क्वचित् स्वारसिकः; यथा 'घटभिन्नभिन्नोऽयम्, घटत्वात्' इत्यादौ निसर्गत एव हेतौ साध्यव्यभिचारशङ्का नोदेति । क्वचित्तर्कप्रयुक्तः; यथा 'वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ धूमे संभवन्त्यपि वह्निव्यभिचारशङ्का 'धूमो यदि वह्निव्यभिचारी स्यात्, वह्निजन्यो न स्यात्' इति तर्केणापनीयते; अनाहार्यशङ्काया वह्निजन्यत्वादिविधिशेषदर्शनेनापगतत्वेऽपि आहार्यशङ्कायास्तर्कैकापोद्यत्वात् ॥

तर्कप्रकरणम्

तर्को नाम व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपः । तर्कत्वं नाम

is a pot, etc., through the relation of temporal attributiveness, and 'being infinite time' is the probans.[18] In short, no nonexistence which abides in the substrate of the probans, and the countercorrelateness of which is determined by the relation that determines the state of being the probandum, exists in a substrate where the countercorrelate is absent through the relation which determines its countercorrelateness.[19]

Vyāptigrahopāya-prakaraṇa

The cognition of the copresence of the probans and the probandum and the noncognition of deviation [in their presence] cause the apprehension of [their] pervasion.[20] This noncognition [of deviation] is, in certain instances, self-evident; for example, with regard to [the inferences], 'This is other than that which is different from a pot, because of its being a pot', etc., naturally enough, doubt does not arise as to the deviation of the probans [from its copresence] with the probandum. In certain instances, it [i.e., the noncognition of deviation] is caused by reasoning;[21] for example, in such intances as, 'It has fire, because there is smoke', though doubt may arise as to the deviation of smoke from its copresence with fire, it is removed by the reasoning, 'If smoke were to exist without fire it could not be caused by fire'.[22] Although a doubt which is not adventitious is removed by seeing the eulogistic passage [in the Veda-s] which speaks of smoke being caused by fire,[23] an adventitious doubt[24] can be removed only by reasoning.

Tarka-prakaraṇa

Reasoning is the deduction of the pervader by the assumption of the pervaded.[25] 'The state of reasoning' is a certain

मानसत्वव्याप्यो जातिविशेषः । तर्के व्याप्यस्याहार्यारोपो नाम तर्कणम् आपाद्यव्यतिरेकनिर्णयश्च कारणमिति दिक् ॥

उपाधिप्रकरणम्

व्यभिचारदर्शनं तु क्वचिदुपाधिदर्शनाहितम् । उपाधिस्तु यद्धर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नहेतोरव्यापको धर्मः। भवति च 'धूमवान् वह्नेः' इत्यादौ द्रव्यत्वादिविशिष्टस्य साध्यस्य धूमस्य व्यापको द्रव्यत्वादिविशिष्टस्य वह्नेरव्यापकश्च आर्द्रेन्धनादिरुपाधिः । 'स श्यामः मित्रातनयत्वात्' इत्यत्र मित्रातनयत्वविशिष्टश्यामत्वव्यापकं स्वविशिष्टस्य च हेतोरव्यापकं शाकपाकजत्वम् । 'वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षगुणाश्रयत्वात्' इत्यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वव्यापकं तदवच्छिन्नहेतोरव्यापकम् उद्भूतरूपमुपाधिः ॥

अत एव 'वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यत्र महानसत्वावच्छिन्नवह्नेर्व्यापकं शुद्धधूमाव्यापकं व्यजनवत्त्वं[1] नोपाधिः; महानसत्वावच्छिन्नधूमं प्रत्यपि व्यापकत्वात् ॥

[1] व्यञ्जनवत्त्वमिति कोशपाठः ।

universal pervaded by [the universal] 'being mental'.[26] In brief, with regard to reasoning the argumentation known as the adventitious assumption of the pervaded and the decisive knowledge of the opposite of the deduced are the causes.[27]

Upādhi-prakaraṇa

In certain instances the knowledge of the deviation [from copresence] is, however, effected by the knowledge of a condition.[28] A condition is that attribute which, while pervading the probandum as determined by a certain attribute, does not pervade the probans as determined by the same attribute. In [an inference such as] 'It has smoke, because of fire', wet fuel is the condition; for, while pervading the probandum, which is smoke specified by substanceness, etc., it does not pervade fire as specified by substanceness, etc.[29] In [the inference] 'He is dark, because he is the son of Mitrā', [the condition] is 'the state of being caused by eating spinach', which pervades darkness as specified by 'being the son of Mitrā' and does not pervade the probans as specified by itself [i.e., 'being the son of Mitrā'].[30] In [the inference] 'Air is perceived, because it is the substrate of a perceptible quality', manifested colour, which pervades perceptionhood as determined by external substanceness and does not pervade the probans as determined by the same [i.e., external substanceness], is the condition.[31]

Because of this [i.e., the condition as defined above],[32] with regard to the inference 'It has fire, because it has smoke', 'the state of having a fan',[33] which pervades the fire delimited by the state of being in the kitchen and does not pervade pure [i.e., nondelimited] smoke, is not a condition; because this [condition] also pervades the smoke which is delimited by the state of being in the kitchen.

तस्य चोपाधेर्व्यभिचारो हेतौ गृह्यमाणः साध्यव्यभिचारं ज्ञापयति । ततो व्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः ॥

उपाधेरभावः पक्षवृत्तितया गृहीतः साध्याभावोन्नायकत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षमुद्रया दोष इति तु केचित् ॥

पक्षताप्रकरणम्

पक्षता च सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्ध्यभावः । सिद्धिः पक्षे साध्यवत्तानिश्चयः । सिषाधयिषा तु तत्पक्षसाध्यकानुमितिगोचरेच्छा । लिङ्गभेदेनापि पक्षता भिद्यत इति केचित् ॥

परामर्शप्रकरणम्

तत्र 'वह्निव्याप्यो धूमः' 'धूमवान् पर्वतः' इति ज्ञानद्वयसाधारणेन गृह्यमाणव्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकपक्षधर्मताज्ञानत्वेन धूमलिङ्गकवह्न्यनुमितौ कारणत्वमिति मीमांसकाः ॥

व्याप्यत्वविशिष्टस्य पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमेव कारणम्, लाघवादिति नैयायिकाः ॥

The deviation of this condition being apprehended with regard to the probans indicates the deviation of the probandum [from its coexistence with the probans];[34] then the apprehension of the pervasion is obstructed.

Some [say] that the absence of the condition, when apprehended as abiding in the subject, proves to be a defect of the type 'fallacy of counterbalanced reason',[35] by obtruding the absence of the probandum.[36]

Pakṣatā-prakaraṇa

Subjectness [i.e., the state of being the subject in an inference] is the absence of certainty accompanied by the absence of any desire to infer.[37] 'Certainty' means positive knowledge that the subject is possessed of the probandum. 'Desire to infer' means the desire for inferential knowledge involving that subject and that probandum [which are desired]. Some [say] that subjectness becomes different through difference in the sign [i.e., the probans] too.[38]

Parāmarśa-prakaraṇa

Here the Mīmāṃsaka-s [hold that] with regard to the inference of fire through the sign [i.e., the probans], smoke, the cause is the knowledge of the presence [of the probans] in the subject, in which [knowledge] the determinant of being pervaded, while it [i.e., the pervaded] is being actually apprehended, is the adjunct; and such a causality is common to both the cognitions 'Smoke is pervaded by fire', [and] 'The mountain has smoke'.[39]

The Naiyāyika-s [say that] the knowledge of the presence in the subject of that which is possessed of the state of being pervaded is the cause, because [such an assumption conforms to the principle] of [logical] economy.[40]

व्यापकताया ज्ञानमेव कारणम्; न तु व्याप्तेः, सामानाधिकरण्यघटितत्वेन गौरवात् इत्येकदेशिनः ॥

अनुमितौ परामर्शोपनीतं लिङ्गमपि भासत इत्याचार्याः। न भासते, अनुभवविरोधात् प्रमाणाभावाच्च, इति मणिकृतः ॥

केवलान्वयिप्रकरणम्

तच्चानुमानं त्रिविधम्——केवलान्वयि, केवलव्यतिरेकि, अन्वयव्यतिरेकि च ॥

अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यकं केवलान्वयि । यथा 'आकाशाभाववान् प्रमेयत्वात्' इति । आकाशाभावस्यात्यन्ताभावो न प्रतियोगिस्वरूपः । तथात्वे वा वृत्तिमत्प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यकं केवलान्वयीति वक्तव्यम् ॥

मीमांसकास्तु, केवलान्वयिसाध्यकमनुमानमेव नास्ति; तस्य केवलान्वयित्वग्रहदशायां साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वव्याप्तेरग्रहाद् अनुमानावतारासंभवाद् इत्याहुः ॥

Certain theorists [among the Naiyāyika-s say that] knowledge of pervasiveness alone is the cause, and not [knowledge] of pervasion,[41] because it is cumbrous to assume a cause which involves 'existence in a common substrate'.[42]

The venerated Ā c ā r y a says that in inferential knowledge, the probans brought forward by the consideration also presents itself to the consciousness.[43] The venerated author of the *Maṇi*, [holds that] it [i.e., the probans] does not present itself to the consciousness as it is contrary to experience and as there is no proof [for entertaining such a view].[44]

Kevalānvayi-prakaraṇa

This Inference is of three kinds: the exclusively affirmative, the exclusively negative and the affirmative-negative.

The exclusively affirmative is [that inference] the probandum of which is never a countercorrelate of [any] absolute nonexistence; for example, [the inference] 'It possesses the nonexistence of Ether, because it is knowable'. The absolute nonexistence of the nonexistence of Ether is not the same as the countercorrelate [i.e., Ether]. If it is held to be so, then it should be stated that the exclusively affirmative is that [inference] which possesses a probandum which is not a countercorrelate of the absolute nonexistence that does not coexist in the same substrate with a countercorrelate having occupancy.[45]

The Mīmāṃsaka-s, however, say that there is no inference in which the probandum is never a countercorrelate of nonexistence. For, when there is the apprehension that the probandum is not a countercorrelate of nonexistence, there could not be an apprehension of the pervasion, which is 'nonexistence [of the probans] where there is the nonexistence of the probandum'; and so there would be no ground for making the inference.

केवलव्यतिरेकिप्रकरणम्

केवलव्यतिरेकि तदुच्यते, यत्र साध्यसाधनसामानाधिकरण्याग्रहेऽपि साध्याभावं प्रति हेत्वभावस्य व्यापकताग्रहादनुमितिः। तथाहि—जलादिकं प्रति पृथिवीत्वाभावस्य व्यापकत्वे गृहीते 'जलादिव्यापकपृथिवीत्वाभावप्रतियोगिपृथिवीत्ववती पृथिवी' इति परामर्शात् 'पृथिव्यां जलादिभेदः' इत्यप्रसिद्धसाध्यिका अनुमितिरुत्पद्यते। सा च साध्यविशेष्यिकैव, न तु तद्विशेषणिका, पूर्वं विशेषणज्ञानाभावात्॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकिप्रकरणम्

अन्वयव्यतिरेकि तदुच्यते, यत्रान्वयतो व्यतिरेकतश्च व्याप्तिं हेतौ गृहीत्वा पक्षे साध्यमनुमीयते। तथाहि—धूमे वह्न्यभावव्यापकधूमाभावप्रतियोगित्वं धूमसमानाधिकरणाभावाप्रतियोगिवह्निसामानाधिकरण्यं च गृहीत्वा पर्वते वह्निरनुमीयते। सा चानुमितिः साध्यविशेषणिकैव, प्रसिद्धसाध्यकत्वात्॥

Kevalavyatireki-prakaraṇa

The exclusively negative [inference] is said to be that in which, although the coexistence of the probandum and the probans is not apprehended, inferential knowledge arises by apprehending the pervasiveness of the absence of the probans with regard to the absence of the probandum. This may be explained as follows: When the pervasiveness of the absence of earthness with regard to water, etc.,[46] is apprehended, there arises the consideration, 'Earth possesses earthness, which is the countercorrelate of the nonexistence of earthness which [nonexistence] pervades water, etc.' From this originates the inferential knowledge 'There is nonidentity of water, etc., with the Earth', the probandum of which [inference] is not previously ascertained.[47] This [inferential knowledge] has the probandum as its substantive only and not as its attribute, because there was no previous ascertainment of the attribute.[48]

Anvayavyatireki-prakaraṇa

That [inference] in which the probandum is inferred in the subject after apprehending the pervasion of the probans [both] positively and negatively, is said to be the affirmative-negative. This may be explained as follows: After apprehending that smoke is the countercorrelate of the absence of smoke which [absence] pervades the absence of fire [49] and that it exists in the same substrate along with fire, which is not a countercorrelate of the nonexistence that exists in the same substrate in which smoke exists,[50] fire in the mountain is inferred. This inferential knowledge has the probandum as its attribute, because the probandum [here] is an already ascertained one.[51]

अर्थापत्तिप्रकरणम्

अर्थापत्तिरपि व्यतिरेक्यनुमानमेव ; न तु मानान्तरम् , प्रमाणाभावात् ॥

न्यायप्रकरणम्

अनुमितिर्द्विविधा—स्वार्था परार्था च । परार्थानुमितौ न्यायजन्यः परामर्शः कारणम् ॥

उचितानुपूर्वीकप्रतिज्ञादिपञ्चकसमुदायो न्यायः । तस्य प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि अवयवाः ॥

न्यायान्तर्गतत्वे सति प्रकृतानुमित्यन्यूनानतिरिक्तविषयताकवाक्यार्थबोधजनकं वाक्यं प्रतिज्ञा । अवयवान्तरघटकपञ्चमीसाकाङ्क्षपदघटितत्वे सति हेतुभिन्नन्यायावयवो वा प्रतिज्ञा । भवति च हेतुघटकपञ्चमीसाकाङ्क्षेण साध्यवाचिना पदेन घटिता हेत्ववयवभि(न्ना) सर्वा प्रतिज्ञा । 'घटो दण्डात् , दण्डान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात् ' इत्यत्र हेत्ववयववारणाय हेतुभिन्नेति। उदासीनवाक्यवारणाय न्यायावयव इति ॥

Arthāpatti-prakaraṇa

Presumption is also only inference of the exclusively negative type. It is not a separate means [of valid knowledge], for there is no proof for holding it to be so.[52]

Nyāya-prakaraṇa

Inferential knowledge is of two kinds: that which is for one's own sake, and that which is for others.[53] With regard to the inference which is for others, the consideration originating from a syllogism is the cause.

The Syllogism is an assemblage of the five [components], Proposition, etc., in the appropriate order.[54] Its components are: Proposition, Reason, Example, Application and Conclusion.

The Proposition is that sentence which, while included in the syllogism, originates the knowledge of the sentence-meaning that objectifies not less and not more than the inferential knowledge in question. Or, the Proposition is that component [of the syllogism] which is other than the Reason and includes a word having expectancy for [a word in] the ablative case occurring in another component. Every Proposition, while being different from the component, Reason, includes a word expressing the probandum and having expectancy for [a word in] the ablative case which occurs in the [component], Reason. To exclude the component Reason [from being the proposition] in 'The pot is caused by the staff, because it [i.e., the pot] conforms to [the causality of] the staff in positive and negative modes', [the phrase] 'other than the Reason' is introduced.[55] [The phrase] 'component of the syllogism' is [introduced] to exclude any unrelated expression [not intended to be a syllogistic expression].

प्रतिज्ञाघटकपदसाकाङ्क्षपदघटितो न्यायावयवो हेतुः ॥

हेत्ववयवाव्यवहितोत्तरो न्यायावयव उदाहरणम् ॥

प्रकृतपक्षे प्रकृतसाध्यव्याप्तिविशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यबोधको न्यायावयव उपनयः ॥

उपनयघटकपदसाकाङ्क्षपदघटितो न्यायावयव उपनयभिन्नो निगमनम् ॥

पर्वतो वह्निमान्; धूमात्; यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमान्, यथा महानसम्; वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् अयम्; तस्माद्वह्निमान्; इति न्यायशरीरम् ॥

'यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमान्' 'धूमवान् पर्वतः' इत्युदाहरणोपनयावेव न्यायावयवौ, न त्वितरे इति बौद्धाः ॥

'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' 'धूमात्' 'यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमान्' इति प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणान्येव न्यायावयवा इति प्राभाकराः ॥

उदाहरणे 'यो यः' इति वीप्सा यच्छब्दे प्रयोक्तव्या, न तच्छब्दे इति प्राचीनाः । यच्छब्देऽपि न प्रयोज्या, इति मणिकृतः ॥

'तथा चायम्' इत्येव उपनयाकार इत्यपि वदन्ति ॥

The Reason is that component of the syllogism which includes a word having expectancy for a word included in the Proposition.[56]

The Example is that component of the syllogism which immediately follows the component, Reason.

The Application is that component of the syllogism which makes it known that the subject in question is characterized by that [57] which possesses pervasion with the probandum in question.

The Conclusion is that component of the syllogism which, while including a word having expectancy for a word included in the Application, is other than the Application.

The body of the syllogism is: The mountain has fire; because of smoke; whatever has smoke has fire, like the kitchen; this has smoke, which is pervaded by fire; therefore, [this] has fire.

Only the Example and the Application [which take the forms] 'whatever has smoke, has fire' and 'the mountain has smoke', respectively, are the components of the syllogism, and the others are not—so say the Buddhists.[58]

The Prābhākara-s [hold that] only the Proposition, the Reason and the Example [which take the forms] 'The mountain has fire', 'because of smoke' and 'whatever has smoke, has fire', respectively, are the components of the syllogism.[59]

The ancients [say that] in the Example there should be repetition of *yat-śabda*, '*yaḥ*, *yaḥ*' [60] but not of *tat-śabda* [*saḥ*].[61] The venerated author of the *Maṇi* [says that] there should not be repetition even of *yat-śabda*.[62]

It is also said [by some] that the form of the Application is merely 'This is also so'.[63]

हेत्वाभासप्रकरणम्

अनुमितितज्जनकपरामर्शान्यतरप्रतिबन्धकज्ञानविषयो विशिष्टधर्मो हेतुदोषः; तद्वान् हेत्वाभासः ॥

स पञ्चधा—सव्यभिचारः, विरुद्धः, सत्प्रतिपक्षः, असिद्धः, बाधितश्च ॥

तत्र व्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धकग्रहविषयत्वे सति हेतु-साध्यादिग्रहाविरोधी यो दोषः, तद्वान् सव्यभिचारः ॥

स त्रिविधः—साधारणः, असाधारणः, अनुपसंहारी च ॥

तत्र साध्ये हेतुव्यापकताग्रहविरोधी दोषः साधारण्यम्, तद्वान् साधारणः। यथा 'धूमवान् वह्नेः' इत्यत्र वह्नौ साध्याभाववद्गामित्वम्, धूमाभाववद्गामी वह्निर्वा ॥

हेतुसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यग्रहविरोधी दोषः असाधारण्यम्; तद्वान् असाधारणः। यथा 'शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वात्, आकाशाद्वा' इत्यादौ साध्यासमानाधिकरणो हेतुः ॥

Hetvābhāsa-prakaraṇa

The defect of the probans is a qualified attribute [64] which is the object of a cognition that obstructs either the inferential knowledge or the consideration that originates it [i.e., inferential knowledge]; [65] that which has this [defect] is a defective probans [*hetvābhāsa*].[66]

It [67] is of five kinds: the Inconsistent, the Contradictory, the Counterbalanced, the Unfounded and the Stultified.

Of these, the Inconsistent is that [probans] which has the defect, which, while being the object of the apprehension that obstructs the apprehension of the pervasion, is not contradictory to the apprehension of the probans, the probandum, etc.[68]

It is of three kinds: the Common, the Uncommon and the Inconclusive.

Of these, the state of being the Common is the defect which prevents the apprehension of the pervasiveness of the probandum with regard to the probans; that which has this [defect] is the Common.[69] For example, in [the inference] 'It has smoke, because of fire', it [i.e., the defect or the defective probans] is either the presence of fire where the probandum does not exist,[70] or the fire [itself] which exists where there is no smoke.[71]

The defect which prevents the apprehension of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum in the same substrate is the state of being the Uncommon; [72] that which has this [defect] is the Uncommon. For example, in such [inferences] as 'Sound is eternal, because of soundness, or because of Ether', the probans which does not coexist in the same substrate with the probandum [is the Uncommon].[73]

व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहविरोधी दोषः अनुपसंहारः ; तद्वान अनुपसंहारी । यथा 'सर्वं प्रमेयं वाच्यत्वात्' इत्यत्र अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यकत्वादिविशिष्टो हेतुः ॥

साध्यव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगी साध्याभावव्याप्यो वा प्रकृतो हेतुः पक्षवृत्तिः विरुद्ध इत्युच्यते । यथा 'शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वात्' इत्यत्र नित्यत्वाभावव्याप्यं शब्दवृत्ति च प्रकृतमेव साधनं शब्दत्वम् ॥

तादृशं प्रकृतहेतुभिन्नं चेत्, तदा सत्प्रतिपक्षः । यथा 'शब्दो नित्यः व्योमैकगुणत्वात्' इति स्थापनायाम्, 'शब्दो न नित्यः उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात्' इति प्रतिस्थापनाविषयो हेतुः उत्पत्तिमत्त्वम् ॥

विरुद्धेन सत्प्रतिपक्षेण च संशयस्वरूपानुमितिर्जन्यत इति रत्नकोशकारः ; नेत्यन्ये ॥

व्यभिचारभिन्नः परामर्शविरोधी (दोषः) असिद्धिः ; तद्वान् असिद्धः ।

स त्रिविधः—आश्रयासिद्धः, व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः, स्वरूपासिद्ध इति ॥

The defect which prevents the apprehension of negative pervasion is the state of being the Inconclusive; that which has this [defect] is the Inconclusive. For example, in [the inference] ' Everything is knowable, because of nameability ', the probans as qualified by such [attributes] as the state of having a probandum which is not a countercorrelate of any absolute nonexistence [is the Inconclusive].[74]

The probans in question,[75] if it be either a countercorrelate of the nonexistence which is pervasive of the probandum,[76] or is pervaded by the nonexistence of the probandum,[77] and abides in the subject,[78] is called the Contradictory. For example, in [the proposition] ' Sound is eternal, because of soundness ',[79] the very probans in the present inference, soundness, which is pervaded by the absence of eternality and abides in the sound [is the Contradictory].[80]

If such [a probans] is different from the probans in question, then it is [called] the Counterbalanced. For example, when it is stated that ' Sound is eternal, because it is a quality of Ether alone ', ' the state of being originated ', which is the probans in the counterstatement ' Sound is not eternal, because it is originated ' [is the Counterbalanced].[81]

The author of the *Ratnakośa*[82] [says that] by the Contradictory and the Counterbalanced, inferential knowledge in the form of doubt is produced;[83] others [say] it is not so.[84]

The defect which is different from the Inconsistent and is opposed to [the apprehension of] consideration is the state of being the Unfounded; that which possesses this [defect] is the Unfounded.

This is of three kinds: the Unfounded in respect of the locus, the Unfounded in respect of being pervaded and the Unfounded in respect of its own existence.[85]

आश्रयासिद्धः 'काञ्चनमयपर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ। व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः 'काञ्चनमयवह्निमान् काञ्चनमय-धूमात्' इत्यादौ। स्वरूपासिद्धः 'तप्तायःपिण्डो वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ प्रकृतो हेतुः ॥

सत्प्रतिपक्षविरोधभिन्नः प्रकृतानुमितिविरोधी दोषो बाधः; तद्वान् बाधितः। यथा 'ह्रदो वह्निमान् धूमात्', 'गन्धप्रागभावकालावच्छिन्नो घटो गन्धवान् पृथिवीत्वात्' इत्यत्र साध्याभाववत्प्रकृतपक्षको हेतुः ॥

ईश्वरानुमानप्रकरणम्

एवमनुमाने निरूपिते तस्मात् जगन्निर्मातृपुरुषधौरेय-सिद्धिः। तथाहि—'क्षितिः सकर्तृका कार्यत्वात्' इत्यनु-मानेन लौकिकस्य शरीरिणः कर्तुर्बाधे अशरीरः कर्ता सिध्यति। स एवेश्वरः। तत्र क्षितिद्व्यणुकाङ्कुरादिः जन्यकृत्यजन्य-जन्यत्वेन अनुगतेन रूपेण क्षितित्वादिना प्रत्येकं वा पक्षः। सकर्तृकत्वं तु उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमज्जन्य-

The Unfounded in respect of the locus is in such [propositions] as 'The golden mountain has fire, because of smoke'.[86] The Unfounded in respect of being pervaded is in such [propositions] as 'It has golden fire, because of golden smoke'.[87] The Unfounded in respect of its own existence is the probans in question in such [inferences] as 'The red-hot iron ball has fire, because of smoke'.[88]

The defect which is different from the Counterbalanced [89] and the Contradictory [89] and is opposed to the inferential knowledge on hand, is Stultification; that which has this defect is the Stultified. For example, in [the inferences] 'The lake has fire, because of smoke,' [90] and 'The pot, [existing] at a time when there is prior-nonexistence of smell,[91] has smell, because of its being earth,' the probans existing in the present subject which is devoid of the probandum [is the Stultified].[92]

Īśvarānumāna-prakaraṇa

When thus Inference has been considered, by means of it, [the existence of] the Supreme Person who created the universe is established. This is as follows: By means of the inference, 'The earth has a creator, because it is an effect', a bodiless creator [of the earth] becomes established, as a worldly corporeal creator [in this case] is impossible. And He is verily *Īśvara*. In this [inference] the subject may be the earth, the dyad,[93] the sprout, etc., having the common attribute of being products which cannot be produced by an originated volition, or separately, being the earth, etc.[94] 'To have a creator' means 'being created by one who has an immediate knowledge, a desire to do and a volition objectifying the material cause [of the thing to be created]'.[95] 'To be an effect' is

त्वम् । कार्यत्वं तु प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वे सति सत्तावत्त्वम् । तेन ध्वंसे न व्यभिचारः ॥

स च कर्ता न शरीरी । तथात्वे हि स कार्यसंनिहित-शरीरचेष्टाद्वारा कार्यजातमुत्पादयेत्, तदसंनिहित एव वा । आद्ये, पाषाणान्तर्वर्तिभेकनिर्माणे पाषाणभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । अन्त्ये, किमस्य शरीरस्वीकारेण? शरीरव्यापारमन्तरापि पाषाणान्त-र्वर्तिभेकस्येव जगतो निर्माणसंभवात् ॥

तस्य च कर्तुः ज्ञानमिच्छा प्रयत्नश्च नोत्पद्यते, शरीराभावात् । अत एव न विनश्यति, उत्पत्तिमतामेव सतां विनाशात् । न च नाना, मानाभावात् । लाघवा-देकैकेषामेव भगवज्ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नानां सिद्धेश्च ॥

शक्तिवादः

मण्यादिकुण्ठिते वह्नौ न दाहकत्वम्; सहकारिणो मण्यभावस्याभावात् । दाहं प्रति हि मण्यभावः कारणम् । दाह-कारणीभूताभावप्रतियोगितया मणिर्दाहप्रतिबन्धक इत्युच्यते ॥

यत्तु—वह्नौ दाहानुकूला शक्तिरभ्युपेया, सा मणि-समवधाने कुण्ठिता भवति, इति मीमांसकैरुक्तम्, तन्न; शक्तेः कुण्ठनस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । नित्यायाः शक्तेः

'to possess *existence* while being a countercorrelate of prior-nonexistence';[96] so, there is no deviation [of this definition] with regard to annihilative nonexistence.[97]

Such a creator does not have a body; for, if he had [it should be clarified] whether he creates all things through efforts of the body while it is proximate to the things created or even while it is not proximate. In the former case, in creating the frog which is inside a rock, there should have been a breakage in the rock. In the latter case, why assume that he has a body? He might just as well create the world, as he creates the frog inside the rock, quite without physical effort.

In such a creator knowledge, desire and volition are not born,[98] as he is without a body. For the same reason [because they are unborn] they do not perish; because only those existents [99] which are born perish. They are not manifold either, as there is no proof [for holding so]. [On the contrary] it is [logically] simple to hold that God's knowledge, desire and volition are [each of them] single.[100]

Śakti-vāda

The fire, which is subdued by [the proximity of] gems, etc.,[101] has no power to burn, because the nonexistence of the gem which is an aid [to burning] [102] is absent there. With regard to burning, the absence of the gem is a cause. The gem is said to be an impediment to burning, as it is the countercorrelate of the nonexistence [103] that causes burning.

It has been said by the M ī m ā ṃ s a k a-s that a power [104] which helps the burning [of fire] is to be accepted [as existing] in the fire and that it [the power] is subdued in the immediate vicinity of the gem. This is not correct; for it is impossible to explain what is meant by the subdual of the

विनाशासंभवात् । शक्तेरुत्पादविनाशवत्त्वे तत्कारणत्वेनावश्य-कल्पनीयस्य मण्यभावस्य दाहकारणताकल्पनमेव न्याय्यम् ॥

तृणारणिमणीनां तृणत्वादिनैव वैकल्पिकी कारणता वह्नौ; न तु एकशक्तिमत्त्वेन, तस्यां शक्तौ मानाभावात् । पुरुषो हि वह्न्यर्थी तृणत्वेन वह्नियोग्यतां ज्ञात्वा तृणे प्रवर्तते । न च तृणस्य वह्निकारणत्वे अरणिजन्ये वह्नौ व्यभिचार:, वह्नौ तृणजन्यतावच्छेदकजातिविशेषस्वीकारात् ॥

व्रीह्यादौ प्रोक्षणादिना यजमानसमवेतमदृष्टमेवोत्पाद्यते, न तु व्रीह्यादौ । व्रीहिभेदात्तद्भेदोपगमे शक्त्याधिक्यापत्तेः । सर्वव्रीहावेकशक्तिस्वीकारे यत्किंचिद्व्रीहिनाशे तन्नाशात् अवघातपर्यन्तमनवस्थानप्रसङ्गात् । दिव्यस्थले तुलावनमनं प्रति परीक्ष्यपुरुषसमवेतमदृष्टमेव प्रयोजकम् । लाक्षारसावसिक्त-बीजपूरतरोरपि रक्तकुसुमोद्गमप्रयोजिका न शक्तिः; अपि तु कुसुमारम्भकबीजपूरावयवानां तरणिकिरणक्वथनजन्मा पाकजो

power [to burn]. If the power is [assumed to be] eternal, it cannot perish. If it is [assumed] to have origination and destruction, it is but just to assume that the absence of the gem, which has necessarily to be held as the cause of the power, is the cause of burning [itself].[105]

With regard to fire, the grass, the two wooden pieces and the gem [106] are separately causes by virtue of their being grass, etc.; and not by possessing a single power [to cause the fire]; for, there is no proof of such a power. The person who needs fire deals with the grass after knowing that the grass, by virtue of being grass, is competent to produce fire. [Even] if grass is accepted as the cause of fire, there will not be deviation of causality with regard to the fire caused by pieces of wood; for, it is accepted that the fire [caused by grass] possesses a certain universal determining the state of being produced by the grass.[107]

By the sprinkling of water, etc., on grain, etc., an unseen [merit] is produced, which inheres in the sacrificer and not in the grain, etc.;[108] for, if a divergence in this [merit] due to the divergence in the grain is accepted, a multiplicity of powers would have to be posited.[109] If [on the other hand], a single power is accepted in all the grains [together], it will be destroyed by the destruction of any one of the grains and so will not exist until the dehusking is over.[110] In the case of an ordeal, the unseen [merit or demerit] alone, inherent in the person subjected to the test, is the cause of the lowering of the [pan of the] balance.[111] In the case of the citron tree also, [the seeds of] which are bedewed with lac-dye, there is no [inherent] power which causes the offshoot of red flowers, but owing to the baking caused by the heat of the sun's rays

रूपान्तरोत्पादः । गोमयवृश्चिकजन्ययोर्वृश्चिकयोः अमेध्यवस्तुतण्डुलीयकबीजप्रभवयोश्च तण्डुलीयकयोः वैजात्यमनुभवसिद्धमेवेति दिक् ॥

कारणतावादः

कार्यकादाचित्कत्वोपपादिका शक्तिरपि कारणतैव । सा च अन्यथासिद्धिशून्यत्वे सति नियतपूर्ववर्तित्वम् । नियतपूर्ववर्तित्वं तु कार्याव्यवहितपूर्वक्षणावच्छेदेन कार्याधिकरणे विद्यमानस्याभावस्य प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदको यो धर्मः, तद्वत्त्वम् । तादृशश्च धर्मो द्रव्यत्वमपि भवतीति रासभेऽपि द्रव्यत्वेन घटकारणत्वप्रसङ्गवारणाय सत्यन्तम् । प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदके धर्मे अन्यथासिद्धिनिरूपकाणां धर्माणां भेदो निवेशनीय इति तत्त्वम् ॥

मोक्षवादः

अस्य शास्त्रस्य परमं प्रयोजनमपवर्गः । स च आत्यन्तिको दुःखध्वंसः । आत्यन्तिकत्वं च स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःखासमानकालीनत्वम् । तादृशश्च दुःखध्वंसः तत्त्वज्ञानजन्यः, श्रुतेस्तत्त्वज्ञाने मोक्षकारणताग्राहिकायाः सत्त्वात् इति संप्रदायः ॥

a change of colour occurs in the parts of the citron which [materially] give rise to the flowers.[112] The difference in species between scorpions born of cow-dung and of scorpions,[113] and between the *Embelia Ribes* growing out of excremental substances and out of seeds of the *Embelia Ribes* is proved by experience.

Kāraṇatā-vāda

The power that makes it possible for the effect to be occasional is also only causality [114] This [causality] is 'being the invariable antecedent while not being established as other than indispensable'.[115] 'To be the invariable antecedent' means to have an attribute which is not a delimitant of the countercorrelateness of a nonexistence present in the substrate of the effect at the moment immediately preceding the effect.[116] And since substanceness can also be such an attribute, the donkey could also be said to be the cause of the pot by virtue of having substanceness.[117] To avoid such [absurdities] the clause 'while, etc.' is introduced. In truth, it is to be mentioned that the attribute which is not a determinant of the countercorrelateness should be different from those attributes which form the state of being other than indispensable.[118]

Mokṣa-vāda

The ultimate purpose of this branch of knowledge is liberation. And that is the final annihilation of sorrows. 'To be final' means not to be simultaneous with a sorrow which exists in its [i.e., of the annihilation] own substrate.[119] Such an annihilation of sorrows is caused by knowledge of reality, for there exists the revealed text [120] which makes it known that knowledge of reality is the cause of liberation. Such is the traditional view.[121]

शिरोमणिस्तु—दुःखध्वंसो दुःखानुव्यवसायसाध्यः। न तत्र तत्त्वज्ञानं जनकम्। श्रुतिरपि नान्यथासिद्धस्य तत्त्वज्ञानस्य मोक्षकारणतां बोधयति, बाधात्। किं तु आत्यन्तिकः पापध्वंसः अपूर्वसामान्यध्वंसो वा मोक्षः। अजनितफलानि च पापानि तत्त्वज्ञानान्नश्यन्ति। "ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुतेऽर्जुन" इति भगवद्वचनमप्यत्र प्रमाणम्। "नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म" इति पुनरारब्धव्यापारकादृष्टपरम्। तथा च अनारब्धव्यापारकाणि तत्त्वज्ञानेन, आरब्धव्यापारकाणि तु पापानि भोगेन क्षीयन्ते। भोगजनकेन कर्मणा तु न पापोत्पत्तिः, अदृष्टकारणमिथ्याज्ञानवासनाविरहात्। अतः परममोक्षस्यार्थादेव सिद्धिः। तत्त्वज्ञानस्य तु तत्त्वज्ञानाव्यवहितोत्तरवर्तिपापध्वंसं प्रत्येव जनकता। आरब्धव्यापारकादृष्टव्यक्तिनाशे तु स स व्यापारः प्रतिबन्धक इति (न) तेषां तदैव नाशः। न च पापनाशो विना तत्त्वज्ञानं तदा संभवतीति न तत्र तत्त्वज्ञानमन्यथासिद्धमित्याह॥

Śiromaṇi,[122] however, says: Annihilation of sorrow is effected by the apperception of sorrow;[123] here knowledge of reality is not the cause. Even the revealed text does not teach that knowledge of reality, which is not indispensable [in the causality],[124] is the cause of liberation; for [such a teaching] is contradictory [to reason]. On the other hand, liberation is the final annihilation of the demerits or the annihilation of the totality of the unseen [i.e., merits and demerits].[125] Those demerits which have not produced their results [126] are destroyed by the knowledge of reality. The words of the Lord, 'The fire of knowledge reduces all actions into ashes, O! Arjuna!',[127] are also a proof of this. [The statement that] 'Actions do not decay without being experienced' [128] is to be understood as concerning the unseen, which has begun to operate.[129] Therefore, [it is to be maintained that] demerits which have not yet begun to operate decay through knowledge of reality, and those which have already begun to operate decay by the experiencing [of their results]. No demerit is produced by actions which lead to the experience [of their results];[130] because there are no impressions of false knowledge [left in the mind] which are the cause of the unseen. So it is implied that there has to be final liberation. Knowledge of reality, on the other hand, is the cause only of that annihilation of demerits which occurs immediately after the knowledge of reality. With regard to the destruction of a particular unseen which has begun to operate, however, every such operation is an impediment [to the destruction of the unseen]; so they are not destroyed at that time itself. In such an instance, as there cannot be destruction of demerit without knowledge of reality, knowledge of reality is not a superfluity there.

लिङ्गशरीरापगमो मोक्ष इत्येके । नित्यसुखाभिव्यक्तिः अविद्यापगमो वा मोक्ष इत्यपरे ॥

इत्यनुमानपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः

Certain theorists [hold that] liberation is the removal of the causal body.[131] Others [maintain that] manifestation of eternal bliss [132] or disappearance of nescience [133] is liberation.

THUS ENDS THE CHAPTER ON INFERENCE

उपमानपरिच्छेदः

अथोपमानं निरूप्यते। तत्र उपमितिकरणं उपमानम्। उपमितित्वं 'उपमिनोमि' इत्यनुव्यवसायसिद्धा जातिः। तत्र 'गोसदृशोऽयम्' इति सादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डप्रत्यक्षं करणम्। तज्जनितं 'गोसदृशो गवयपदवाच्यः' इत्यतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणं व्यापारः। 'अयं गवयपदवाच्यः' इत्युपमितिः फलम्॥

एवं क्वचित् वैधर्म्यविशिष्टपिण्डप्रत्यक्षकरणिकाप्युपमितिरूहनीया। तथाहि—'भावविधर्मा नञ्पदवाच्यः' इत्यतिदेशवाक्यार्थज्ञानानन्तरं 'भावविधर्मा अयम्' इति वैधर्म्यविशिष्टघटाभावादिप्रत्यक्षम्; अथातिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणम्; ततः 'अयमभावो नञ्पदवाच्यः' इत्युपमितिरुत्पद्यते॥

एवं सादृश्यवैधर्म्यातिरिक्तधर्मदर्शनजन्माप्युपमितिर्विद्यते। तथाहि—'धिक् करभकमतिदीर्घग्रीवं कठोरकण्टकाशिनमतिविकटपृष्ठमपसदं पशूनाम्' इत्युदीच्यवक्तृकमति-

III. COMPARISON

Now Comparison is being considered. Comparison is the efficient instrument of assimilative knowledge. Assimilative knowledgeness is a universal established by the apperception 'I compare'.[1] Here the efficient instrument [of the assimilative knowledge] is the perception[2] of a thing possessing similarity, which [i.e., perception] is [in the form] 'This is similar to a cow'. The recollection of the meaning of the assimilative proposition, which is originated by that [i.e., perception][3] and is in the form, 'That which is similar to a cow is to be denoted by the word *gayal*' is the operation.[4] Assimilative knowledge [in the form] 'This[5] is to be denoted by the word *gayal*', is the result.

Thus, in certain cases, an assimilative knowledge, of which the efficient instrument is the perception of a thing possessing dissimilarity [to some other thing], is also to be observed. For example, after knowing the meaning of the assimilative proposition 'That which is dissimilar to what is existent is to be stated by the word *nañ*[6] ['no']', there arises the perception of the nonexistence of the pot, etc., possessing dissimilarity [to what is existent], in the form 'This is dissimilar to what is existent'; then the recollection of the meaning of the assimilative proposition; after this the assimilative knowledge 'This nonexistence [of the pot, etc.,] is to be stated by the word *nañ* ['no']'.

In this way, there is also the assimilative knowledge that arises on finding an attribute which is other than similarity and dissimilarity. For example, having heard the assimilative proposition uttered by the North Indians, 'Fie upon the camel

देशवाक्यं श्रुत्वा, दक्षिणापथिकैः ‘अतिदीर्घग्रीवोऽयं पशुः’ इति दृष्ट्वा, ‘अतिदीर्घग्रीवादिः पशुः करभकपदवाच्यः’ इत्यतिदेशवाक्यार्थं स्मृत्वा, ‘अयं पशुः करभकपदवाच्यः’ इत्युपमीयते ॥

एवं वाच्यत्वातिरिक्तोऽपि धर्मः उपमितिविषयः। ‘इयमोषधिः कटुः’ इति प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभ्य ‘कटुरोषधिर्ज्वरहरा’ इति भैषज्यातिदेशवाक्यार्थं स्मृत्वा ‘ज्वरहरेयमोषधिः’ इत्युपमिमीत इति दिक् ॥

इत्युपमानपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः

with its very long neck and very uneven back, eating hard thorns, accursed among all animals!', South Indians, who see an animal with a very long neck, recollect the meaning of the assimilative proposition, 'The animal with a very long neck, etc., is to be denoted by the word "camel"', and derive the assimilative knowledge, 'This animal is to be denoted by the word "camel".'

In this way, an attribute other than nameability can also be an object of assimilative knowledge. [For example,] after apprehending through perception that a medicinal plant is hot [to taste] and recollecting the meaning of the assimilative proposition of the medical man, 'The medicinal plant which is hot [to taste] cures fever', one derives the assimilative knowledge, 'This medicinal plant cures fever'. This, in short, is [the instrument of Comparison].

THUS ENDS THE CHAPTER ON COMPARISON

शब्दपरिच्छेदः

अथ शब्दो निरूप्यते । शाब्दमितिकरणं शब्दः । शाब्दमितित्वं तु 'वाक्यार्थं शृणोमि' इत्यनुभवसाक्षिको जातिविशेषः; श्रावण इव शाब्दबोधेऽपि शृणोतेः शक्तेः ॥

शब्दप्रामाण्यवादः

अत्र शब्दो न प्रमाणम्; अपि तु पदैरुपस्थितानां पदार्थानामसंसर्गाग्रहः संभावना वा व्यवहारजनिका इति सौगताः । तन्न; निष्कम्पप्रवृत्तौ इष्टपुरोवर्तिविशिष्टनिश्चयत्वेनैव कारणतया शब्दात्तदुत्पत्तेरावश्यकत्वात् ॥

शाब्दप्रमितित्वमनुमितित्वव्याप्यमिति वैशेषिकाः । तदसत्; मानाभावात् ॥

वेद एव प्रमाणम्; स्मृत्यादिलौकिकवाक्यमनुवादकत्वादप्रमाणम्, गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वात् इति मीमांसकाः । तदपि न; वेदे कॢप्तया सामग्र्या लौकिकवाक्यस्यापि अगृ-

IV. VERBAL TESTIMONY

Now verbal testimony is being considered. Verbal testimony is the efficient instrument of verbal knowledge. Verbal-knowledgeness is a certain universal proved by the experience, 'I hear [i.e., comprehend] the meaning of the sentence'. The root *śru* [to hear] has denotative power with regard to verbal comprehension also just as with regard to what is heard.

Śabdaprāmāṇya-vāda

Here the followers of Sugata [say][1]: Verbal testimony is not a means of valid knowledge; but the nonapprehension of the nonconnection of the word-meanings presented [to the consciousness] by the words or the mental image [produced by words][2] causes volition [on the part of the hearer]. This is not correct; because with regard to doubt-free volition a definite knowledge, in which the desired [thing] lying in front is the substantive, can alone be maintained as the cause,[3] [and hence] it becomes necessary [to hold] that it [i.e., definite knowledge] originates from the words [uttered].[4]

The Vaiśeṣika-s [say] that verbal-knowledgeness is pervaded by inferenceness.[5] This is incorrect; for there is no proof [for holding so].[6]

The Mīmāṃsaka-s [hold] that only the revealed text is an instrument of valid knowledge; human compositions such as *smṛti* are not instruments of valid knowledge, being [merely] corroborative; for they make [us] apprehend what has already been apprehended.[7] This also is not correct; for, through the same means which is fixed [as causing verbal comprehension]

हीतार्थविषयकशाब्दबोधजनकत्वात् ॥

योग्यतावादः

तस्य शब्दस्य शाब्दबोधजनने योग्यताकाङ्क्षासत्ति-तात्पर्याणि सहकारीणि ॥

तत्रान्वयप्रतियोगिपदार्थयोः परस्परसंसर्गाबाधो योग्यतेति केचित्। एकपदार्थे अपरपदार्थसंसर्ग एव योग्यता; तस्याः संशयसाधारणं ज्ञानं कारणमिति नवीनाः ॥

आकाङ्क्षावादः

आकाङ्क्षा तु एकपदव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयबोधाभाव-प्रयोजकव्यतिरेकप्रतियोगित्वं द्वितीयपदस्य। भवति हि 'घटीया कर्मता' इत्यन्वयबोधाभावो घटपदस्य अम्पदस्य च व्यतिरेकेण प्रयुक्त इति 'घटम्' इत्यत्र प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोराकाङ्क्षेति संप्रदायः। पदयोः पौर्वापर्यमाकाङ्क्षेति वस्तुगतिरिति नवीनाः ॥

आसत्तिवादः

आसत्तिरन्वयप्रतियोगिनां यौगपद्येन पदजन्यो-

in the revealed text, human speech can also produce verbal comprehension of what has not been [previously] apprehended.[8]

Yogyatā-vāda

Competency, expectancy, contiguity and intention are aids to this verbal testimony in producing verbal comprehension.

Here some [say] that competency is the noncontradiction of the mutual relationship between the two word-meanings that are correlatives in the syntax.[9] The modern [logicians say] that the relationship of one word-meaning with another word-meaning is itself competency and that knowledge of it, including doubt,[10] is the cause [of verbal comprehension].

Ākāṅkṣā-vāda

Expectancy is [that which exists between two words, when] one word is the countercorrelate of an absence which causes the noncognition of the syntactical connection while that noncognition is caused by the absence of the other word [also]. For, the traditional view is that the noncognition of the syntactical connection such as 'the state of being the object belongs to the pot' is caused by the absence of [either] the word *ghaṭa*, or the word *am*;[11] so in [the expression] '*ghaṭam*', the expectancy is between the stem and the suffix. The modern [logicians] say that the due order of the two words, one preceding and the other following, is in reality expectancy.[12]

Āsatti-vāda

Contiguity is the presentation [i.e., remembrance] of the correlatives of the syntax conjointly caused by words. The

पस्थितिः । प्राभाकरास्तु पदाजन्यापि पदार्थोपस्थितिः आसत्ति-घटिका भवतीत्याहुः । असावर्थाध्याहारवादो न स्वीकर्तव्यः; 'घटः कर्मत्वम्' इत्यादिना घटकर्मताबोधाभावेन पदविशेष-जन्याया एव पदार्थोपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधाङ्गत्वात् शब्दाध्याहारवाद एव श्रेयानिति तदितरे ॥

तात्पर्यवादः

घटपदत्वावच्छेदेन घटकर्मत्वान्वयबोधतात्पर्यज्ञानमपि कारणम्; तात्पर्यविरहनिश्चये शाब्दबुद्धेरनुदयात्; अतात्पर्य-निश्चयत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकत्वे गौरवात्; इति संप्रदायः ॥

अत एव वैदिकवाक्यानां अतात्पर्यकत्वे तस्मात् वाक्यार्थबुद्ध्यनुदयप्रसङ्गात् अनादितात्पर्यवान् भगवान् भवः सिध्यति ॥

शब्दानित्यतावादः

वेदत्वं तु यादृशानुपूर्वीकवाक्यत्वसामानाधिकरण्येन जन्यबुद्ध्यजन्यत्वं तादृशानुपूर्वीकवाक्यत्वम् । सर्गादौ हि

Prābhākara-s, however, say that the presentation of word-meanings, even if it is not caused by words, constitutes contiguity. Others [maintain] that this theory of 'supplying the meaning' cannot be accepted, since by the expressions, 'the pot', 'the state of being the object', etc., apprehension of the pot as being the object does not arise; so [it is to be maintained that] only the presentation of the word-meaning which is caused by the particular word is a constituent of verbal comprehension; and therefore, the theory of 'supplying the [elliptical] word' alone is the better one. [13]

Tātparya-vāda

[With regard to the verbal comprehension arising from the expression *ghaṭam*] the knowledge [on the part of the hearer] of the intention [of the speaker] that there should arise from the word 'pot' syntactical knowledge as to the pot being the object [of the predicate] is also a cause [14]; for, no verbal comprehension arises when there is certainty as to the absence of intention. If [on the other hand] the absence of certainty concerning the intention [is assumed] to obstruct the verbal comprehension, [such an assumption] would be cumbrous. This is the traditional view.[15]

It is only thus that [the existence of] Lord Bhava [16] whose intention is beginningless is established; [for otherwise,] if [it is assumed that] the Vedic passages are devoid of any intention [as it is defined above], comprehension of the sentence-meanings would not arise out of them.

Śabdānityatā-vāda

To be Veda is 'to be [in the form of] sentences which have arrangement in such an order that, along with these sentences which are arranged in such an order, there coexists the state

भगवानेव प्रथममाम्नायमुच्चारयति; ततोऽन्ये। स प्रथमो वेदो जन्यबुद्ध्यजन्य इति तद्गतानुपूर्वीमादाय आधुनिकवेदेऽपि वेदत्वमुपपन्नम्। न च वेदस्य नित्यत्वात् कथमीश्वरप्रवक्तृकत्वमिति वाच्यम्; ध्वनिवत् वर्णस्यापि नित्यत्वे मानाभावात्; उत्पादविनाशप्रतीतेः भ्रान्तत्वे मानाभावात्। 'स एवायं गकारः' इति प्रतीतेः एकजातीयत्वविषयकत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः, तदेवेदमौषधम् इतिवत्॥

उच्छिन्नप्रच्छन्नवादः

प्रवाहाविच्छेद एव वेदस्य नित्यत्वम्। तच्च प्रवक्तृसत्त्वे विरुध्यते इति चेत्, न; स्मृत्याचारमूलीभूतानां श्रुतीनामुच्छेददर्शनात्। नित्यानुमेयास्ताः श्रुतय इति चेत्, न; श्रुतित्वस्य शब्दत्वस्य वा उत्पन्नत्वव्यञ्जितत्वादिव्याप्यत्वात्॥

प्रलयसत्त्वादपि भवति श्रुतीनामुच्छेदः; 'द्व्यणुकत्वं कालनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं जन्यमात्रवृत्तिधर्मत्वात्' इत्यनुमानेन प्रलयसिद्धेः॥

of not being originated by a created intellect '.[17] For, at the beginning of creation it is the Lord Himself who utters the first revealed text; then others [utter it]. Since that first Veda is not originated by a created intellect, it is fitting [to hold] that the Veda of the present day also possesses Veda-hood by virtue of having the same order of arrangement as the first. It is not to be asked how the Veda can be said to have been uttered by the Lord since it is eternal;[18] for, like sounds, phonemes also cannot be proved to be eternal.[19] There is [also] no proof [for holding] that the notion of origination and destruction [of phonemes] is an illusion; [20] for the notion, 'This is the same [phoneme] *ga*' can be explained by the fact that it refers to the same kind [and not the same individual], as in the case, 'This is the same medicine'.

Ucchinna-pracchanna-vāda

If it be [contended] [21] that the eternality of the Veda is but its uninterrupted tradition and this contradicts the assumption of an utterer, [we say] it is not so; for the loss of the revealed passages which were the sources of the moral codes and conduct is noticed.[22] It cannot be [argued] that those revealed passages are eternal and their existence is to be inferred; for 'the state of being heard' [i.e., the revealed text] or 'the state of being sound' is pervaded by 'the state of being originated', 'the state of being manifested', etc.[23]

Because of the existence of dissolution also there is the loss of revealed passages;[24] and the [existence of] dissolution is proved through the inference, 'Dyadness is a determinant of the countercorrelateness of the absolute nonexistence abiding in Time, because it [i.e., dyadness] is an attribute abiding only in caused entities'.[25]

विधिवादः

आचारमूलत्वं श्रुतेः प्रवर्तकज्ञानजननद्वारा । प्रवर्तकं तु कृतिसाध्यत्वेष्टसाधनत्वबलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वानां ज्ञानम् । तेषु जनकज्ञानविषयेषु लिङः शक्तिः । यत्र यागत्वावच्छेदेन स्वर्गादीष्टसाधनत्वं, नरकमरणादिबलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वं, स्वकीयेदानींतनकृतिसाध्यत्वं च गृह्यते, तत्र 'यागो मत्कृतिसाध्यो भवतु' इत्याकारा चिकीर्षा; ततो यागकृतिरुत्पद्यते । तेन यागेच्छां प्रति स्वर्गेच्छाविशिष्टं स्वर्गसाधनताज्ञानं, नरकद्वेषविशिष्टयागेच्छां प्रति नरकासाधनत्वज्ञानं, कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारकेच्छायां तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं कारणम् । तैर्जनिता चिकीर्षा उपादानप्रत्यक्षसहकारेण प्रवृत्तिं जनयतीति नैयायिकादीनां सिद्धान्तः ॥

प्राभाकरास्तु—कार्यताज्ञानमात्रं चिकीर्षासामान्यजननद्वारा प्रवृत्तिजनकम् । चिकीर्षायां तु नेष्टसाधनताबुद्धिः कारणम्, मानाभावात्; चिकीर्षाभिन्नाया इच्छाया यागादावनभ्युपगमात्; वृष्टिजन्ये सुखे हीच्छा वृष्टिमपि विषयीकरोति इति गुरुसिद्धान्तात् । भवतु वा उपायेच्छासामान्ये

Vidhi-vāda

The revealed text becomes the source of [religious] conduct by originating the knowledge which produces volition. What produces volition is the knowledge that [a thing] is to be achieved through one's volition, that it is a means to what is desired, and that it does not entail great harm. The [suffix] *liṅ* [26] [i.e., the potential mood] has denotative power with regard to those [above-mentioned] objects of knowledge that produce volition. With regard to a sacrifice, when it is apprehended that it originates what is desired, such as heaven, does not entail great harm, such as hell or death,[27] and can be achieved by one's volition of the present time, there [arises] the desire to act in the form, 'Let there be the sacrifice effected through my volition'; then arises the volition towards the sacrifice. Therefore, with regard to the desire for the sacrifice, the knowledge that it [i.e., the sacrifice] is productive of heaven coupled with a desire for heaven; with regard to the desire for the sacrifice coupled with an aversion for hell, the knowledge that it is not productive of hell; and with regard to the desire in which the state of being produced by volition is the adjunct, the knowledge having such an adjunct—are the causes.[28] Thus, the desire to do, originated by these [i.e., the threefold knowledge] and aided by the perception of the material cause [29] originates the volition; this is the conclusion reached by the Naiyāyika-s, etc.

The Prābhākara-s, however, say: The knowledge that something has to be done, alone causes volition by originating the desire to do in general. With regard to the desire to do, however, the knowledge that [the act] is a means to what is desired is not the cause, as there is no proof [for holding so]. For, with regard to sacrifice, etc., no desire other than the desire to do is accepted, because the doctrine of Guru [30]

इष्टसाधनताज्ञानम्, उपायाभावगोचरद्वेषसामग्रीभूतं प्रत्यवाय-साधनताज्ञानम्, उपायाभावगोचरो द्वेष एव वा वैकल्पिकं कारणम् । अत एव निष्फलतया ज्ञाते नित्ये प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यत इति कार्यत्वेन कार्यं विध्यर्थ इत्याहुः ॥

भाट्टास्तु—प्रवृत्तिर्द्विविधा, स्वारसिकी प्रैरणिकी च । तत्र स्वारसिकप्रवृत्तौ इष्टसाधनताज्ञानादि कारणम् । प्रैरणिक-प्रवृत्तौ प्रवर्तनाज्ञानमेव कारणम् । प्रवर्तना च लोके राजाज्ञादिः ; वेदे तु लिङ्निष्ठो धर्मविशेषः ; स एव लिङादि-शक्य इत्याहुः ॥

अपूर्ववादः

अपूर्वं तु वैदिकलिङा कार्यत्वेनाभिधीयत इति प्राभाकराः । वेदेन क्रियागतेष्टसाधनतायां बोधितायाम्, आशु-विनाशिन्याः फलपर्यन्तमनवस्थानात् तत् द्वारतया कल्प्यत

is that the desire for the pleasure derived from rain has the rain also for its object.[31] Or, with regard to the desire for the means in general, let the knowledge that it [i.e., the means] is a means to what is desired, or the knowledge that it is productive of a [particular kind of] demerit, which [knowledge] is the cause of an aversion for the absence of the means, or the aversion for the absence of the means itself, be the alternative causes. The volition towards the obligatory rites which are known not to produce results can therefore be properly explained.[32] So the meaning of injunction is [the notion] that something has to be done by virtue of having to be done.

The Bhāṭṭa-s, on the other hand, say: Volition is of two kinds: spontaneous and imposed. Of these, with regard to spontaneous volition, the knowledge that it is a means to what is desired, etc., are the causes; with regard to imposed volition the knowledge of the imposition alone is the cause. In worldly life, imposition is in the form of an order from the king and so on; but as far as the Veda is concerned, it is a particular attribute abiding in [the suffix] *liṅ*, and that itself is what is denoted by *liṅ*, etc.[33]

Apūrva-vāda

The Prābhākara-s [say that], by the *liṅ* in Vedic passages, the unprecedented (*apūrva*) is denoted as something which has to be achieved by volition.[34] Others [argue] [35] that when it is made known by the Veda that the action is a means to what is desired, the unprecedented is assumed as its operation, because the action being destroyed instantaneously cannot last until the result is produced. The Vedāntin-s

इत्यन्ये । देवताप्रीतिरेव यागादेः स्वर्गजनने व्यापार इति वेदान्तिनः । यागध्वंस एव यागव्यापार इत्येकदेशिनः ॥

जातिशक्तिवादः

गवादिपदानां जातिरेव शक्या ; व्यक्तिः आक्षेपात् लक्षणया तुल्यवित्तिवेद्यतया वा लभ्या, इत्येके । कार्यान्विता गौः इतरान्विता वा गौः शक्या इत्यपरे । वस्तुतः समवायेन गोत्वविशिष्टा व्यक्तिः गोपदशक्या । अन्वयस्तु आकाङ्क्षादिबललभ्यत्वान्न पदार्थः ॥

शक्तिवादः

शक्तिस्तु गोत्वविशिष्टबुद्धौ गोपदजन्यत्वावगाही सङ्केतः ; न त्वतिरिक्तपदार्थः, मानाभावात् ॥

शक्तं पदं त्रिविधम्—योगरूढं रूढं यौगिकं च । योगरूढं पङ्कजादिपदम् । तत्र हि योगोपस्थितः पङ्कजनिकर्ता रूढ्यर्थे पद्मे अन्वेति ॥

[contend that] the operation of the [action of] sacrifice, etc., in producing heaven, is but the propitiation of dieties.[36] Certain theorists [among the N a i y ā y i k a - s say that] the annihilative nonexistence of the sacrifice is itself the operation of the sacrifice [in producing heaven].[37]

Jātiśakti-vāda

Some [38] [hold that] the universal alone is the denotation of the words, 'cow', etc.; the [knowledge of the] individual is obtained either by implication,[39] or by the secondary significatory power (*lakṣaṇā*), or by its being the object of the same knowledge [which conveys the universal].[40] Others [say that] the cow as syntactically connected with what is to be done or syntactically connected with another [thing] is the denotation [of the word 'cow'].[41] In reality, the particular [cow] possessing cowness through [the relation of] inherence, is the denotation of the word, 'cow'.[42] The syntax, in any case, is not the meaning of words,[43] since it is obtained by the force of expectancy, etc.

Śakti-vāda

Denotative power is but the convention that knowledge of that which possesses cowness is originated by the word 'cow'. It is not a separate category,[44] as there is no proof [for holding so].

Words possessing denotative power are of three kinds: the derivative-conventional, the conventional and the derivative. Words [such as] *paṅkaja* [that which grows in the mud, i.e., the lotus], etc., are derivative-conventional. Here, the agent of the [act of] growing in the mud, presented [to the consciousness] by derivation, connects itself with the lotus, which is the conventional meaning.[45]

रूढं धेन्वादिपदम् । औणादिकप्रत्ययानां शक्तत्वे मानाभावात्; धानकर्मगोत्वावच्छिन्ने विशिष्टैकशक्तिस्वीकारात् ॥

यौगिकं कृत्तद्धितसमासभेदात् त्रिविधम् ॥

कृदन्तं पावकपाचकादि ॥

तद्धितान्तमौपगवादि ॥

समासवादः

समासाः अव्ययीभावतत्पुरुषकर्मधारयद्विगुबहुव्रीहिद्वन्द्वोपपदभेदात् सप्तधा ॥

उपकुम्भं निर्मक्षिकं इत्यादिरव्ययीभावः । तत्र उपादिपदार्थे सामीप्ये कुम्भादीनां भेदेनान्वयात् कुम्भसामीप्यादिरर्थः ॥

राजपुरुषादिस्तत्पुरुषः । तत्र षष्ठीस्मरणेन राजसंबन्धः पुरुषेऽवगम्यत इत्येके । राजसंबन्धे राजसंबन्धिनि वा राजशब्दो लाक्षणिक इत्यन्ये ॥

समानाधिकरणपदद्वयघटितो नीलोत्पलादिः कर्मधारयः । तत्र च न कुत्रापि पदे लक्षणा ॥

The words *dhenu*, etc., are conventional; as there is no proof [for holding] that suffixes belonging to the *uṇādi* group have any denotative power, only a single qualified denotative power is accepted with regard to what is determined by cowness and is the object of sucking.[46]

The derivative is threefold, differentiated by *kṛt*,[47] *taddhita*[48] and *samāsa*.[49]

[The words] *pāvaka* [the purifier, i.e., fire], *pācaka* [the cook], etc.,[50] end in *kṛt*.

[Words such as] *aupagava*[51] [the son of Upagu], end in *taddhita*.

Samāsa-vāda

Compounds have a sevenfold division: the *avyayībhāva*, the *tatpuruṣa*, the *karmadhāraya*, the *dvigu*, the *bahuvrīhi*, the *dvandva* and the *upapada*.[52]

[The words] *upakumbha* [near the pot], *nirmakṣika* [devoid of a fly, i.e., solitude], etc., belong to the *avyayībhāva* type. Here, the proximity of the pot, etc., are the meaning [of the compound words], since the pot, etc., connect themselves, through nonidentity, with 'proximity', etc., which are the meanings of [the words] *upa*, etc.[53]

[The words] *rājapuruṣa* [king's person], etc., belong to the *tatpuruṣa* [type]. Here some [say that] owing to the recollection of the genitive case-[ending],[54] the relationship of the person with the king is understood. Others [say that] the word *rāja* is indicative [through secondary signification] of either the relationship [of the person] with the king,[55] or the person [himself] who is related to the king.[56]

[The words] *nīlotpala*, etc., which are composed of two words with the same case-ending, are [instances of] *karmadhāraya*. Here, neither word has secondary signification.[57]

पञ्चपूल्यादिर्द्विगुः । पञ्चानां पूलानां समाहार इति बोधे पूलपदं तत्समाहारे लाक्षणिकम् । इतरथा शक्त्यैव पञ्चाभिन्नपूलबोधः ॥

चित्रगुरिति बहुव्रीहिः । तत्र गोपदं गोस्वामिनि लाक्षणिकम्; तदेकदेशे गवि चित्राभेदान्वयः ॥

धवखदिराविति द्वन्द्वः । तत्र धवादिसहितखदिरादौ (खदिरपदस्य) लक्षणेत्यन्ये । तन्न; धवखदिरपदाभ्यां शक्त्या स्वस्वार्थोपस्थापनेन अन्वयबोधोपपत्तौ लक्षणायां मानाभावात् ॥

धातुशक्तिवादः

धातूनां फलावच्छिन्ने व्यापारे फलव्यापारयोर्वा शक्तिः । फलमात्रं धात्वर्थ इति मण्डनः । तन्न; पाकादिपदात् व्यापारबोधोदयात् ॥

[The words] *pañcapūlī* [a set of five bunches], etc., are [instances of] *dvigu.*[58] [Here] if the [verbal] comprehension is 'a collection of five bunches', the word '*pūla*' [bunch] conveys the [sense of] 'collection' through secondary signification.[59] Otherwise, comprehension of 'the bunch undifferentiated from the number five' is [caused] by the [primary] denotative power itself.

[The word] '*citragu*' [a person who has dappled cows] is a *bahuvrīhi*. Here the word '*go*' [cow], conveys the meaning of 'the owner of the cow' through secondary signification; and the word '*citra*' [dappled] connects itself with cow, which is a part of it [i.e., the secondary meaning of the word 'cow'].[60]

[The word] *dhavakhadirau* [*dhava* and *khadira*] [61] is [the example for] *dvandva*. Here others [62] [say that] the word '*khadira*' implies *khadira*, etc., as associated with the *dhava*, etc., [through secondary signification].[63] This is not correct; for there is no warrant for [assuming] a secondary signification, as the syntactical connection can be understood from the words '*dhava*' and '*khadira*' which present their respective meanings through their [primary] denotative power.[64]

Dhātuśakti-vāda

[65] Roots have denotative power with regard to the action qualified by the result, or [with regard to] both the result and the action. M a ṇ ḍ a n a [66] says that result alone is the meaning of roots. This is not correct; for from the word '*pāka*' [cooking], etc., there arises [verbal] comprehension of the action [also].

आख्यातशक्तिवादः

आख्यातस्य कर्तृकर्मणी वाच्ये। ते च धात्वर्थे विशेषणीभवतः। 'चैत्रः पचति' इत्यत्र चैत्रकर्तृको विक्लित्त्यनुकूलो व्यापार इति, 'तण्डुलः पच्यते' इत्यत्र तण्डुलकर्मको व्यापार इति प्रतीयत इति वैयाकरणाः॥

व्यापारत्वेन भावनैव आख्यातार्थः; सैव वाक्ये प्रधानम्; इति मीमांसकाः॥

यत्नत्वविशिष्टमेवाख्यातवाच्यम्; तच्चेदाश्रयतया अन्वेति तदा कर्तृलकार इति यदि विषयतया तदा कर्मलकार इति व्यवह्रियते। 'रथो गच्छति' इत्यादौ व्यापारे आश्रयत्वे वा लक्षणा इति नैयायिकाः॥

इति सिद्धानि चत्वारि प्रमाणानि॥

ऐतिह्यसंभवाभावार्थापत्तयो न प्रमाणान्तरम्; उक्तेष्वन्तर्भावात् इति॥

इति सन्दर्भशुद्धानां सुवर्णानां गुणैर्दृढाः।
कर्णौ गोपालसिंहस्य मण्डयन्तु मणेः कणाः॥

इति मणिकणो नाम ग्रन्थः संपूर्णः

Ākhyātaśakti-vāda

The agent and the object are the denotation of verbal suffixes. These two qualify the meaning of the roots. By [the expression] 'Caitra cooks', the notion of an operation in which Caitra is the agent and which leads to the softening [of the rice], and by [the expression] 'Rice is being cooked', the notion of an operation in which rice is the object, arise—so say the Grammarians.[67]

The Mīmāṃsaka-s [argue that] the *bhāvanā*[68] alone, being the operation, is the meaning of verbal suffixes. It [the *bhāvanā*] alone is important in a sentence.[69]

The Naiyāyika-s [hold]: That which is qualified by volitionness [i.e., volition] alone is the denotation of verbal suffixes; when it [i.e., volition] connects itself [with the other word] through [the relationship of] dependence, the verbal suffix is said to be 'of agency' [*kartṛ-lakāra*], and when through [the relationship of] objectness, [it is said to be] 'of the object' [*karma-lakāra*]. [But] in [such expressions as] 'the chariot goes',[70] etc., [the suffix *ti*] conveys the action or dependency through secondary signification.

Thus the four instruments of valid cognition are established.

Tradition,[71] Inclusion,[72] Nonexistence[73] and Presumption[74] are not separate instruments of valid cognition, because they are included in those [already] mentioned.

Let these bits of Maṇi which are firmly held together by strings [also, by the qualities] made of properly purified gold [also, of fine letters suitable for a composition] adorn the ears of Gopāla Siṃha.

THUS ENDS THE COMPOSITION NAMED MAṆIKAṆA

NOTES

I. PERCEPTION

1. A literal translation of the principal clause is: 'May this treatise be rolling on the neck of Gopāla.' The treatise is metaphorically conceived as a necklace which adorns, and confers respect upon, the wearer. The wish is therefore expressed that the work may be long remembered and repeated by Gopāla, for whose sake it is composed.

2. The word *cirāyus* though literally meaning 'long-lived' is often used, as it is here, as a term of affection, especially towards one who is younger in years.

3. *Śiṣṭa* is translated here as 'disciplined one'. Being a *śiṣṭa* is interpreted as 'accepting the authoritativeness of the Veda-s' (वेदप्रामाण्याभ्युपगन्तृत्वम्) and 'not having any misconceptions about the capacity of the means to produce the result' (फलसाधनतांशे भ्रान्तिरहितत्वम्). Śaśadhara, however, says that a *śiṣṭa* is a person who is devoid of demerits (क्षीणदोषपुरुष). NSD, p. 18.

4. An auspicious act, mental or physical, such as an invocation, prayer or benediction. The verbal expression of these is particularly meant here.

5. Udayana, the celebrated exponent of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosophy who flourished in the tenth century A.D. For his view, see NVTP, pp. 24-8; K, pp. 20-6.

6. *Dhvaṃsa*, one of the four kinds of nonexistence accepted by the Naiyāyika-s. Having once come into existence, *dhvaṃsa* can never become nonexistent; to suppose that the *dhvaṃsa* of an object becomes nonexistent is to admit the

absurdity that an object which has been once destroyed emerges again.

7. *Vyāpāra*, or operation of the cause. It is defined as 'that which is originated by the cause and itself causes that which is originated by the cause' (तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनकत्वम्). For example, the potter's wheel is one of the causes originating the pot; the rotation of the wheel is the operation (*vyāpāra*). The rotation is originated by the wheel and also itself causes the pot which is originated by the wheel.

8. When the last phoneme of a composition is uttered or the last letter written down, the composition is completed. So, the completion of a composition can be defined as its last phoneme.

9. The above-mentioned definition of *samāpti* is, however, defective; for, according to the Nyāya theory, the phoneme, which is *śabda*, has only two moments of existence. If completion (*samāpti*) is held to be the last phoneme, it would remain in existence only for two moments. This cannot be correct. Even two moments after the utterance of the last phoneme, the composition is complete; hence the second definition. According to this definition, as *dhvaṃsa* is never destroyed, completion can safely be said to be everlasting. For other definitions of *samāpti* see Mathurānātha on TC, pp. 23-4.

10. The famous prose romance of Bāṇabhaṭṭa (seventh century) was not completed by the author despite several invocatory verses at the beginning. His son completed it later on.

11. Very often Buddhists and others who do not accept the authoritativeness of the Veda-s are referred to by the word *nāstika*.

12. *Anvaya-vyabhicāra* and *vyatireka-vyabhicāra*. In the former the cause *is* and the effect *is not*; in the latter there is the

effect even *without* the admitted cause. A knowledge of these obstructs the apprehension of causality.

13. Here, 'obstacle' means a kind of demerit (*pāpa*) abiding in the self. See Rucidatta on K, p. 26 and *Prabhā* on M, p. 11.

14. *Saṃsargābhāva* comprises all the three types of nonexistence other than reciprocal nonexistence (*anyonyābhāva*). The Naiyāyika-s hold that with regard to any effect the absence of the obstructing element is a cause in general.

15. The view of the Naiyāyika-s is that effectness (*kāryatā*), causality (*kāraṇatā*) and obstructorness (*pratibandhakatā*) are, each, to be conceived as delimited by proper adjuncts. Cf. PIL, p. 28. Here *maṅgala* is the cause, *vighna*, the obstruction and *samāpti*, the effect. *Vighna* is *nāśya*, that which is destroyed; and it is destroyed while delimited by *vighnatva*. *Vighna* is the obstructor of *samāpti*. The *pratibandhakatā* in *vighna* is also delimited by *vighnatva*. This can be put in the form of an inference: मङ्गलनाश्यः किंचिद्धर्मावच्छिन्नः नाश्यत्वात् । समाप्तिप्रतिबन्धकः किंचिद्धर्मावच्छिन्नः प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । Through this a generic attribute that determines the *nāśyatā* and *pratibandhakatā* in the obstacles is established, which is *vighnatva*.

16. Such as the lack of necessary intelligence, imagination and circumstances. See M, p. 31.

17. Thus where there is *maṅgala* there is also destruction of obstacles. Sometimes, however, *maṅgala* may not be sufficient to annihilate all the obstacles when the latter are too numerous to be destroyed by the *maṅgala* performed. More *maṅgala* would certainly be considered to destroy them.

18. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya (twelfth century), author of TC.

19. *Karaṇa*. The oldest school of Nyāya defines it as 'an uncommon cause having an operation' (व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणम्).

The modern school, however, holds that *karaṇa* is that cause which immediately produces the result (फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं कारणम्). The former definition obviously applies also to an agent (*kartṛ*) who is not a *karaṇa*, but only a *nimitta-kāraṇa*. See Athalye, pp. 188-9.

20. To exclude recollection, which is not a valid cognition, the word 'experience' (*anubhava*) is used.

In the definition, the locative case-ending in *tadvati* refers to a substantive. It is connected to 'experience' through the relation of *āśrayatā*. According to the Nyāya theory of cognition, the object of every cognition is threefold, comprising the substantive (*viśeṣya*), the adjunct (*prakāra*) and their relation (*saṃsarga*). All these three constitute the object (*viṣaya*), while the cognition is the subject (*viṣayin*). The substantive is said to have substantiveness, which is the relation between the cognition and the substantive. Similarly, the adjunct has adjunctness, which is the relation between the cognition and the adjunct. The relation (*saṃsarga*) has *saṃsargatā* which is the relation between the cognition and the relation.

Substantiveness and adjunctness are also correlated. They are said to have the relation of the correlated and the correlator (*nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāva*). Just as objectness is threefold, subjectness (*viṣayitā*) also is threefold, comprising *viśeṣyitā*, *prakāritā* and *saṃsargitā*, respectively. For example, in the cognition of silver, silver which is the substantive, silverness which is the adjunct, and their relation are all the object of cognition. Cognition is the subject. The cognition exists in the silver through *viśeṣyatā*, while silver exists in cognition through *viśeṣyitā*. Cognition exists in silverness through *prakāratā* and silverness in the cognition through *prakāritā*. The relation between silver and silverness exists in cognition through *saṃsargitā* while cognition is related to it through *saṃsargatā*.

21. Here the cognition has reference to the substantive, nacre, which is not possessed of silverness, which is an adjunct to the cognition.

22. Because, in this case, the *viśeṣyatā* which exists in nacre has no relation to the *prakāratā* in silverness. So the illusion consists in cognizing the correlation between *viśeṣyatā* and *prakāratā* when it does not actually exist.

23. Here the cognition refers not only to the objectness in the substantive, 'this', and the objectness in the adjunct, silverness, but also to the relation between these two objectnesses: If there were no relation between the objectnesses there could not be a qualified cognition like this.

24. i.e., not through apperception. According to the Prābhākara-s, knowledge is self-effulgent and does not require another knowledge for its apprehension.

25. The Prābhākara-s contend that the cognizer is also part of every cognition. Unless this view is accepted, nothing would differentiate A's cognition of an object from B's. The cognitions of the same object by A and B are different, because A is part of A's cognition and B of B's cognition. The Prābhākara-s are called *tripuṭīpratyakṣavādinaḥ*, meaning those who hold that perception invariably presents the knowledge, object and the knower.

26. Murāri Miśra, the Mīmāṃsaka, is said to have held views different from those of the Bhāṭṭa-s and the Prābhākara-s, as is implied by the well-known saying: मुरारेस्तृतीयः पन्थाः (Murāri's is the third path).

27. Murāri Miśra does not share the view of Prabhākara that knowledge illuminates itself. He, therefore, accepts apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) for the cognition of knowledge.

28. *Jñātatā*. This is a form of objectness (*viṣayatā*) existing in the object and originated by *jñāna* (knowledge). It is related to the self through attributiveness. The Bhāṭṭa-s say that when an object is cognized, an attribute (*dharma*), cognizedness, connects itself with the object. Otherwise, ideas corresponding to expressions like 'The pot is revealed' (घटः भासते or प्रकाशते) could not exist. Cognition is of course in the self, and the cognizedness is in the object cognized. See NT, pp. 131-6.

29. The Bhāṭṭa-s do not admit the relation of inherence. They accept instead a relation of self-sameness (*tādātmya*). Here the word *samavāya* is translated as 'inherence' for the sake of uniformity in translation; but in the context it only means 'a certain relationship' and not the *samavāya* of the Naiyāyika-s.

30. For, according to them knowledge is apprehended through inference and is not perceived, as others hold.

31. Namely, the first cognition. Without first apprehending the cognition, there can be no doubt as to its validity. To have a doubt the object of doubt must be apprehended. (संशयं प्रति धर्मिज्ञानं कारणम्).

32. The Sanskrit word *vyavahāra* may mean 'desire', 'volition', 'activity' and 'verbal expression'. Here it is translated as 'volition', as later the author refers to volition (*kṛti* or *yatna*) which has an object (*saviṣaya*), just like cognition and desire. (ज्ञानेच्छाकृतीनां सविषयत्वम्).

33. Thus the validity is known through inference, while the cognition is apprehended through apperception. So there is no intrinsicality with regard to the apprehension of validity.

34. Now it is being stated that validity is extrinsic not only with regard to its apprehension (*jñapti*) but also with regard to its origin (*utpatti*).

35. *Guṇa*. This *guṇa* should not be confused with the Guṇa category which is translated as 'Quality'.

36. For example, seeing a thing in twilight, from a distance, one may doubt whether the object is a person or a post. The object may first be misapprehended as a post. But on seeing the distinctive features of a man, the hands, feet, head, etc., there is the right cognition: 'This is a person'.

37. *Liṅgaparāmarśa*. This is the knowledge that the probans which has pervasion with the probandum exists in the subject of the inference in question. (व्याप्तिविशिष्टस्य पक्षवृत्तित्वज्ञानम्).

38. *Atideśavākyārtha*. e.g., '*Gayal* is an animal similar to the cow' with regard to the assimilative knowledge 'This is to be denoted by the word *gayal*.'

39. *Tātparyajñāna* is defined as 'the knowledge on the part of the hearer of the intention of the speaker that a particular sentence should convey a particular meaning'. (वक्तुरिच्छा—'अस्मादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य' इति—तात्पर्यम्; तस्य ज्ञानम्). But knowledge of intention, as defined here, may not always make verbal comprehension valid. For example, in spite of hearing the sentence, 'Fire is not hot', and knowing that the intention of the speaker is to convey the meaning, 'Fire is not hot', a knowledge of the validity of this knowledge does not arise. Hence, the following alternative suggestion.

40. *Yogyatā* is defined as 'the relationship of one meaning with another meaning'. (एकपदार्थे अपरपदार्थसंबन्धः). In the example cited, as a right knowledge of the relationship between the meanings of 'fire' and 'not hot' does not arise, valid verbal comprehension does not arise. So, the definition of merit becomes defectless.

41. This is only the generalization of तद्वति तत्प्रकारकम्, which particularizes each valid cognition. Wherever there is

knowledge of the adjunct as related to the substantive, the knowledge is valid.

42. *Pramātva* is not a single appending attribute such as a universal, for the validity in each case of knowledge is different. This is obvious from the general definition of validity, तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वम्, where the pronoun *tat* particularizes each cognition.

43. This means that according to the Prābhākara-s all cognitions are तद्वति तत्प्रकारकम्. In other words, the definition of *pramā* according to the Naiyāyika-s is the definition of *jñāna* according to the Prābhākara-s.

44. After realizing that the thing lying in front is nacre, one understands that the volition had reference to a substantive which has no silverness, which was an adjunct to the volition. Such volition is caused by a cognition corresponding to it, i.e., the cognition must also refer to a substantive which has no silverness, which is an adjunct to the cognition. Thus a qualified cognition is established. And along with it, the *anyathā-khyāti*, 'cognizing one thing as another', is also established. This is the gist of the argument.

45. i.e., silver.

46. This is in the form of recollection (*smṛti*).

47. This means 'as a principal substantive' (*mukhya-viśeṣyatayā*); that is to say, as 'silver' and not as 'having silverness'. The recollection of silver does not involve any attribute or adjunct according to the Prābhākara-s.

48. The effect is the volition in which silverness is the adjunct and nacre is the substantive.

49. These three causes operate jointly and produce the effect. That which directly causes the volition is the nonapprehension of the difference between the thing contacted with the eye and the thing recollected.

50. i.e., where silver is cognized as silver.

51. Qualified cognition means that cognition in which a substantive possessed of an attribute and that attribute as an adjunct are both present. So there is conformity to the principle of logical economy, if a qualified cognition is assumed as the cause of volition in general. Otherwise, two cognitions, one perception and the other recollection, in addition to the nonapprehension of the difference between the two objects, as mentioned above, will have to be assumed as the cause of the volition. This is cumbrous.

52. Because a qualified cognition is the cause of volition when the volition is successful.

53. The weakness of the theory of Prabhākara is exposed here. He has to assume separate causes for separate volitions. If the causality of qualified cognition is accepted, there is no reason not to apply it wherever possible.

54. The Prābhākara-s could argue that the view of the Naiyāyika-s also does not conform to logical economy, because as they say that silver is apprehended by the sense of sight there should be a relation between the sense and the object, which is not possible since the object (the silver) is not there. So, they are obliged to say that the contact is supernormal (*jñāna-lakṣaṇā*). It would be better instead to hold that the silver is recollected in which case there cannot be *anyathākhyāti*.

    In order to refute such an argument by the Prābhākara-s another solution is offered here.

55. This clearly points out that the cognition has the thing lying in front as its substantive, and silverness as its adjunct.

56. In inference, comparison and verbal testimony, the apprehension is mediate since they require the knowledge that the probans as pervaded by the probandum exists in the subject (*parāmarśa*), the recollection of the assimilative proposition (*atideśavākyārtha-smaraṇa*) and the knowledge of word-meanings (*padārtha-jñāna*), respectively. TC gives another definition: ज्ञानाजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्. 'Perception is that knowledge which is not caused by another knowledge', which, in effect, is the same as that given here.

57. According to the Naiyāyika-s, conjunction (*saṃyoga*) can take place only between two Substances. The mind (*manas*) and the self (*ātman*) are both Substances.

58. This qualification excludes divine perception (*īśvara-pratyakṣa*) which is eternal (*nitya*) and not caused.

59. The cognition exists in the Substance which is the object of perception through the relation of objectness (*viṣayatā*). Dimension and colour exist in the same Substance through inherence, since they are Qualities. Cf. गुणगुणिनोः समवायः संबन्धः. Thus the coexistence of both the cause and the effect in the same substrate is explained.

60. The prime atom has only atomic dimension (*aṇuparimāṇa* or *pārimāṇḍalya*). Air and Ether do not have colour. In order to exclude the sense of sight, which is 'fire' (*tejas*) according to the Naiyāyika-s, but not perceived, the epithet 'manifested' is given to 'colour'. The colour (white) in the sense of sight is not manifested (*anudbhūta*).

61. Manifestedness (*udbhūtatva*) cannot be a generic attribute or a universal, since it would produce *saṃkara* with whiteness, etc. *Saṃkara* prevents an attribute from becoming a universal. For, manifestedness exists in the colour blue where there is no whiteness; whiteness exists in unmanifested white colour; manifestedness and whiteness together exist in

manifested white colour. The definition of *saṃkara* is the coexistence of two attributes (in an object) which share the nonexistence of one another somewhere else. (परस्परात्यन्ताभाव-समानाधिकरणयोर्धर्मयोरेकत्र समावेशः). Later Naiyāyika-s, however, do not accept *sāṃkarya* as something that prevents a thing from possessing a *jāti* (*jātibādhaka*). So, in their view, manifestedness can be a universal. Following the earlier school, nonmanifestedness is accepted here as a universal.

62. Though the four Qualities, colour, taste, smell and touch, are both manifested and unmanifested, only colour is referred to here. Colour is accepted as sixfold: white, blue, yellow, red, green and tawny. Earlier Naiyāyika-s admitted a seventh, composite colour (*citrarūpa*), which the later Naiyāyika-s do not accept. Nonmanifestedness cannot be a generic attribute of all the six colours for the same reason that manifestedness cannot be a universal. Hence, the acceptance of six universals of nonmanifestedness separately.

63. This seems to be a new assumption of the author of the *Maṇikaṇa*. It has to be accepted that white colour is twofold, comprising manifested white and unmanifested white. The sense of sight, though white in colour, is yet imperceptible, because the colour is not manifested. With regard to other colours, however, even without assuming a twofold nature, perception and nonperception can be explained. Hence, all colours other than white are solely manifested, and there is no purpose in assuming their unmanifestedness. Hence this simple explanation.

64. Light (*tejas*) is a Substance and can therefore have conjunction with another Substance.

65. Radiance (*prabhā*) is also a Substance.

66. Such a thing can only be a Quality, Action, or universal. The clause 'other than a Substance' excludes material parts of the Substance.

67. *Existence* is *sattā, summum genus,* the grand universal. The Naiyāyika-s hold that only Substance, Quality and Action have *existence*. So, the adjectival clause 'possessed of *existence*' is used to exclude the perception of *rasatvajāti*, for *rasatvajāti* does not have *existence*. So, only the perception of *rasa* can be included here.

68. See note above. The epithet excludes the universal *gandhatva*.

69. The relation of *samavāya* and *abhāva* with the things in which they exist is attributiveness (*viśeṣaṇatā*). It is to be noted that the relation of *samavāya* between the Substance and the attribute existing in it is introduced here as a part of the cause. Through these specified relations, perception and inherence both exist in the same thing. So the theory of causation can operate.

70. The triad is inherent in dyads, for the relation between the whole and the parts is inherence. (अवयवावयविनोः समवायः). But it is a Substance; hence there is no deviation of causality.

71. Qualityness is inherent only in Quality, and colourness in colour. These are not substances.

72. i.e., ज्ञानलक्षणा प्रत्यासत्तिः (supernormal sense-contact). A discussion regarding this contact follows in the text.

73. The spirit does not have colour, because its body is constituted of wind (*vāyavīya*).

74. There are three kinds of dimensions: atomic dimension (*aṇu-parimāṇa*) in prime atoms, medium dimension (*mahat-parimāṇa*) in ordinary Substances and superlative dimension (*paramamahat-parimāṇa*) in Time, Ether, Self and Space.

75. The Nyāya view is that though a triad is perceptible to the sense of sight, it is not so to the sense of touch. The triad has medium dimension (*mahattva*). *Mahattva* begins from the triad. So *mahattva* in the triad is not higher

(*utkṛṣṭa*) but lower (*apakṛṣṭa*). The same in *caturaṇuka* and so on is, of course, higher. Radiance does not have manifested touch. It cannot, therefore, be cognized by tactual perception.

76. The general rule of causality given does not apply here. Therefore, it is said that with regard to the perception of smell, smell itself and with regard to the perception of taste, taste itself are separate causes.

77. Weight and elasticity are not perceptible. Their non-perceptibility cannot be explained by the general rule of causality given above. Hence this assumption.

78. Such a thing can only be sound. The epithet 'possessed of *existence*' is to exclude the universal soundness (*śabdatva-jāti*).

79. The epithet 'other than what possesses *existence*' is to exclude *śabda*, because the causation explained here is with regard to the perception of *śabdatva*, which is devoid of *existence*.

80. *Katva* is a universal pervaded by *śabdatva*.

81. 'Qualified by' means having Quality, etc., as adjuncts.

82. For example, the cognition of a pot objectifies the Substance, pot, as substantive, the universal, potness, as adjunct and the relation between the pot and potness.

83. In the cognition '*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*' [man with a staff], the man, the staff and the relation between these two are the objects.

84. If *svarūpa-sambandha* is assumed, it has to be separate for each individual. This is cumbrous.

85. The modern logicians do not share the view that inherence is one. Based on the experience that smell is inherent in earth but not in water, they hold several *samavāya-s*. (पृथिव्यां

गन्धस्य समवायः, न जले इत्यादिप्रतीतेः समवायस्य नानात्वम्). Cf. RR on D on M, p. 132. In their view, it is simpler to assume several *svarūpa-sambandha-s* rather than several *samavāya-s*. Hence, they establish the existence of *samavāya* through another inference.

86. This means all caused Substances, Qualities and Actions.

87. If such a causality is not accepted the absence of Qualities, etc., without a Substance cannot be accounted for.

88. Thus the causality is in this form: यत्किंचित्संबन्धावच्छेदेन जन्यसत्त्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति द्रव्यं तादात्म्येन कारणम्. As there must be some relation which determines the effectness, that relation is *samavāya*.

89. If only the relation of self-sameness is recognized, and not a separate relation (inherence).

90. i.e., any caused Substance, Quality or Action.

91. Though Time (*mahākāla*) is one and indivisible, the limiting adjunct of *kāla* or especially *khaṇḍakāla* are actions in the form of *sūryaparispanda*, i.e., the motion of the sun above or below the horizon by so many degrees.

92. This is *kālika-sambandha* or *kālika-viśeṣaṇatā* which is a *svarūpa-sambandha*. Through this relation every caused entity remains in Time.

93. Because in this instance, with regard to the effectness determined by *svarūpa-sambandha*, Action and not Substance is the cause.

94. The relation of attributiveness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) is manifold, as explained here. In the perception of *abhāva*, as well as of *samavāya*, the principal relation is attributiveness. See also M on BP, 59-62.

95. 'If there were a pot on the floor it would be perceived' (यद्यत्र घटः स्यात् तर्ह्युपलभ्येत).

96 Nonexistence is of two kinds: relational nonexistence (*saṃsargābhāva*) and reciprocal nonexistence. See note 14. The competence of relational nonexistence is the competence of the countercorrelate; that of reciprocal nonexistence is the competence of the substrate. Here the nonexistence of medium dimension in atoms and the nonexistence of colour in the unlimited external Ether are absolute nonexistences. The nonexistence referred to in the latter two instances is reciprocal nonexistence or difference. The competence of a reciprocal nonexistence consists in its either having a countercorrelate delimited by a universal or having a countercorrelate delimited by a perceptible attribute other than a universal. (अन्योन्याभावे योग्यता जात्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वजात्यतिरिक्तयोग्यधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वान्यतरत्. D on M on BP, 59-62). Thus the difference of the pillar from a spirit is competent and is, therefore, perceptible. But the difference of the pillar from that which is possessed by a spirit is not perceptible. For neither of the two types of competence defined above can be shown to exist in the latter case.

97. That is to say, the senses cease to function after apprehending the locus of nonexistence. The nonexistence is apprehended not by the senses but by a different means called nonapprehension. The employment of the senses is, however, inevitable as they serve as auxiliary causes by causing the apprehension of the locus.

98. Because here the perception of the locus is through the tactual sense and, according to the Bhāṭṭa-s, the senses do not apprehend nonexistence.

99. Thus the causal relation is in the form: विजातीयघटाभावज्ञानं प्रति चक्षुः कारणम्। विजातीयघटाभावज्ञानं प्रति त्वक् कारणम्।

The effect is the cognition of the nonexistence of the pot. Then different types of such cognition will have to be posited to explain the noncognition of the pot in different circumstances. This is cumbrous.

100. In any case, visuality and tactuality have to be accepted with reference to the apprehension of the locus of the nonexistence.

101. If the view of the Bhāṭṭa-s is accepted, a new means of valid cognition called nonapprehension has to be posited, and also two *vaijātya-s* as determinants of the effectness. According to the view of the Naiyāyika-s, who say that nonexistence is perceived by the senses, the causality is simple.

102. This refers to the view of the Prābhākara-s who hold that nonexistence is nothing but the locus devoid of the countercorrelate of the nonexistence; it is by no means a separate category.

103. Thus, experience, which cannot be contradicted by any other *pramāṇa*, proves that nonexistence is separate from its locus.

104. Though absolute nonexistence is eternal, the nonexistence of a pot when there is a pot is not perceived. For, though absolute nonexistence is there, there is no relation between the locus and the nonexistence. The relation of the nonexistence in question is the particular floor associated with the particular time (i.e., when one has the notion that the pot is not there). (तत्तत्कालीनं तत्तद्भूतलादिकं तत्तदभावानां सम्बन्धः. M on BP 11).

105. Partial extensity (*avyāpya-vṛttitva*) can be spacial as well as temporal. *Saṃyoga* has spacial partial extensity, e.g., the conjunction of an ape with a tree. Here, the conjunction

is only at the top and not at the root. *Avyāpyavṛttitva* is defined as स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वम् which means the existence of a thing and its nonexistence together in one substrate.

106. If attributiveness were accepted as a separate category, it should be either eternal like inherence, or noneternal. If it were eternal and were the relation between the locus and the nonexistence of a thing there, its absolute nonexistence would have to be accepted even when that thing is present in the locus, for the relation is there. On the other hand, if it is contended that attributiveness is manifold, the assumption is cumbrous. Better, therefore, to assume that the locus itself is the relation between it and the nonexistence.

107. For example, the cognition, 'This is a fragrant piece of sandalwood'. Here the sense of sight has contact with the piece of sandalwood and not with the fragrance. Still the cognition objectifies it. So it is recognized that the eye has supernormal contact with the fragrance. This contact is in the form of recollection. Now, the perception exists in fragrance through the relation of supernormal adjunctness. The objectness in fragrance is correlated with the objectness in the sandalwood which is the substantive.

108. Indeterminate perception does not refer to the threefold objectness (*viṣayatā*), namely, substantiveness, adjunctness and the correlation between them. It is defined as वैशिष्ट्यानवगाहि (not comprehending any relationship) or विशेषण-विशेष्यसंबन्धानवगाहि (not referring to the qualification, the qualified and the relation between them). It is said to refer to a fourth objectness (तुरीयविषय). Cf. D, p. 432; N, pp. 235-6.

109 With regard to the mental perception of fragrance, however, a cognition in which fragrancehood is the adjunct and fragrance the substantive, is the cause.

110. *Upanīta* means cognition produced by the relation which is in the form of cognition (ज्ञानलक्षणाजन्यं ज्ञानम्).

111. In the cognition of fragrance through the supernormal contact of the external senses, the fragrance appears as an attribute of the sandalwood. But, in the case of a mental perception of fragrance, it appears as a substantive.

112. There is no separate causality between *jñānalakṣaṇā* and *pratyakṣa* because in the case of *jñānalakṣaṇā* fragrancehood (*saurabhatva*) appears only as an attribute or qualification. And the cognition of qualification is the cause of a qualified cognition. This is the general rule which includes the causality of *jñānalakṣaṇā* too.

113. Principal substantiveness means that substantiveness which is not correlated with any adjunctness. For example, in the cognition of smoke where smokeness is presented as adjunct, there is no principal substantiveness in the smoke; but in a cognition which refers only to smoke without referring to any adjunct, smoke is said to have principal substantiveness. See also note 47.

114. After seeing the coexistence of smoke and fire in one place, there arises a doubt as to the coexistence of fire and smoke everywhere and at all times. This doubt is possible only when all cases of fire and smoke are apprehended. As there cannot be normal sense-contact with smoke or fire at a distance, the apprehension of all cases of smoke and fire is through contact which is in the form of generality, i.e., smokeness and fireness.

The celebrated Raghunātha Śiromaṇi does not, however, accept *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. There is a traditional account that Pakṣadhara Miśra ridiculed Raghunātha, saying:

वक्षोजपानकृत्! काण! संशये जाग्रति स्फुटम्।
सामान्यलक्षणा कस्मादकस्मात् परिभूयते ॥

"O, one-eyed suckling infant, when uncertainty is staring at you [regarding the universal coexistence of smoke and fire], how perforce do you refuse to accept contact in the form of generality?"

115. Not relevant because any knowledge is mental in the sense that the operation of the mind is inevitable. The difference between contact in the form of generality in a supernormal sensual perception and that in a supernormal mental perception is that in the former it is an adjunct to a cognition which has a substantive related to the sense and in the latter it is the generality which is adjunct to the cognition.

116. See note 111.

117. The locus of yogic power is the self (*ātman*), which is conjoined with all material Substances (i.e., Earth, Water, Fire, Wind and Mind).

118. This is required when Qualities, Actions, etc., inherent in Substances are perceived through yogic power.

119. Indeterminate perception is the knowledge which follows upon sense-object contact. In such perception an object appears not as a substantive or as an adjunct but merely as an object. Then there arises the determinate knowledge. *Ālocana* is the term of the Mīmāṃsaka-s.

120. The difference between an attributive adjunct and an indicative adjunct is that the former always exists in the qualified, e.g., cowness and cow, or the staff and the man with the staff. The latter's presence is not necessary for the identification of the qualified, e.g., a crow may indicate the house of a particular person, but it need not always be there.

121. The identification 'This is the same' is recognition. It is a qualified single cognition according to the Naiyāyika-s.

There is another view that with regard to 'this' there is perception, but the other part depends on recollection and therefore identification is a combination of two cognitions, i.e., perception and recollection. This view is refuted here.

122. If two different cognitions are accepted, the identity of the objects experienced at different times which is cognized here cannot be explained well. 'This is that' (*so'yam*) is the form of cognition. 'This' refers to the object existing in the present time; 'that' refers to the object which existed in the past. The unity of these two objects is comprehended by this cognition. So it has to be admitted that the cognition is also one and not two.

II. INFERENCE

1. The cognition of *pakṣadharmatā* qualified by pervasion is *parāmarśa*. That is to say, in the cognition, *pakṣadharmatā* is the substantive and *vyāpti* is the adjunct (*prakāra*). In the language of the Naiyāyika-s: व्याप्त्यवच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताशाली निश्चयः परामर्शः. *Pakṣadharmatā* is only *hetutā* under particular circumstances. For example, smoke is the *hetu*; when it is known to be present in the subject of the inference in question it becomes *pakṣadharma*. See Athalye, pp. 234-5.

   Here the explanation of व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं follows Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Vardhamānopādhyāya and Pakṣadhara Miśra dissolve the compound in another way. See the commentary NP on TD, p. 254.

2. The efficient instrument of inferential knowledge is *parāmarśa*. The older school of the Naiyāyika-s were, however, of the view that knowledge of pervasion (*vyāptijñāna*) is the instrument (*karaṇa*) of inferential knowledge and

parāmarśa is the intermediary function (*vyāpāra*). See NK, pp. 199-201 for the different definitions of *karaṇa* by the old and new schools of Nyāya. See also NNL, pp. 30-2.

3 i.e. the Indian materialists. According to them knowledge is originated only through the senses and perception is the only means of knowledge.

4. That is to say, there is no separate means which causes inferential knowledge. The Cārvāka-s hold that *vyāpti* cannot be established as a means of knowledge; hence inference which is based on *vyāpti* cannot be a means to knowledge. Gaṅgeśa refutes their view in his TC, pp. 133, 138. See also HIL, p. 420.

5. Experience, which is irrefutable, proves that inferential knowledge is different from perception. Inferencehood is a universal or generic attribute that is experienced in several cases of inferential knowledge.

6. This definition is defective as it does not include some valid inferences. For example, in the proposition, 'It has the conjunction of a monkey, because it is this tree', the probandum, 'conjunction of a monkey', is nonexistent at the root of the tree; but the probans, 'this treeness' is not absent. That is to say, in inferences where the probandum has partial extensity (*avyāpyavṛttitva*), this definition of pervasion does not hold good. Hence the second definition.

7. In this definition, by introducing the clause 'other than that which has the probandum' as an epithet of 'substrate' the above-mentioned defect is rectified. For, the tree is not 'other than that which has the conjunction of the monkey'.

8 As there is nothing which is not nameable, there can be no substrate in which the probandum, nameability, is nonexistent. Nor can there be a substrate which is other than that which has the probandum, i.e., nameability. Thus both

the definitions given above are defective with regard to this inference.

9. This definition lays stress on the coexistence of the probans and the probandum, while the former definitions stress the *avinābhāva* aspect of the probans and the probandum. In the inference 'There is fire in the mountain, because there is smoke', smoke is the probans and fire is the probandum. Smoke coexists with fire in the same substrate. The determinant of the probandum, which is fireness, is not a determinant of the countercorrelateness of the nonexistence resting in the substrate of the probans. In the substrate of the probans, smoke, there may be the nonexistence of things other than fire; for example, pot, water, etc. So, potness, waterness, etc., alone can be the determinants of such a countercorrelateness. The text below explains that the substrate of the probans should not be a substrate of a countercorrelate of the nonexistence of the probandum. Taking an inference lacking pervasion, 'There is smoke, because there is fire', fire is the probans and smoke is the probandum. The determinant of the probandum is smokeness. In a hot iron ball there is the probans, fire, but the nonexistence of the probandum, smoke. So, smokeness is the determinant of the countercorrelateness of the nonexistence that exists in the substrate of the probans; the same smokeness is the determinant of the probandum. Hence there is no pervasion.

   The long definition in Sanskrit can be split and explained as follows: प्रतियोगी = जलं (anything other than the present probandum); तदधिकरणं = ह्रदः; तदनधिकरणं यत् हेत्वधिकरणं (हेतोः धूमस्याधिकरणं) = पर्वतः; तन्निष्ठः य अभावः = जलाभावः; तस्य प्रतियोगी = जलं; प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं = जलत्वं; अनवच्छेदकं = वह्नित्वं; तदेवात्र साध्यतावच्छेदकं; तद्विशिष्टसाध्यं = वह्निः; तत्समानाधिकरणो हेतुः = धूमः; तत्त्वं व्याप्तिः।

10. Conjunction is a Quality of partial extensity (*avyāpyavṛtti-guṇa*) (see note 6 above) and a conjoined thing can be

pratiyogyadhikaraṇa too. If this phrase were not added to the definition the inference in question could not have pervasion. When it is added, the nonexistence in the substrate of the probans can be, in this case, only a nonexistence other than that of conjunction. So there is no defect in the definition, for it includes this proposition also.

11. This is a fallacious proposition to which the definition of pervasion should not be applicable. According to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika theory, Substance, Quality and Action possess *existence* (*sattā*) and these are the only three which have universals. In the light of the accepted view that 'the qualified does not differ from the unqualified' (विशिष्टं शुद्धान्नातिरिच्यते) the unqualified *existence* (*śuddha-sattā*) is not different from qualified *existence* (*viśiṣṭa-sattā*). If the interpretation in the text were not given, the definition could also apply to this inference which has no pervasion. For, in a Quality there is the universal qualityness as well as *existence*. But as it is stated that the countercorrelate should be specified by the determinant of the countercorrelateness, in the present instance there is no pervasion; for, though a Quality is a substrate of *sattā*, it is not a substrate of the *sattā* as specified by the determinant 'possessed of difference from that of Qualities', and hence the substrate of the probans here is the substrate of the countercorrelate.

12. This is a valid inference to which the definition ought to be applicable. Here 'the determinant of being the probans' is 'having a *sattā* different from that of Qualities, etc.' If the explanation were not introduced a Quality could be taken as the substrate of *sattā* and the absence of substanceness shown there. See also note above.

13. The relation determining the countercorrelateness and the subjectness (*pratiyogitāvacchedaka-sambandha* and *sādhyatāvacchedaka-sambandha*) must be the same. If the desire is to infer fire in the mountain through the relation of conjunction,

the same relation of conjunction must determine the countercorrelateness of the nonexistence also.

14. Fire does not exist through inherence in a mountain which has smoke. Therefore, if the relation of the probandum and that of the countercorrelate of nonexistence is not the same, the definition would not include any valid inference, for the nonexistence of the probandum through some relation can be shown to exist in the substrate of the probans.

15. *Avacchedakatva* is considered to be a particular type of *svarūpa-sambandha*. NK, p. 84. It is an accepted rule that the simple should be preferred to the complex (संभवति लघौ गुरौ तदभावः). So, smokeness alone can be the determinant of smoke, and not 'knowable smokeness'.

16. In a fallacy, the probandum, as qualified by the attribute and the relation determining its state as such, is lacking in some substrate of the probans. There the countercorrelateness of the nonexistence abiding in the substrate of the probans must be qualified by both the attribute and the relation which determine the state of being the probandum. Hence these two qualifications never being jointly absent, the definition is not too extensive. In a valid proposition, however, the substrate of the probans is not wanting in the probandum possessing the above two qualifications. Therefore, the countercorrelateness of the nonexistence abiding in the substrate of the probans invariably lacks the above two qualifications.

17. In a valid proposition like 'It has fire, because it has smoke', as fire is not absent through the relation of conjunction in the substrate of the probans, i.e., the mountain, all countercorrelateness of the nonexistence abiding in the substrate of the probans lacks qualification by the attribute and the relation determining the state of being the probandum, namely, fireness and conjunction, respectively.

Hence, in the absence of the two together, the definition is applicable.

In a fallacious proposition like, 'It has smoke, because it has fire', the attribute determining the state of being the probandum is smokeness, and the relation determining the same is conjunction. A red-hot iron ball has fire (the probans) but no smoke, i.e., there is the nonexistence of smoke in it, of which the countercorrelate is smoke, and the relation determining the countercorrelateness is conjunction. In this countercorrelateness, both smokeness and conjunction exist. Hence, as both these are not absent together, the definition does not extend to the fallacious proposition.

18. The proposition is: कालो घटवान् महाकालत्वात्. *Kāla* or infinite Time is the substrate of everything and one of the common causes of everything produced. Cf. BP 45. जन्यानां जनक: कालो जगतामाश्रयो मत:. Everything exists in Time through the relation of *kālikaviśeṣaṇatā*. The former definition of pervasion cannot include this valid proposition. For, here the substrate of the probans is Time in which everything exists. So every nonexistence abides in the substrate of its countercorrelate through the same relation as that of the determinant of the state of being the probandum, namely, temporal attributiveness. Hence, this new definition, according to which, in the example cited above, there is the nonexistence of the pot through the relation of conjunction in the substrate of the probans, namely, infinite Time, which is not the substrate of the countercorrelate of the nonexistence of the pot (which is the pot) through the relation of conjunction. So, here, the countercorrelateness of the nonexistence of the pot possesses the twofold nonexistence of the state of being determined by potness and the state of being determined by the temporal relation; for, though the determinant of the state of being the probandum, namely, potness, exists here, the relation which is conjunction does not exist. (एकसत्त्वेऽपि द्वयं नास्ति.)

19. That is to say, there is no nonexistence, in this case, which abides in the substrate of the probans and does not coexist with its countercorrelate (i.e., the thing of which the nonexistence is spoken of), since everything exists in Time, which is the substrate, through the relation of temporal attributiveness (*kālikaviśeṣaṇatā*), which is the relation that determines the state of being the probandum (*sādhyatāva-cchedaka*) as well as the state of being the countercorrelate (*pratiyogitāvacchedaka*).

20. The older school of the Naiyāyika-s maintained that repeated observation (*bhūyodarśana*) of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum was the cause of the apprehension of pervasion. Gaṅgeśa objects that this cannot be accurate since even after observing the coexistence a thousand times, if one contrary instance is noticed the pervasion cannot be apprehended. Moreover, as Nīlakaṇṭha remarks, the word *bhūyodarśana* is itself ambiguous; it may mean repetition of the same observation, or observation of several instances of the probans and probandum, or observation of the coexistence of the two in several instances. See PIL, pp. 264-5.

21. Argument through *reductio ad absurdum.*

22. Because fire and smoke are related together as cause and effect.

23. अग्नेर्वै धूमो जायते. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, V. 3. 5. 17.

24. For example, during a debate if the opponent raises the objection, 'Let there be smoke, but not fire', the proponent uses *tarka* to falsify the objection.

25. The pervader is absence of smoke, and the pervaded, absence of fire. The form of reasoning is: 'Were there no fire, there would be no smoke.' This falsifies the opponent's stand as he maintains that there is smoke.

26. *Mānasatva* is a *parā jāti* and *tarkatva* is the *aparā-jāti* pervaded by *mānasatva.* The universal *tarkatva* is established by the experience 'I reason' which follows several instances of reasoning.

27. In the example cited above, the pervaded is the nonexistence of fire, which is hypothetically assumed in the *tarka.* At the same time, there is definite knowledge of the nonexistence of the deduced, which is 'absence of smoke'. See Athalye, pp. 356-8.

28. *Upādhi*; for details, see Athalye, pp. 311-3.

29. Wherever there is smoke, there is conjunction with wet fuel, but wherever there is fire, wet fuel is not necessarily present, e.g., in a red-hot iron ball. Thus 'conjunction with wet fuel' pervades smoke, but does not pervade fire. This type of condition is called *kevalasādhyavyāpaka.* See TD, p. 301.

30. Some sons of Mitrā are dark, while others are fair. The dark colour of her sons is due to her eating spinach during her pregnancy. When she carried her fair sons, she drank only milk!

31. With regard to the perception of an external Substance, manifested colour (*udbhūtarūpa*) is a cause. But an external Substance which is the substrate of a perceptible quality need not have manifested colour. For example, Ether is an external Substance and is the substrate of sound which is a perceptible quality; but Ether does not have colour.

32. Namely, that the determinant of the probandum and the probans must be the same.

33. Because in the kitchen a fan is usually used to keep the fire active.

34. In the proposition, 'It has smoke, because it has fire', if the condition, 'conjunction with wet fuel', is apprehended as not always coexisting with the probans, fire, it leads to the inference that fire exists without smoke, because it exists without the conjunction of the wet fuel which pervades smoke. For, in this instance, fire is the pervaded (*vyāpya*) and smoke is the pervader (*vyāpaka*). If it is known that a condition does not invariably coexist with the pervader, how can it coexist with the pervaded?

35. *Satpratipakṣa*. The definition of this follows in the text on p. 50 and in the translation on p. 51.

36. For example, a proposition like 'The red-hot iron ball has smoke, because it has fire' may give rise to the counter-proposition, 'The red-hot iron ball does not have smoke, because it does not have conjunction with wet fuel'. The difference between these two views is that while according to the former the knowledge of the condition obstructs the apprehension of pervasion, according to the latter it obstructs the inferential knowledge directly.

37. The compound word 'सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्ध्यभावः' is to be dissolved as सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टा या सिद्धिः तस्याः अभावः; i.e. certainty must be qualified by the absence of desire to infer. So, where there is no certainty there is subjectness, whether the desire to infer exists or not. Where there is the desire to infer, there is subjectness, whether there is certainty or not. Here certainty and the desire to infer exist through the relation of inherence in the person who infers; they also exist in the subject through the relation of objectness (*viṣayatā*). For further information, see Athalye, pp. 239-41; PIL, pp. 249-52.

38. For example, though through the inferences 'The mountain has fire, because it has smoke' and 'The mountain has fire, because it has light', the same thing, fire, is inferred, the

pakṣatā is different, because of the difference in the probans. Certainty can be a composite knowledge (*samūhālambanajñāna*) in the form, 'The mountain has fire, and has smoke which is pervaded by fire'. पर्वतो वह्निमान् वह्निव्याप्यधूमवांश्च. So, in the latter proposition, it is: 'The mountain has fire, and has light pervaded by fire'. Thus the certainty is different in these inferences; hence the absence of certainty (which is *pakṣatā*) must also be different. See N, p. 252; M on BP, 70.

39. The view of the Mīmāṃsaka-s is: When one perceives smoke in the mountain and recollects the pervasion of smoke and fire, the inference can and does take place. Here the perception is in the form, 'There is smoke in the mountain', and the recollection in the form, 'Smoke is pervaded by fire'. Knowledge of the *pakṣadharmatā* in which the determinant of the *vyāpyatā* (*dhūmatva*) is an adjunct is, in this case, caused by the two above-mentioned cognitions, namely, perception and recollection. Therefore, there is no need to assume a knowledge qualified by pervasion, as the Naiyāyika-s do. But it is necessary that the pervadedness (*vyāpyatā*) must be apprehended at the time of the inference; otherwise, any kind of cognition in the form, 'The mountain has smoke', would lead to inferential knowledge, because there is a knowledge in which smokeness, which is the determinant of *vyāpyatā*, is an adjunct.

    The Mīmāṃsaka would argue that his assumption conforms to logical economy, for pervasion involves *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, and it is simpler to assume a cause which involves only *vyāpyatā*. See M, pp. 477-9 and commentaries on it.

40. The Naiyāyika argues that what the Mīmāṃsaka presents as simple is actually cumbersome. He has, of course, *avacchedakalāghava*, i.e., *vyāpyatāvacchedaka* is simpler than *vyāpti*. But according to his definition of *parāmarśa*, there would be the possibility of inferential knowledge (either for X or Y) when X is aware of the pervasion and Y has the knowledge that the probans is present in the subject; for

there is *vyāpyatāvacchedakaprakāraka-pakṣadharmatājñāna*. To avoid this absurdity the Mīmāṃasaka must maintain the view that both cognitions should exist in the same person who has the inferential knowledge. He is obliged to say: तत्पुरुषीयगृह्यमाणव्याप्यतावच्छेदकं तत्पुरुषीयपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं तत्पुरुषीयानुमितौ कारणम्. This involves the assumption of an endless number of causes and effects. So, it is simpler to hold *vyāptiviśiṣṭapakṣadharmatājñāna* as the cause of inferential knowledge, as then the causality would be: समवायसंबन्धेन अनुमितिं प्रति समवायसंबन्धेन व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं कारणम्. Therefore there is greater conformity to the principle of logical economy in assuming a qualified knowledge as the cause of inferential knowledge.

41. According to this view *vyāpakatāprakāraka-pakṣadharmatājñāna* is the cause.

42. For, pervasion is *hetusādhyasāmānādhikaraṇya* and *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is *svātyantābhāvavadavṛttitva*, i.e., the state of being nonexistent where the nonexistence (of the other) abides This is therefore more cumbrous than pervasiveness (*vyāpakatā*).

43. Udayana's view is that when the *parāmarśa* is वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्वतः, the inferential knowledge which immediately follows the *parāmarśa* must also feature the probans, namely, smoke, as there is no warrant for assuming otherwise. Thus according to him the form of inferential knowledge is धूमवान् पर्वतो वह्निमान्, not simply पर्वतो वह्निमान्.

44. Gaṅgeśa does not favour Udayana's view for the following reason: If the form of inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) were धूमवान् पर्वतो वह्निमान्, it would be on a par with another knowledge, नीलपर्वतो वह्निमान्, inasmuch as both present the existence of the probandum, i.e., fire, in a particular subject. In the former, the subject is 'the smoky mountain', and in the latter, 'the blue mountain'. In both cases the knowledge is that the probandum coexists with another

thing in the given subject (सामानाधिकरण्येन साध्यवत्ताबुद्धिः). It is an accepted rule that the knowledge of the absence of a thing through *sāmānādhikaraṇya* obstructs the knowledge of the existence of that thing through *avacchedakāvaccheda*. For example, knowledge that the absence of fire has the same substrate as fire obstructs the knowledge that the substrate has fire. In the language of the Naiyāyika-s अवच्छेदकावच्छेदेन वह्निमत्ताबुद्धिं प्रति सामानाधिकरण्येन वह्न्यभावबुद्धिः प्रतिबन्धिका। पर्वतत्वावच्छेदेन वह्नौ साध्ये सामानाधिकरण्येन वह्न्यभावो बाधः। But according to Udayana, as pointed out above, in inferential knowledge, the probandum is presented through the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, and not *avacchedakāvaccheda*. So knowledge of the absence of the probandum through *sāmānādhikaraṇya* would not obstruct any inferential knowledge. Consequently the above-mentioned rule would be invalid if Udayana's view were accepted.

45. The early Naiyāyika-s maintained that the nonexistence of the absolute nonexistence of a thing is the thing itself (घटाभावाभावो घटस्वरूपः). The modern Naiyāyika-s, however, do not favour this view. For, in that case, as the pot exists on the floor through the relation of contact (*saṃyoga-saṃbandha*), the nonexistence of the nonexistence of the pot must also be held to be so related. This is absurd, since nonexistence abides in its substrate through attributiveness (*viśeṣaṇatā*), which is a *svarūpa-sambandha*. See NNL, p. 68.

    Occupancy (*vṛttitva*) means existence in some substrate through a relation other than temporal attributiveness. Ether, being an eternal Substance does not exist in any substrate through a relation other than temporal attributiveness. Thus by introducing the adjective *vṛttimat* qualifying the *pratiyogin* this inference can also be treated as *kevalānvayī*.

46. Wherever there are water, etc., there is the absence of earthness. (यत्र यत्र जलादिकं तत्र तत्र पृथिवीत्वाभावः).

47. Nonidentity of water, etc., with earth or the fact that water, etc., are different from earth is ascertained only by this inference; it is not previously known.

48. Here the inferential knowledge is पृथिव्यां जलादिभेदः. So *jalādibheda* is the substantive (*viśeṣya*) in the knowledge. There cannot be the inferential knowledge 'जलादिभेदवती पृथिवी' in this instance, for, then, *jalādibheda* would have to be the attribute of *pṛthivī*. This would be possible only if *jalādibheda* were previously known; but, as said above, *jalādibheda* is known only through this inference.

49. This is negative pervasion (*vyatirekavyāpti*).

50. This is positive pervasion (*anvayavyāpti*).

51. Fire was known prior to this inferential knowledge; only its existence in the subject in question is within the scope of the present inferential knowledge. So the form of inferential knowledge is: पर्वतो वह्निमान्. In this knowledge the thing which has fire (the mountain) is the substantive and fire is only an attribute.

52. The Mīmāṃsaka-s accept Presumption as a separate means of valid knowledge on the ground that a fact such as Caitra being alive but not present in his house, can be accounted for only by presuming another fact like Caitra being outside his house. The means that leads to this knowledge is *arthāpatti* or Presumption. The Naiyāyika-s say that this is only an instance of inferential knowledge based on exclusively negative pervasion. Here the inference is in this form: देवदत्तः बहिरस्ति जीवति सति गृहेऽसत्त्वात्. Where 'being alive' is known to be pervaded by one or the other of the two alternatives, namely 'being outside' and 'being at home' one of the two must be held to be true; existence at home being contradicted by perception, existence outside is inferred.

Arthāpatti is the name for the knowledge as well as its means, In the former case it means: अर्थस्य आपत्तिः कल्पना ; in the latter: अर्थस्य आपत्तिः यस्याः सा. See PIL, pp., 182-9.

53. *Svārtha* is informal and *parārtha* is formal. The former is one's own knowledge, the other conveys the knowledge to others also so as to convince them. See Athalye, pp. 251-3.

54. The appropriateness of the order consists in arranging the components of a syllogism in such a way as to convince the listener of the inferential knowledge with the minimum of words, and to satisfy his expectancy.

55. घटो दण्डात्, दण्डान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात्. Here the proposition as well as the reason is in the ablative case and the latter includes words which have expectancy for the former, ending in the ablative case.

56. Because when the proposition, 'The mountain has fire' is heard there arises the expectancy 'how?', which is satisfied by the word or words expressing the reason, 'because there is smoke'

57. i.e., the probans.

58. The Buddhists say that when the general rule, *vyāpti*, and its application to a particular case, *upanaya*, are stated the aim of the syllogism is realized. So, the other components are superfluous. See BL, part I, pp. 279-80.

59. For these three suffice to convey the pervasion, *pakṣadharmatā* and the conclusion. The Buddhists, however, include conclusion in application.

The Bhāṭṭa school of Mimāṃsā accepts either: proposition, reason and example; or, example, application and conclusion. For further information and for a comparison

of the Nyāya and Aristotelian syllogisms, see Athalye, pp. 266-78; PIL, pp. 287-301.

60. The repetition conveys the idea that all substrates of the probans have the probandum, thus avoiding all doubt as to the deviation of the coexistence between the probans and the probandum in any substrate. Thus *vyabhicāravāraṇa* is the purpose of repeating *yat śabda.*

61. *Tat śabda* does not need repetition. In *yat yat,* the first *yat* refers to the example, the kitchen, with regard to the proposition, 'It has fire because it has smoke', and the second *yat* refers to the substrates of smoke other than the kitchen. Both these substrates can be referred to by one *tat śabda.* Explaining this ancient view, TC quotes the following verse from Bhavabhūti: 'यद्यत्पापं प्रतिजहि जगन्नाथ नम्रस्य तन्मे'. Here though *yat* is repeated *tat* is not. Gadādhara in his commentary on this quotes Kālidāsa 'विवर्णभावं स स भूमिपालः' and remarks that though the repetition is not needed here, the poet has employed it either for the sake of the metre or for stressing the point.

62. TC, end of the Avayava-Prakaraṇa, p. 1572 (CSS ed.). After stating the ancient view Gaṅgeśa argues that *vyabhicāravāraṇa* cannot be the purpose of repetition. For, if the inference is made on seeing the coexistence of the probans and the probandum in one place, as in the *anvayavyatirekī* type of inference, there is no point in referring to all substrates. In a *kevalānvayī* on the other hand, even if there is repetition, *vyabhicāravāraṇa* cannot be effected.

63. See TS and TD. The difference is that तथा चायम् would mean धूमवान् पर्वतः वह्निमान् whereas वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयम् includes the pervasion also in its fold.

64. The defect of the probans is not merely an attribute (*dharma*) which is an object of a cognition that thwarts inference.

It should be a qualified attribute (*viśiṣṭadharma*); that is to say, it is an object together with its qualification. If this were not said, in an instance like 'The mountain has fire, because it has smoke', the absence of fire which when known obstructs the inference, and which is an object in the cognition of the obstructor (*pratibandhaka-jñāna-viṣaya*), in its capacity of being the delimitant of the obstructing element (*pratibandhakatāvacchedaka*), would also be included in a fallacy. This is not correct. Since it is said that only a qualified object is the defect, there is no flaw in the definition. For, only if there were the knowledge 'पर्वतो वह्न्यभाववान्' which objectifies *vahnyabhāvavattva*, a qualified attribute it can be a fallacy.

65. Among the defects that are enumerated here some like the Counterbalanced obstruct the inferential knowledge directly. Others obstruct the consideration by producing the knowledge of inconsistency in the pervasion.

66. *Hetvābhāsa* can be either the defect or the defective probans. Here the defects are defined and the probans which possess these defects are called *hetvābhāsa-s*.

67. i e., defective probans.

68. Knowledge of inconsistency obstructs pervasion. So, obstruction of the pervasion is the common characteristic of the three kinds of inconsistent probans enumerated below.

69. The name Common is suggestive since in such instances the probans exists in the substrate of the probandum as well as in other substrates.

70. This is the defect.

71. This is the defective probans.

72. The Uncommon probans exists neither where the probandum is, nor where the probandum is not. Hence it is uncommon.

73. Soundness exists only in sound and not in any substrate where eternality, the probandum, exists. Thus the defect here prevents one from apprehending the coexistence of the probans and the probandum in any substrate. For the Contradictory also the same example is given in the text. Thus one may wonder whether this is an instance of the Uncommon or the Contradictory. To avoid such a possibility, the alternative probans 'because of Ether' is given here. Ether being an eternal Substance does not exist in any substrate. See also note 45 above.

74. When the probans has a probandum which is *kevalānvayī* there cannot be negative pervasion. In certain cases, however, there can be inferential knowledge through positive pervasion alone. For instance, the proposition 'घटोऽभिधेयः वाच्यत्वात्' is a valid inference, for though there is no negative pervasion, there is positive pervasion. In the example referred to here, 'everything' is the subject; and as there is nothing which is not included in everything, positive pervasion is also not possible. So this is an instance of fallacy.

75. This is to exclude the Counterbalanced in which the probans is other than the one in question.

76. i.e., the probans whose absence pervades the probandum. Such a probans has negative pervasion with the absence of the probandum: यत्र न नित्यत्वाभावः तत्र शब्दत्वम्. This is the definition accepted by Raghunātha. Gaṅgeśa's definition follows. See NK, p. 774.

77. i.e., the probans which exists in a subject other than the one which has the probandum. The Uncommon is that probans which exists in a subject in which the absence of the probandum is ascertained. This is the difference, according to this definition, between the Uncommon and the Contradictory. See N on TD, p. 297.

78. This epithet distinguishes the Contradictory from the Uncommon type of the Inconsistent, where the probans need not be abiding in the subject.

79. The same example is given to illustrate the Uncommon also. In fact, according to Gaṅgeśa, there is *saṃkara* of the Uncommon and the Contradictory (असाधारणे च सङ्कर एव; अनेनापि रूपेण तस्य दोषत्वात्. TC, p. 1776). That is to say, there are both the defects in the example cited. Raghunātha also admits this: उपधेयसङ्करेऽप्युपाधेरसङ्करः. Quoted in N on TD, pp. 295-6.

80. The Contradictory probans leads to a knowledge of the probans which has negative pervasion with the nonexistence of the probandum, and this knowledge directly obstructs the inferential knowledge. (साध्याभावव्याप्यो हेतुः हेतुमान् पक्षः इति ज्ञानद्वयसत्वे पक्षे साध्यवत्ताज्ञानानुत्पत्तेः. RR on TD, p. 298)

81. Here each inference obstructs the inferential knowledge arising from the other. The technical difference between the Contradictory and the Counterbalanced is that while in the former there is only one probans, in the latter there are two probans and two inferences.

82. This work, quoted by some authors, is said to have been written by Pṛthvīdhara. No MS. of this work has so far been found.

83. i.e., when there are two propositions opposed to each other, doubt arises as to their validity. This inferential knowledge, in the form of doubt, is the defect of *satpratipakṣa*, which does not refer to one inference obstructing the other.

84. As the valid causality 'तद्वत्ताज्ञानं प्रति तदभावव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकम्' has to be accepted, *satpratipakṣa* cannot but obstruct the inference.

85. Consideration, *parāmarśa*, is constituted of three elements: pervasion (*vyāpti*), subjectness (*pakṣatā*) and the presence of the probans in the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*). Knowledge of consideration is obstructed by a defect in the apprehension of any of its constituents; hence the three varieties of the Unfounded.

86. As there is no golden mountain, it cannot be the *pakṣa*. That is to say, there is no delimitant of the subject (*pakṣatāvacchedaka*), as golden-mountainness is nonexistent.

87. There is no pervasion between golden fire and golden smoke.

88. There is no smoke in the red-hot iron ball.

89. Even though this defect also obstructs knowledge of consideration, its form is different from that of Stultification.

90. Here the defect in the inference is that we know by other means like perception that there cannot be fire (the probandum) in a lake (the subject). It might be argued that in an instance of the Stultified, if the probans exists in the subject there is the defect of Inconsistency (the first fallacy); if the probans does not exist in the subject the defect is *svarūpāsiddhi*. Therefore, the Stultified cannot be a separate fallacious probans. To meet this argument, the next example is given.

91. i.e., the pot during the first moment of its existence. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika theory is that any caused Substance is during the first moment of its existence devoid of any Qualities or Actions (उत्पन्नं द्रव्यं क्षणमगुणमक्रियं च तिष्ठति). Such an assumption is necessary because a Substance is held to cause its own Qualities and Actions; and a cause is that which immediately precedes the effect (*niyatapūrvavṛtti*). Immediate precedence means existing at a time preceding the moment of the existence of the effect.

92. Such a pot has the probans, which is earthness, but not the probandum, smell. Here, there is no Inconsistency, as the pervasion is correct; nor is there *svarūpāsiddhi* because the probans exists in the subject. So, this kind of inference has to be exclusively assigned to the Stultified type of fallacy.

93. Only the prime atom is eternal; the dyad (*dvyaṇuka*) is a product.

94. i.e., the determinant of subjectness (*pakṣatāvacchedaka*) can be either *janyakṛtyajanyajanyatva* which is common to all the above-mentioned products, or *kṣititva, aṅkuratva, dvyaṇukatva,* etc., separately.

95. This is the *sādhyatāvacchedaka*. With regard to any product only the volition (*prayatna*) of the creator is the cause; his knowledge and desire are superfluous. Or, it might be said that his knowledge, desire and volition are separate and independent causes. See D on M, p. 41.

96. Every effect, i.e., a produced thing, is a countercorrelate of its prior nonexistence. This view is consistent with the Ārambha-vāda of the Naiyāyika-s, according to which an effect is different from its material cause. According to the Sāṃkhya-s who hold the Satkārya-vāda, this cannot be the definition of 'effect'.

97. i.e., *dhvaṃsābhāva*. It is also produced, but everlasting. It has no *existence* (*sattā*), which is inherent only in Substances, Qualities and Actions. Though *dhvaṃsa* is a countercorrelate of its prior nonexistence, it is not an effect (*kārya*).

98. *Īśvara's* knowledge, desire and volition are eternal.

99. i.e., those possessed of *existence* (*sattā*). This specification is to exclude prior nonexistence, which is not born but perishes when the thing in question comes into being.

100. Everything is an object of God's knowledge, desire and volition. If we assume that God has separate knowledge, desire and volition with regard to each thing, then the multiplicity of these makes the assumption cumbrous. Hence, it is assumed that God has a single knowledge which comprises everything; so do his desire and volition.

101. In the immediate vicinity of some gems, medicinal herbs, etc., it is said that fire does not burn.

102. Gems, etc., obstruct burning; so they are *pratibandhaka*. Their absence is *pratibandhakābhāva*, which according to the Naiyāyika-s is an auxiliary cause (*sahakārikāraṇa*) of every effect.

103. Nonexistence of the gem.

104. A separate category distinct from the seven categories accepted by the Naiyāyika-s.

105. It is cumbersome to assume *pratibandhakābhāva* as the cause of the power and again the power as the cause of burning. It is better to assume *pratibandhakābhāva*, which has to be accepted anyhow, as the cause

106. This is *uttejakamaṇi*, which causes burning inspite of the proximity of *pratibandhakamaṇi* which obstructs burning. This is a reply to the Prābhākara-s, who assume that there is a power in some gems to cause burning and in others to prevent burning.

107. Thus the fire caused by grass is different from that which is caused by wooden pieces and so on. The causality is: तृणजन्यत्वविशिष्टवह्निं प्रति तृणं कारणम्.

108. The Mīmāṃsaka-s say that by sprinkling water on the grain used in a sacrifice an unseen power is produced in

the grain; otherwise the Vedic injunction व्रीहीन् प्रोक्षति would become meaningless, as no perceptible purpose is served by the sprinkling. The Naiyāyika-s hold that the sprinkling produces a kind of merit (*dharma*) in the institutor of the sacrifice, because it is he who enjoys the result.

109. To suppose, for instance, that an unseen power is produced in each grain in a measure is to admit a very large number of powers.

110. The grain is dehusked after sprinkling water on it (व्रीहीनवहन्ति) and then cooked for sacrificial oblations.

111. The ordeal of balance (*tulādivya*). See YS, Vyavahārādhyāya, Divyaprakaraṇa, v. 95, etc.

112. It is said that trees grown from citron seeds moistened with lac-dye produce red flowers. The Mīmāṃsaka-s declare that association with lac-dye imparts to the citron the power to produce red flowers. The Naiyāyika-s, however, contend that the material parts which produce the flowers change their colour owing to the heat of the sun and that this makes the flowers red.

113. Gaṅgeśa says that there is a difference in the colour of the two species, the former being bluish and the latter reddish grey. TC, p. 2028.

114. The effect is occasional because it does not always appear, but only when there is some cause. The Mīmāṃsaka-s include *kāraṇatā* also in the category of power (*śakti*).

115. *Anyathāsiddha* is that which does not have to be necessarily held as the cause of a thing, though it may invariably precede the effect. For example, with regard to a pot, the potter who makes it is a cause; but not his father, who is *anyathāsiddha*.

116. That is to say, the cause, to be a cause, should exist in the substrate of the effect at the moment immediately preceding the moment when the effect takes place.

117. As the potter uses the donkey to carry the clay, the animal is present when the pot comes into existence. The donkey also possesses substanceness, which is not a delimitant of a nonexistence present there, because there is no absence of Substance. So the donkey, which is *anyathāsiddha*, could also be included in the causality.

118. So the definition would read: कार्याव्यवहितपूर्वक्षणावच्छेदेन कार्याधिकरणे विद्यमानस्य अभावस्य प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकः अन्यथासिद्धिनिरूपकधर्मभिन्नश्च यो धर्मः तद्वत्त्वम्.

119. According to the Vaiśeṣika-s and Naiyāyika-s, sorrow (*duḥkha*) is a Quality inherent in the self (*ātman*) where, consequently, the annihilation of sorrow also abides. After the annihilation of one sorrow if another sorrow springs up there cannot be final annihilation of sorrows, for then sorrow and annihilation would be simultaneous.

120. तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, VI. 15.

121. Almost all Indian philosophical systems agree that Right Knowledge is the key to liberation.

122. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, the author of the commentary *Dīdhiti* on TC.

123. Apperception is a kind of knowledge. Knowledge as well as sorrow is a special Quality (*viśeṣaguṇa*) of the *ātman.* योग्यविभुविशेषगुणानां स्वोत्तरवृत्तिविशेषगुणनाश्यत्वम्. So sorrow is destroyed by another *viśeṣaguṇa*, which in this case is apperception.

124. i.e., *anyathāsiddha.*

125. That is to say, liberation is the annihilation of the cause of the sorrow and not of the sorrow itself.

126. *Saṃcitapāpa* or accumulated demerit.

127. BG, IV. 37.

128. नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म कल्पकोटिशतैरपि. *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa*, 26. 70.

129. *Prārabdhāpūrva*.

130. i.e., in a person who has knowledge of reality.

131. The followers of Bhāskara, the proponent of the theory of difference-cum-identity (*bhedābheda*). The causal body or *kāraṇaśarīra* is the name for the five senses of knowledge, the five senses of action, the five vital airs, *manas* and *buddhi*.

Cf. पञ्चप्राणमनोबुद्धिदशेन्द्रियसमन्वितम् ।
अपञ्चीकृतभूतोत्थं सूक्ष्माङ्गं भोगसाधनम् ॥

132. The Mīmāṃsaka-s.

133. The view of the Advaita-vedāntin-s.

III. COMPARISON

1. i.e., experience proves the existence of a knowledge obtained through an instrument other than perception, inference or verbal testimony.

2. Only perceptional knowledge can be an instrument (*karaṇa*) of assimilative knowledge, because comparison (*upamāna*) is dependent upon perception (*pratyakṣopajīvaka*).

3. Perception serves as a reminder (*udbodhaka*) of the knowledge of the meaning of the assimilative proposition.

4. Earlier Naiyāyika-s were of the view that the verbal comprehension of the assimilative proposition, is the efficient instrument (*karaṇa*) and the remembrance of the same, the operation (*vyāpāra*). The perception of the analogous thing was held to be an aid (*sahakārin*). But the modern Naiyāyika-s maintain that this perception itself is the *karaṇa*.

5. 'This' means the *gavaya* possessing *gavayatva*. Or else, the assimilative knowledge would have the individual *gavaya* alone for its object, which would not be correct. Cf. M: गवयो गवयपदवाच्य इति ज्ञानं यज्जायते तदुपमितिः; न त्वयं गवयपदवाच्य इत्युपमितिः; गवयान्तरे शक्तिग्रहाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।

6. *Nañ* is the name for the particle *na* which indicates negation.

IV. VERBAL TESTIMONY

1. The Buddhists.

2. *Sambhāvanā* or productive imagination. The Buddhists, being idealists, do not think that cognition has any external object corresponding to it. See BL, pp. 472-5.

3. This general rule has to be accepted in accordance with the *anyathā-khyāti* theory of illusion held by the realists.

4. When volition is found to result from words, it has necessarily to be maintained that the words give rise to some definite knowledge which in turn causes the doubt-free volition.

5. i.e., every verbal comprehension is the result of an inference.

6. Because nobody experiences the knowledge of pervasion, etc., which is essential for an inference, while comprehending verbal knowledge.

7. According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, valid knowledge must have an object which has been neither previously apprehended, nor subsequently sublated. अनधिगताबाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानं प्रमा ।

8. For, there is no reason why Vedic passages and passages in human compositions should be treated on different lines, as far as verbal comprehension is concerned.

9. According to this definition competency itself, and not the knowledge of it, is the cause of verbal comprehension.

10. According to this definition, there cannot be any definite knowledge of competency before the sentence-meaning is understood, because the sentence-meaning is other than the individual meanings of the words. But there can be a doubt as to the competency and that suffices to produce verbal comprehension.

11. The Naiyāyika-s do not follow the Grammarians, definition of *pada* which is 'सुप्तिङन्तं पदम्'. (Pā. I. 4. 14). They define *pada* as that from which meaning is understood. शक्तं पदम्. Thus the stem and the suffix are also considered to be separate *pada-s*, whereas, according to the Grammarians, the stem and the suffix together make a *pada*.

12. The defect of the former definition is that even when the stem and the suffix are pronounced in reversed order (such as *aṃ ghaṭa*), there would be expectancy. In the view of the modern Naiyāyika-s there is no room for such an absurdity. In the language of the Naiyāyika-s, the expectancy in the expression *ghaṭam* is *ghaṭapadāvyavahitottarāmpadatva*.

13. The theory of the Prābhākara-s is known as *arthādhyāhāra*, while the other theory is *śabdādhyāhāra*.

14. In the instance *ghaṭam ānaya* (Bring the pot), the 'intention' is the desire of the speaker that the expression *ghaṭam* (i.e., the stem *ghaṭa* + the accusative case-ending *am*) should give rise to a knowledge in which 'the state of being the object' (*karmatva*) is the substantive, the pot is the adjunct, and *ādheyatā* is the relation. The knowledge of the hearer that the word is uttered by the speaker with such a desire is *tātparya-jñāna*, which causes verbal comprehension.

15. With regard to any effect the absence of impediment (*pratibandhakābhāva*) is the general cause. But in this instance, with regard to verbal comprehension, the absence of the definite knowledge of the absence of intention will have to be assumed as the cause, which is cumbrous. Some modern logicians do not accept *tātparya-jñāna* as a cause of verbal comprehension.

16. i.e., Śiva, meaning only God. The author, being a Śaiva, refers to God by the name 'Bhava'.

17. Human intellect is created intellect. So, 'not originated by a created intellect' means not having human origin. That is to say, the words and sentences in the Veda-s are not arranged by a human being. Human beings utter them in the same order in which they were first pronounced by God.

18. The questioner is the Mīmāṃsaka who holds that the Veda is beginningless and eternal. He does not admit of Īśvara. The Naiyāyika-s, on the other hand, argue that the Veda is pronounced by Īśvara, which fact constitutes its validity.

19. For the Mīmāṃsaka, phonemes, which constitute words and sentences, are eternal. The primary sounds (*dhvani*) produced by the vocal organs manifest the eternal phonemes. The Naiyāyika-s do not accept this theory. To them any sound is a property of *ākāśa* and ephemeral.

20. The Mīmāṃsaka-s, who hold phonemes to be eternal, would contend that the notion that a particular phoneme is produced or destroyed is an illusion.

21. Another contention of the Mīmāṃsaka.

22. In the Veda, as we have it now, there are no direct references to certain rules laid down by the Smṛti-s. As the Smṛti-s ought to conform to the Veda, it is inferred that the passages in question were originally in the Veda, but were lost by the passage of time.

23. i.e., the Veda is in the form of sounds and sounds are ephemeral.

24. The Mīmāṃsaka-s do not admit of dissolution and creation. They say: न कदाचिदनीदृशं जगत्. (The universe never was and never will be different from what it is now).

25. This means there is a time when there is no dyad. According to the Naiyāyika-s, even during dissolution, eternal entities such as atoms, the Ether, etc., do not perish. They also admit of two *pralaya-s*: *khaṇḍa-pralaya* and *mahāpralaya*. They are defined as *sarvakāryadravya-dhvaṃsa* and *sarva-bhāvakārya-dhvaṃsa* respectively.

26. One of the ten suffixes (*lakāra-s*) added to roots to convey a particular meaning. *Liṅ* is the potential mood and indicates an injunction, e.g., *yajeta*, *juhuyāt*, *bhakṣayet*, etc.

27. For example, the Śyena sacrifice. It produces desired things such as the annihilation of foes, but also brings about great harm to the performer in the form of hell.

28. With regard to the desire 'Let this thing be achieved by my volition', the knowledge 'This thing is to be achieved by my volition' is the cause. Here the substantive of the desire as well as of the knowledge is 'the thing', the adjunct is 'the state of being achieved by volition' (*kṛtisādhyatva*).

Thus the desire as well as the knowledge has the same adjunct for its object.

29. i.e., materials that constitute the desired thing.

30. Prabhākara.

31. This is the answer to the objection implied here that the desire for the pleasure derived from rain is not a desire to do, as rain cannot be produced by the person who desires the pleasure. Prabhākara says that here the object of desire is not only pleasure but the rain also.

32. There are two kinds of rites: obligatory and optional. The former includes *sandhyāvandana*, etc., and the latter, the rites performed with a desire to obtain a particular result. Obligatory rites do not yield either good or bad results, but when not performed a sort of demerit is said to ensue. Here only *kāryatājñāna* can be productive of activity.

33. i.e., not because it is a means to a desired end.

34. For example, in the injunction स्वर्गकामो यजेत, the *liṅ* suffix *ta* denotes something to be effected. This something cannot be the sacrificial act, as it is momentary and does not subsist until the result, which is heaven, is attained. In this case, the one who desires heaven is the person enjoined to perform the sacrifice. If he knew that his action, which is transitory, could not lead him to the result, he would not understand from the injunction *yajeta* that he should perform the sacrifice. So it is to be concluded that he understands from the injunction that something has to be effected which will subsist until the result is achieved. This something must be different from the action, which is cognized by other means of knowledge, and must also be permanent compared with the action. As it is not cognized by any other means, it is called *apūrva* and *apūrva* is the import of sentences in the Veda.

35. The Bhāṭṭa-s, who say that *apūrva* is presumed, as otherwise the momentary sacrifice cannot lead to its result.

36. When the sacrifice is performed the deities to whom it is offered become pleased with the performer and bestow upon him the desired results.

37. As *yāgadhvaṃsa* subsists until the result is achieved, it can act as an intermediary between the sacrifice and its result.

38. The Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s.

39. This is the means of Presumption (*arthāpatti*).

40. The first and second views are those of the Bhāṭṭa-s, and the third, that of the Prābhākara-s.

41. This is the view of the Prābhākara-s who contend that each word conveys its meaning as connected with the meanings of other words.

42. This is the view of the modern Naiyāyika-s. Gautama and Vātsyāyana were of the opinion that *jāti*, *ākṛti*, and *vyakti* are the denotation of words. जात्याकृतिव्यक्तय: पदार्थ: ।

43. Some maintain that words possess *tātparyaśakti* through which they convey the sentence-meaning. This is refuted here.

44. The Mīmāṃsaka-s maintain *Śakti* as a separate category.

45. If the derivative meaning alone were depended upon, the word might refer to anything that grows in mud. Hence the application of conventional meaning.

46. Here the objection may be raised that since the word *dhenu* is derived from the root *dheṭ*, according to the *Uṇādi-sūtra* धेट इच्च (III 34), it cannot be said to be conventional. The

reply is: Here the denotative power is with regard to the thing having cowness. The derivative meaning, 'object of sucking' (*dhīyate iti dhenuḥ*), is not separately denoted; for, it is maintained that *uṇādi* suffixes do not have denotative power, since the *Uṇādi-sūtra-s* do not always give the meaning of the suffixes laid down by them.

47. Suffixes added to verbal roots to form nouns (Pā. III. 1. 93 to III. 4. 76).

48. Suffixes added to nouns to form derivative nouns (Pā. IV. 1. 77 to the end of the fifth Adhyāya).

49. See Pā. II. 1. 4 to the end of the second quarter of the second Adhyāya.

50. The two words are derived from the roots *pūṅ* and *pac* respectively, adding the *kṛt* suffix *ṇvul* (Pā. III. 1. 133).

51. Derived from the word *upagu*, adding the *taddhita* suffix *aṇ* (Pā. IV. 1. 92).

52. Some Naiyāyika-s do not count *Upapada* as a separate compound. According to them there are only six types of compounds.

53. There is also another view that *upa* means *samīpa* and not *sāmīpya*. The word *kumbha* implies *kumbhasambandhin* (that which is related to a pot) through *lakṣaṇā*. Hence the verbal comprehension is *kumbhasambandhyabhinna-samīpa*.

54. Because the words are *rājan* with its genitive case-ending and *puruṣa* with its nominative case-ending. The case-endings are dropped in a compound, according to Pāṇini. Some say that when the compound word *rājapuruṣa* is heard, there is a recollection of the genitive case-ending attached to *rājan* and of the fact that the declensional suffix means

sambandha (relation) between the two (*rājan* and *puruṣa*). Pā. II. 3. 50: शेषे षष्ठी. The defect in this view is that even when the case-ending is not remembered, verbal comprehension occurs. Hence the following view.

55. This is the view of the followers of Pakṣadhara Miśra. Verbal comprehension (*śābdabodha*) is said to occur as follows: The word *rājan* implies the relationship with the king and the relationship connects itself with *puruṣa* leading to verbal comprehension to the effect: *puruṣaniṣṭho rājasambandhaḥ*. This explanation contradicts the rule that the relationship between the meanings of two nouns is always identity (*abheda*). In this instance, there is lack of identity between *rājasambandha* and *puruṣa*. Hence the following alternative.

56. This view does not violate the above-mentioned rule as there is identity between the one who is related to the king and the man. Verbal comprehension takes the form: *rājasambandhyabhinnaḥ puruṣaḥ*. Those who hold the former view would say that the general rule cited above does not apply to compounds.

57. Because both words have mutual connection without breaking the general rule mentioned above, the verbal comprehension being, *nīlābhinnam utpalaṁ*.

58. *Dvigu* is also included in *Karmadhāraya*. When the first word of a *Karmadhāraya* is a numeral, it is called *Dvigu*. संख्यापूर्वो द्विगुः, Pā. II. 1. 52.

59. Because *pūla* does not have power to denote collection.

60. The verbal comprehension is *citrābhinnagosvāmin*.

61. Names of two trees.

62. The Mīmāṃsaka-s.

63. The contention of the Mīmāṃsaka-s is that the declensional suffixes denote only those numbers which are pervaded by the number of that which determines the thing spoken of. सुपामुद्देश्यतावच्छेदकव्याप्यसंख्याबोधकत्वम्. See D on M, p. 606. For example, the word *ākāśau* does not convey any meaning, because that which determines *ākāśa* is *ākāśatva*, which is single, while the case-ending *au* denotes duality; therefore the number conveyed by the suffix is not pervaded by the number of *ākāśatva*. Similarly, if *dhavatva* and *khadiratva* were *uddeśyatāvacchedaka*, the word *dhavakhadirau* would convey the meaning 'two *khadira-s* and two *dhava-s*', which is not correct. So they say that the association (*sāhitya*) is, in this case, *uddeśyatāvacchedaka* and only the duality of *dhava* and *khadira* is pervaded by the association and not the duality of *dhava* or *khadira* separately.

64. The Naiyāyika-s, who do not accept the above-mentioned rule of the Mīmāṃsaka-s, say that in the verbal comprehension *dhava* and *khadira* appear as adjuncts to the dual number of the substantive.

65. The treatment of *Upapadasamāsa* is omitted in the text though it finds a place in the enumeration. *Kumbhakāra*, etc., are examples of *Upapadasamāsa*.

66. The famous Mīmāṃsaka-vedāntin of the eighth century.

67. According to the Grammarians, in the expression चैत्रः पचति the suffix *ti* denotes the agent. The root *pac* has denotative power with regard to the result (*phala*) and action (*vyāpāra*). The agent qualifies the root meaning. Thus the verbal comprehension is: चैत्रकर्तृकविक्लित्त्यनुकूलव्यापारः. The Naiyāyika-s do not accept this. They say it is simpler to accept the view that verbal suffixes denote the volition. Thus according to them the verbal comprehension is: विक्लित्त्यनुकूलकृतिमान् चैत्रः.

68. This is *ārthī bhāvanā*, which is either the volition on the part of the agent (*kartṛ*) or a particular kind of operation (*vyāpāraviśeṣa*). The latter view, advocated by Pārthasārathi Miśra, is referred to here.

69. Because all words in a sentence relate themselves to *bhāvanā* as objects, agents or instruments, in order to satisfy the expectancy.

70. A chariot, being inert, cannot have volition (*kṛti*) which is inherent in the self.

71. The Paurāṇika-s say that Tradition is an independent means of valid knowledge. The Naiyāyika-s include it in *śabda*, which, if authoritative, is valid, and otherwise invalid.

72. Such as, fifty being included in hundred. This is comprised in Inference.

73. Included in Perception.

74. Included in the *kevalavyatirekī* type of inference.

GLOSSARY

aṅkura	sprout
ativyāpti	overapplicability
atīndriyatva	transcendency
atyantābhāva	absolute nonexistence
adṛṣṭa	unseen
adhikaraṇa	substrate
anudbhūtatva	nonmanifestedness
anupasaṃhārin	the Inconclusive
anumāna	inference
anumiti	inferential knowledge
anuvādaka	corroborative
anuvyavasāya	apperception
anyathāsiddha	superfluity
anyathāsiddhi-śūnya	not being established as other than indispensable
anvaya	copresence; syntax
anvaya-vyatirekin	affirmative-negative
anyonyābhāva	mutual nonexistence
apūrva	unprecedented
aprāmāṇya	non-validity
abhāva	nonexistence, absence
araṇi	wooden piece
arthādhyāhāra-vāda	theory of supplying meaning
arthāpatti	Presumption
alaukika-mukhyaviśeṣyatā	supernormal principal substantiveness
alaukika-viṣayatā	supernormal objectness
alaukika-sākṣātkāra	supernormal immediate apprehension
avaghāta	dehusking
avayava	component
avidyā	nescience
avyāpyavṛttitva	partial extensity

asādhāraṇa	the Uncommon
asiddha	the Unfounded
ākṣepa	implication
ākhyāta	verbal suffix
ācāra	conduct
ācāramūla	source of [religious] conduct
ātyantika-duḥkha-dhvaṃsa	final annihilation of sorrows
ānupalabdha-jñāna	nonapprehending cognition
āhārya	adventitious
āhārya-śaṅkā	adventitious doubt
āhāryāropa	adventitious assumption
ālocana	indeterminate perception
āśrayāsiddha	the Unfounded in respect of the locus
udāharaṇa	example
udbhūtatva	manifestedness
udbhūta-rūpa	manifested colour
udbhūta-sparśa	manifested touch
upanaya	application
upanīta	that which is brought [to the cognition through supernormal relation]
upamāna	comparison
upamiti	assimilative knowledge
upalakṣaṇa	indicative
upādāna	material cause
upādhi	condition
oṣadhi	medicinal plant
karaṇa	efficient instrument
kartṛ-lakāra	verbal suffix of agency
karma-lakāra	verbal suffix of the object
kāryatāvacchedaka	determinant of effectness
kāryatāvacchedaka-saṃsarga	relation determining the effectness
kevala-vyatirekin	exclusively negative

kevalānvayin	exclusively affirmative
*kvathana**	baking
guṇa	Quality; merit
*guru**	complex
gurutva	weight
gaurava	cumbrousness
ghrāṇa	sense of smell
ghrāṇaja	olfactory perception
cakṣus	sense of sight
cākṣuṣa	ocular perception
janyakṛti	originated volition
janyabuddhi	created intellect
jāti	universal
jñātatā	cognizedness
jñānalakṣaṇā	[contact] in the form of cognition
taṇḍulīyaka	*Embelia Ribes*
tattvajñāna	knowledge of reality
taptāyaḥpiṇḍa	red-hot iron ball
tarka	reasoning
tarkaṇa	argumentation
tātparya	intention
tādātmya	[relation of] selfsameness
tejas	fire
trasareṇu	triad
tvak	sense of touch
tvāca-pratyakṣa	tactual perception
divya	ordeal
duḥkhānuvyavasāya	apperception of sorrow
dravya	Substance
dvyaṇuka	dyad
dhvaṃsa	destruction; annihilative nonexistence

nigamana	conclusion
nitya	obligatory [rite]
nitya-sukha	eternal bliss
nirūpaka	correlator
nirūpya	correlated
nirvikalpaka	indeterminate [perception]
nyāya	syllogism
nyāyāvayava	component of a syllogism
pakṣatā	subjectness
padārtha	category
parataḥ	extrinsically
paramāṇu	prime atom
parārthānumiti	inferential knowledge which is for others
pāpa	demerit
piśāca	spirit
pṛthivī	Earth
prakāra	adjunct
prakāratā	adjunctness
prakṛṣṭa-mahattva	higher magnitude
praṇidhāna	contemplation
pratijñā	proposition
pratibandhaka	obstructing element; impediment
pratiyogin	countercorrelate
pratiyogitāvacchedaka	determinant of countercorrelateness
pratyakṣa	perception
pratyakṣatva	perceptionhood
pratyabhijñā	recognition
pratyavāya	[particular kind of] demerit
prathama-vyavasāya	primary cognition
pradhvaṃsābhāva	annihilative nonexistence
prabhā	radiance
pramatta-nāstika	erring heretic
pralaya	dissolution
pravartanā	imposition
pravāhāviccheda	uninterrupted tradition

prāgabhāva	prior nonexistence
prāmāṇya	validity
prairaṇikī pravṛtti	imposed volition
balavadaniṣṭānanubandhin	that which does not entail great harm
bahirdravyatva	external substanceness
bādhita	the Stultified
bījapūra-taru	citron tree
bheda	difference; nonidentity
manas	mind
mahattva	medium dimension
mahākālika-viśeṣaṇatā	[relation of] temporal attributiveness
mahā-bāhyākāśa	unlimited external Ether
mānasa	mental [perception]
mithyājñāna-vāsanā	impression of false knowledge
mokṣa	liberation
yogaja-lakṣaṇā	[contact] originated from yogic power
yoga-rūḍha	derivative-conventional
yogyatā	congruity
yaugika	derivative
rajatatva-prakāraka-jñāna	silverness-adjunct-cognition
rajatatva-prakāraka-vyavahāra	silverness-adjunct-volition
rasana	sense of taste
rāsana	gustatory perception
rūḍha	conventional
lakṣaṇā	secondary significatory power
laghu	simple
lākṣā-rasa	lac-dye
lāghava	principle of logical economy
liṅga	sign; probans
liṅga-śarīra	causal body
laukika-viṣayatā	normal objectness
laukika-sākṣātkāra	normal immediate apprehension

vācyatva	nameability
vighnatva	obstacleness
vighna-dhvaṃsa	destruction of obstacles
vidhi	injunction
viparyaya	misapprehension
viruddha	the Contradictory
viśiṣṭa-jñāna	qualified cognition
viśiṣṭa-buddhi	qualified cognition
viśeṣaṇa	attributive
viśeṣaṇatā	attributiveness
viśeṣya	substantive
viśeṣyatā	substantiveness
viśeṣyatāvacchedaka	determinant of substantiveness
viṣayatā	objectness
visaṃvādi-vyavahāra	unsuccessful volition
vṛtti	occupancy
vyatireka	coabsence
vyatireka-vyāpti	negative pervasion
vyabhicāra	deviation
vyavahāra	volition
vyāpaka	pervader
vyāpakatā	pervasiveness
vyāpāra	[intermediary] function
vyāpti	pervasion
vyāpya	pervaded
vyāpyatvāsiddha	the Unfounded in respect of being pervaded
śakti	[primary] denotative power
śabda	verbal testimony
śabdatva	soundness
śabdādhyāhāra-vāda	theory of supplying the [elliptical] word
śarīra-vyāpāra	physical effort
śāka	spinach
śābda-bodha	verbal comprehension
śābda-miti	verbal knowledge
śiṣṭa	disciplined one

śrāvaṇa — auditory perception
śruti — revealed text
śrotra — sense of hearing

saṃketa — convention
saṃpradāya — tradition; traditional view
saṃbhāvanā — mental image
saṃyukta-samavāya — inherence in the conjoined
saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya — inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined
saṃyoga — conjunction
saṃvādi-vyavahāra — successful volition
saṃśaya — doubt
sat — existent
sattā — *existence*
satpratipakṣa — the Counterbalanced
samavāya — inherence
samaveta-samavāya — inherence in the inherent
samāpti — completion
samāsa — compound
savikalpaka — determinate [perception]
savyabhicāra — the Inconsistent
sākṣātkāra — immediate apprehension
sādhāraṇa — the Common
sāmānyalakṣaṇā — [contact] in the form of generality
sthiti-sthāpaka — elasticity
smṛti — moral code
svatogrāhyatva — intrinsic apprehension
svarūpāsiddha — the Unfounded in respect of its own existence
svārasika — self-evident
svārasikī pravṛtti — spontaneous volition
svārthānumiti — inferential knowledge for one's own sake

hetu — reason
hetvābhāsa — defective probans